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ennobled manner using
legal forms that go back to ancient Germanic times” (Uhde 1936, 47)—
should not be dismissed as pure propaganda, however. For, regardless of
the truth of this statement, there were conservative elites who were con-
42
M A R K U S U R B A N
vinced that the only solution to the failure of the Weimar System was a return to pre-modern forms of “democracy”.1
The fact that the referendum was used twice within the space of a year
is not surprising, for Hitler had been looking for a suitable way to demon-
strate the German people’s support for the government since the summer
of 1933. Finally, on November 12, 1933, a Reichstag election, together with a plebiscite on Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, were
held; and, on August 19, 1934, voters were called upon again to confirm in
a plebiscite the transference of presidential power from Hindenburg, who
had recently died, to Hitler. As Jung points out in his detailed analysis, the
election results announced reveal the relative success of the regime, even
though the numbers can have little validity given the prevailing conditions
in the totalitarian state. A closer look at the results of November 1933
shows that the plebiscite with 95.1 per cent of the valid votes received
nearly one million more “yes” votes than the list of the NSDAP in the
Reichstag election held separately on the same day. Researchers consider this a great victory for the Nazi regime and an indicator of public support,
despite the numerous infringements of voter independence, which made
the free, equal and secret casting of votes in many cases impossible.
For example, the “right to vote” was declared a “duty to vote”, which is
the reason why potential non-voters were visited at home by a Schleppdienst
and taken to the polling station. And, as at National Socialist fundraising
campaigns, small badges were given to those who had already voted, which
made identifying those who had not yet done so easier. Furthermore, op-
ponents of the regime could never be sure that the confidentiality of the
ballot would be observed, since in some areas ballot papers were marked
so that voters could be identified later.2 Also, in many places, an attempt
was made to normalize the practice of not using the polling booth to vote
in, the consequence of which was that anyone who insisted on using the
polling booth to preserve their anonymity attracted suspicion. For this
reason, Victor Klemperer is right to view his “no” vote and his wife’s ab-
——————
1 The former Chancellor Franz von Papen had declared months earlier that “We have learned from the Middle Ages, from institutions that have been preserved to the present day, that there are natural and real forms of democracy that have nothing to do with mass opinion, mass scourging and mass abuse”. Speech of February 24, 1933, quoted from Hubert (1992, 44).
2 Cf. also the essay by Frank Omland in this volume. Uhde’s claim that the “basic election principles (general, equal, direct, secret) had not been touched up to that point” was pure fiction in 1935 (Uhde 1936, 23).
T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P
43
stention as “nearly a brave deed since everybody anticipated that the confi-
dentiality of the ballot would not be observed”.3
Nonetheless, large-scale electoral fraud does not seem to have occurred
in the Third Reich, which makes it possible to compare individual election
results. Thus, between the election of November 1933 and the plebiscite
held nine months later, the regime’s popularity fell. In the summer of 1934,
the first signs of wear and tear after the initial seizure of power began to
show, and the state-sanctioned murders committed during the so-called
“ Röhm-Putsch” had created feelings of unease. In addition, the ballot following Hindenburg’s death appeared more a matter of domestic
legal forms that go back to ancient Germanic times” (Uhde 1936, 47)—
should not be dismissed as pure propaganda, however. For, regardless of
the truth of this statement, there were conservative elites who were con-
42
M A R K U S U R B A N
vinced that the only solution to the failure of the Weimar System was a return to pre-modern forms of “democracy”.1
The fact that the referendum was used twice within the space of a year
is not surprising, for Hitler had been looking for a suitable way to demon-
strate the German people’s support for the government since the summer
of 1933. Finally, on November 12, 1933, a Reichstag election, together with a plebiscite on Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations, were
held; and, on August 19, 1934, voters were called upon again to confirm in
a plebiscite the transference of presidential power from Hindenburg, who
had recently died, to Hitler. As Jung points out in his detailed analysis, the
election results announced reveal the relative success of the regime, even
though the numbers can have little validity given the prevailing conditions
in the totalitarian state. A closer look at the results of November 1933
shows that the plebiscite with 95.1 per cent of the valid votes received
nearly one million more “yes” votes than the list of the NSDAP in the
Reichstag election held separately on the same day. Researchers consider this a great victory for the Nazi regime and an indicator of public support,
despite the numerous infringements of voter independence, which made
the free, equal and secret casting of votes in many cases impossible.
For example, the “right to vote” was declared a “duty to vote”, which is
the reason why potential non-voters were visited at home by a Schleppdienst
and taken to the polling station. And, as at National Socialist fundraising
campaigns, small badges were given to those who had already voted, which
made identifying those who had not yet done so easier. Furthermore, op-
ponents of the regime could never be sure that the confidentiality of the
ballot would be observed, since in some areas ballot papers were marked
so that voters could be identified later.2 Also, in many places, an attempt
was made to normalize the practice of not using the polling booth to vote
in, the consequence of which was that anyone who insisted on using the
polling booth to preserve their anonymity attracted suspicion. For this
reason, Victor Klemperer is right to view his “no” vote and his wife’s ab-
——————
1 The former Chancellor Franz von Papen had declared months earlier that “We have learned from the Middle Ages, from institutions that have been preserved to the present day, that there are natural and real forms of democracy that have nothing to do with mass opinion, mass scourging and mass abuse”. Speech of February 24, 1933, quoted from Hubert (1992, 44).
2 Cf. also the essay by Frank Omland in this volume. Uhde’s claim that the “basic election principles (general, equal, direct, secret) had not been touched up to that point” was pure fiction in 1935 (Uhde 1936, 23).
T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P
43
stention as “nearly a brave deed since everybody anticipated that the confi-
dentiality of the ballot would not be observed”.3
Nonetheless, large-scale electoral fraud does not seem to have occurred
in the Third Reich, which makes it possible to compare individual election
results. Thus, between the election of November 1933 and the plebiscite
held nine months later, the regime’s popularity fell. In the summer of 1934,
the first signs of wear and tear after the initial seizure of power began to
show, and the state-sanctioned murders committed during the so-called
“ Röhm-Putsch” had created feelings of unease. In addition, the ballot following Hindenburg’s death appeared more a matter of domestic
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