Read Online Giap: The General Who Defeated America in Vietnam by James A. Warren - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: James A. Warren
Ads: Link
Believing these forces could stand up against the French in Hanoi for perhaps a month, Giap made plans for the withdrawal of the main forces surrounding the city to the north and west, where he believed he could hold on in the countryside indefinitely. Meanwhile, more than 1,000 Legionnaires landed at ports in Tonkin and Annam in order to take the fight to the capital city.
On the night of December 18, the War of Resistance began with a Vietminh sapper team attack on Hanoi’s main power station. The Tu Ve struck French outposts in many Vietnamese cities and towns that night. Urban fighting, typically fierce small unit clashes, erupted sporadically for the next two to three weeks in most cities; in Hanoi, the Vietminh regional forces put up a spirited defense until late January, suffering about 6,000 killed in action, but gaining time for Giap to withdraw his precious regulars. According to his protracted war paradigm, it was essential for these forces to avoid battle and remain in secure base areas for expansion and further training. Today, the Vietnamese celebrate December 19 as the anniversary of the outbreak of their War of Resistance against France.
VIETMINH DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
A few days after the outbreak of hostilities, the Party’s Central Committee issued a strategic directive, laying out their understanding of the war that was to follow. A theory, a way of thinking about how the war should unfold, was required to guide decision making. Giap himself surely had a stronghand in shaping the document, and his strategic thinking on the application of the three-stage model of protracted war in Vietnam, which he had been contemplating since Mao’s lectures on the subject were published around 1938, is clearly in evidence in the directive itself. 10
In the first stage, the revolutionary forces would find themselves on the strategic defensive. Base areas needed to be expanded and strengthened for training and sanctuary purposes; political work had to intensify in order to lay the groundwork for recruiting and intelligence networks. Meanwhile guerrilla units, still lightly armed, could harass the French forces’ lines of communication through sabotage, ambush, and raids.
In stage two, the equilibrium stage, the French would reach their peak military strength and consolidate their hold on the cities and towns. Simultaneously, the Vietminh would shift gradually from the defensive to offensive operations by whole regiments, and then divisions, engaging in combat in places and times of their own choosing, grinding down French strength by protracting the conflict. Mobile operations by regular units would be coordinated with guerrilla warfare both within the enemy’s rear—the areas under his control—and, to a lesser degree, in offensive campaigns.
The objective of military operations in this stage was not to gain and hold territory, but to force the French to disperse their forces into small units to conduct static defense duties. Once the FEF had been spread thin, they would be vulnerable to battalion and regimental attacks by Vietminh regulars. It was essential that PAVN units develop proficiency in hit-and-run attacks, in which units would disperse before the French could bring artillery or air power to bear. Then they could re-form as a complete unit at a prearranged point, typically in a remote area inhospitable to France’s mobile armored groups and air attacks.
Stage three was called the counteroffensive. In theory at least, it culminated in the “general uprising,” meaning the point at which the power of the people and the army together was so great that spontaneous rebellions would erupt all over the country.
By the third stage, the regular PAVN would have formed full divisions equipped with modern weapons, including artillery and engineers (in 1946 the PAVN was capable of fighting only at the battalion level of about 600 men in any one engagement) and would be sufficiently trained and seasoned to
On the night of December 18, the War of Resistance began with a Vietminh sapper team attack on Hanoi’s main power station. The Tu Ve struck French outposts in many Vietnamese cities and towns that night. Urban fighting, typically fierce small unit clashes, erupted sporadically for the next two to three weeks in most cities; in Hanoi, the Vietminh regional forces put up a spirited defense until late January, suffering about 6,000 killed in action, but gaining time for Giap to withdraw his precious regulars. According to his protracted war paradigm, it was essential for these forces to avoid battle and remain in secure base areas for expansion and further training. Today, the Vietnamese celebrate December 19 as the anniversary of the outbreak of their War of Resistance against France.
VIETMINH DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
A few days after the outbreak of hostilities, the Party’s Central Committee issued a strategic directive, laying out their understanding of the war that was to follow. A theory, a way of thinking about how the war should unfold, was required to guide decision making. Giap himself surely had a stronghand in shaping the document, and his strategic thinking on the application of the three-stage model of protracted war in Vietnam, which he had been contemplating since Mao’s lectures on the subject were published around 1938, is clearly in evidence in the directive itself. 10
In the first stage, the revolutionary forces would find themselves on the strategic defensive. Base areas needed to be expanded and strengthened for training and sanctuary purposes; political work had to intensify in order to lay the groundwork for recruiting and intelligence networks. Meanwhile guerrilla units, still lightly armed, could harass the French forces’ lines of communication through sabotage, ambush, and raids.
In stage two, the equilibrium stage, the French would reach their peak military strength and consolidate their hold on the cities and towns. Simultaneously, the Vietminh would shift gradually from the defensive to offensive operations by whole regiments, and then divisions, engaging in combat in places and times of their own choosing, grinding down French strength by protracting the conflict. Mobile operations by regular units would be coordinated with guerrilla warfare both within the enemy’s rear—the areas under his control—and, to a lesser degree, in offensive campaigns.
The objective of military operations in this stage was not to gain and hold territory, but to force the French to disperse their forces into small units to conduct static defense duties. Once the FEF had been spread thin, they would be vulnerable to battalion and regimental attacks by Vietminh regulars. It was essential that PAVN units develop proficiency in hit-and-run attacks, in which units would disperse before the French could bring artillery or air power to bear. Then they could re-form as a complete unit at a prearranged point, typically in a remote area inhospitable to France’s mobile armored groups and air attacks.
Stage three was called the counteroffensive. In theory at least, it culminated in the “general uprising,” meaning the point at which the power of the people and the army together was so great that spontaneous rebellions would erupt all over the country.
By the third stage, the regular PAVN would have formed full divisions equipped with modern weapons, including artillery and engineers (in 1946 the PAVN was capable of fighting only at the battalion level of about 600 men in any one engagement) and would be sufficiently trained and seasoned to
Similar Books
