Read Online Jessen & Richter (Eds.) by Voting for Hitler, Stalin; Elections Under 20th Century Dictatorships (2011) - Free Book Online Page B
Ads: Link
evening Danzig results: only 60 per cent […] Jubilation from abroad. A heavy defeat”. (Fröhlich 1998-2006). Originally the National Socialists had anticipated a two-thirds majority, which would have enabled them to make a constitutional amendment. Minister of Propaganda Goebbels even had to persuade Gauleiter Alfred Forster not to announce a false result of 67 per cent, which would probably have led to an escalation of the situation at this time.
7 At the outset of the speech, he referred to the fact that “with 38 million votes the German people had elected only one member of parliament, him, to be its representative”.
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt2_w9_bsb00000142_00044.html.
8 Cf. Uhde (1936, 25): “German radio broadcast this Reichstag session, the content of which was primarily directed at a foreign audience, at other European and non-European countries”.
9
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt2_w9_bsb00000142_00060.html.
T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P
45
sembly of March 7 in which he announced the invasion, Hitler declared the
Reichstag dissolved and proclaimed that a ballot would take place on March 29. The tactical nature of this decision is shown by the fact that the Reichstag was not dissolved immediately, as would have been the case in the
Weimar Republic . Rather, Hitler scheduled the dissolution of the Reichstag officially for election day. Thus, any semblance of an intermediary phase
was avoided, and it would have been possible—should the need have
arisen—for Hitler to have convened the Reichstag to make a formal decla-
ration on foreign affairs (Hubert 1992, 129). The election result was once
again a great success for the NS regime, which won 98.7 per cent ap-
proval.10 A closer scrutiny reveals two radical features to this vote, how-
ever. First, the mechanism to exclude so-called Gemeinschaftsfremde (aliens to the community) from the group of eligible voters was already in operation,
since the German Jews were no longer allowed to take part in the elec-
tion.11 Second, those arguing for a legalistic course within the regime found
themselves increasingly on the defensive as it became known that Minister
of the Interior Frick, under the directive of the Ministry of Propaganda,
was no longer allowed to make a separate record of spoilt ballot papers.12
Furthermore, the Reichstag , in the absence of occasions suitable for propaganda, did not convene once for a constitutive meeting during the first
nine months following the election, which clearly violated the procedure
stipulated in the Reich’s constitution.
The reason why Hitler decided in March 1936 to hold a Reichstag elec-
tion rather than a referendum can no longer be determined with certainty.
More important, though, is the fact that the National Socialists themselves
barely distinguished between these two modes of balloting at the time.
This is evident not only from the numerous intentional and unintentional
terminological muddles, which can be attributed in part to a certain secre-
tiveness, but also from the fact that Hitler liked to take decisions at short
notice.13 At this time also, the majority of experts in National Socialist
——————
10 Cf. Goebbels’ diary entry of March 31, 1936: “Triumph upon triumph. […] We hadn’t imagined it like this in our wildest dreams”. (Fröhlich 1998-2006).
11 Through Heinrich Himmler’s intervention, the inmates of concentration camps were no longer allowed to vote after 1938.
12 Goebbels’ diary entry of March 31, 1936: “I am correcting a stupid legal nonsense by Frick: ‘valid and invalid votes!’ what a load of nonsense”. (Fröhlich 1998-2006).
13 In this way Frick announced a referendum in the Frankfurter Zeitung on March 9, 1936.
Conversely, Goebbels spoke, at least internally, in August 1934 about the impending
“election”, as in all of his diary entries stemming from this time.
7 At the outset of the speech, he referred to the fact that “with 38 million votes the German people had elected only one member of parliament, him, to be its representative”.
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt2_w9_bsb00000142_00044.html.
8 Cf. Uhde (1936, 25): “German radio broadcast this Reichstag session, the content of which was primarily directed at a foreign audience, at other European and non-European countries”.
9
www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/Blatt2_w9_bsb00000142_00060.html.
T H E S E L F - S T A G I N G O F A P L E B I S C I T A R Y D I C T A T O R S H I P
45
sembly of March 7 in which he announced the invasion, Hitler declared the
Reichstag dissolved and proclaimed that a ballot would take place on March 29. The tactical nature of this decision is shown by the fact that the Reichstag was not dissolved immediately, as would have been the case in the
Weimar Republic . Rather, Hitler scheduled the dissolution of the Reichstag officially for election day. Thus, any semblance of an intermediary phase
was avoided, and it would have been possible—should the need have
arisen—for Hitler to have convened the Reichstag to make a formal decla-
ration on foreign affairs (Hubert 1992, 129). The election result was once
again a great success for the NS regime, which won 98.7 per cent ap-
proval.10 A closer scrutiny reveals two radical features to this vote, how-
ever. First, the mechanism to exclude so-called Gemeinschaftsfremde (aliens to the community) from the group of eligible voters was already in operation,
since the German Jews were no longer allowed to take part in the elec-
tion.11 Second, those arguing for a legalistic course within the regime found
themselves increasingly on the defensive as it became known that Minister
of the Interior Frick, under the directive of the Ministry of Propaganda,
was no longer allowed to make a separate record of spoilt ballot papers.12
Furthermore, the Reichstag , in the absence of occasions suitable for propaganda, did not convene once for a constitutive meeting during the first
nine months following the election, which clearly violated the procedure
stipulated in the Reich’s constitution.
The reason why Hitler decided in March 1936 to hold a Reichstag elec-
tion rather than a referendum can no longer be determined with certainty.
More important, though, is the fact that the National Socialists themselves
barely distinguished between these two modes of balloting at the time.
This is evident not only from the numerous intentional and unintentional
terminological muddles, which can be attributed in part to a certain secre-
tiveness, but also from the fact that Hitler liked to take decisions at short
notice.13 At this time also, the majority of experts in National Socialist
——————
10 Cf. Goebbels’ diary entry of March 31, 1936: “Triumph upon triumph. […] We hadn’t imagined it like this in our wildest dreams”. (Fröhlich 1998-2006).
11 Through Heinrich Himmler’s intervention, the inmates of concentration camps were no longer allowed to vote after 1938.
12 Goebbels’ diary entry of March 31, 1936: “I am correcting a stupid legal nonsense by Frick: ‘valid and invalid votes!’ what a load of nonsense”. (Fröhlich 1998-2006).
13 In this way Frick announced a referendum in the Frankfurter Zeitung on March 9, 1936.
Conversely, Goebbels spoke, at least internally, in August 1934 about the impending
“election”, as in all of his diary entries stemming from this time.
Similar Books
