Read Online Giap: The General Who Defeated America in Vietnam by James A. Warren - Free Book Online
Authors: James A. Warren
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Meanwhile, Giap stepped up the indoctrination and proselytizing program in the villages with a view to consolidating the Communist hold over the population. His success in the elimination campaign planted the seeds of his reputation in the many years of war to come. “Even his enemies, men who were notoriously anticommunist,” observes historian Stein Tonnesson, “showed respect for him. They seemed to lose some of their aggressiveness when they were in his presence.” 5
Meanwhile, after six months of intransigence, on March 6, 1946, Ho and the French emissary, Jean Sainteny, signed a letter of understanding, hoping to avert war. Under the terms of the agreement, France would be permitted to deploy 15,000 troops in Vietnam for five years; to enjoy favored economic status in trade relations; and to maintain a permanent cultural presence throughout Indochina. For its part, France recognized the legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the DRV, the formal name adapted by Ho’s government) “as a free state having its own government, parliament, army and treasury, and belonging to the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.” 6 Crucially, the French retained overarching political control of the Union—an organization akin to the commonwealth of Great Britain—and total control over Vietnam’s foreign relations and armed forces.
More troubling for the new government was the failure of the letter of understanding to include Cochinchina as a part of the DRV. The French sought to maintain complete control there, offering to grant but a few cosmetic concessions for Vietnamese participation in its governance. Cochinchina was an integral part of Vietnam and had been so since time immemorial. A Vietnamese state without Cochinchina was completely unacceptable to either Ho’s government or the Vietnamese people. In the end, the parties agreed to leave the status of Vietnam’s most economically developed region temporarily unresolved. A plebiscite at a later date would decide whether it would join the DRV or enter into a separate agreement with France. In the eyes of the hardliners in the Communist Party the agreement was a nonstarter for obvious reasons. Soon thereafter, the governor of Indochina, a hardline reactionary named Admiral Thierry D’Argenlieu,enraged the Vietminh by unilaterally declaring Cochinchina an independent republic allied with France.
The fledgling government of the DRV was now between the proverbial rock and hard place. Ho’s government desperately sought the help of allies on the international front and pressed forward with little hope of gaining critical concessions at conferences at Fontainebleau and Dalat with the French in summer and fall 1946. That fall, a frustrated and defiant Ho had an oft-quoted exchange with American correspondent David Schoenbrun. “How can you hope to wage war against the French? You have no army, you have no modern weapons. Why, such a war would seem hopeless to you,” said the journalist. Ho’s reply would be echoed time and time again by his commander in chief once the battle had been joined:
No, it would not be hopeless. It would be hard, desperate, but we could win. . . . The spirit of man is more powerful than his own machines. It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands still the elephant will crush him with its mighty tusks. But the tiger does not stand still. He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges only at night. He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the jungle. And slowly the elephant will bleed to death. That will be the war in Indochina. 7
Giap’s hopes of gaining the military and diplomatic support of the United States as a result of Vietminh cooperation with the OSS were soon dashed, in part due to the Americans’ not-unfounded belief that a strong French presence in the Western coalition was an essential asset in the looming
Meanwhile, Giap stepped up the indoctrination and proselytizing program in the villages with a view to consolidating the Communist hold over the population. His success in the elimination campaign planted the seeds of his reputation in the many years of war to come. “Even his enemies, men who were notoriously anticommunist,” observes historian Stein Tonnesson, “showed respect for him. They seemed to lose some of their aggressiveness when they were in his presence.” 5
Meanwhile, after six months of intransigence, on March 6, 1946, Ho and the French emissary, Jean Sainteny, signed a letter of understanding, hoping to avert war. Under the terms of the agreement, France would be permitted to deploy 15,000 troops in Vietnam for five years; to enjoy favored economic status in trade relations; and to maintain a permanent cultural presence throughout Indochina. For its part, France recognized the legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (the DRV, the formal name adapted by Ho’s government) “as a free state having its own government, parliament, army and treasury, and belonging to the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.” 6 Crucially, the French retained overarching political control of the Union—an organization akin to the commonwealth of Great Britain—and total control over Vietnam’s foreign relations and armed forces.
More troubling for the new government was the failure of the letter of understanding to include Cochinchina as a part of the DRV. The French sought to maintain complete control there, offering to grant but a few cosmetic concessions for Vietnamese participation in its governance. Cochinchina was an integral part of Vietnam and had been so since time immemorial. A Vietnamese state without Cochinchina was completely unacceptable to either Ho’s government or the Vietnamese people. In the end, the parties agreed to leave the status of Vietnam’s most economically developed region temporarily unresolved. A plebiscite at a later date would decide whether it would join the DRV or enter into a separate agreement with France. In the eyes of the hardliners in the Communist Party the agreement was a nonstarter for obvious reasons. Soon thereafter, the governor of Indochina, a hardline reactionary named Admiral Thierry D’Argenlieu,enraged the Vietminh by unilaterally declaring Cochinchina an independent republic allied with France.
The fledgling government of the DRV was now between the proverbial rock and hard place. Ho’s government desperately sought the help of allies on the international front and pressed forward with little hope of gaining critical concessions at conferences at Fontainebleau and Dalat with the French in summer and fall 1946. That fall, a frustrated and defiant Ho had an oft-quoted exchange with American correspondent David Schoenbrun. “How can you hope to wage war against the French? You have no army, you have no modern weapons. Why, such a war would seem hopeless to you,” said the journalist. Ho’s reply would be echoed time and time again by his commander in chief once the battle had been joined:
No, it would not be hopeless. It would be hard, desperate, but we could win. . . . The spirit of man is more powerful than his own machines. It will be a war between an elephant and a tiger. If the tiger ever stands still the elephant will crush him with its mighty tusks. But the tiger does not stand still. He lurks in the jungle by day and emerges only at night. He will leap upon the back of the elephant, tearing huge chunks from his hide, and then he will leap back into the jungle. And slowly the elephant will bleed to death. That will be the war in Indochina. 7
Giap’s hopes of gaining the military and diplomatic support of the United States as a result of Vietminh cooperation with the OSS were soon dashed, in part due to the Americans’ not-unfounded belief that a strong French presence in the Western coalition was an essential asset in the looming
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