damp because of a leaking basement that had to be regularly pumped dry. The offices were cramped and dreary. 1
Scattered through the small, dank rooms was a modest staff that consisted of two undersecretaries, a chief clerk, nineteen clerks, a private secretary, a précis writer, a librarian, and several translators. 2 In 1801, the war and colonial bureaucracies had been amalgamated because the two inextricably overlapped. Although the theory seemed sound, executionresulted in an office constantly bursting at the seams with files and paperwork while being inevitably short-staffed.
Tradition held that responsibility for ensuring each ministry operated efficiently rested with the minister. This meant that the minister was expected to personally handle all important matters. Furthermore, there was a clear division of function between the political men, such as Bathurst, and the permanent officials in the office, such as the undersecretaries. It fell to the minister to decide policy, which was modified only âin response to the criticism of colleagues in the Cabinet.â 3 The permanent officials then implemented the policy, but generally played no major part in its development or in orchestrating modifications once policy met the test of reality.
Lord Liverpoolâs cabinet was much inclined toward this traditional bureaucratic model because the prime minister was noted for âhis assiduity as a man of business.â 4 Liverpool was never given to standing back and letting others manage things. Rather, he was deeply involved in all important matters of state. Viscount Castlereagh was so similarly inclined that most dispatches emanating from Foreign Affairs were not only drafted by him but a product of his own hand.
Such exercise of control came at a price: a ministryâs effectiveness was limited by the ability of the minister to process its regular business while also developing sound policy in response to critically important issues or developments. The workload for ministers holding major portfolios was crushingly heavy, and this was particularly the case in 1812 for Castlereagh and Bathurst, for they were jointly responsible for the war with France and now the one with America. A workhorse, Castlereagh prided himself on mastery of every detail, so was as well suited for such great responsibility as anybody could have been. Bathurstâs abilities were less clear.
His early political appointments resulted from close friendship with William Pitt âthe Youngerâ and his familyâs record of government service dating back to the Restoration. His distinguished grandfather had served in the House of Lords after gaining a peerage in 1712, becoming privy councillor in 1742. His father, the 2nd Earl Bathurst, who bestowed his first given name on his eldest son at his birth on May 22, 1762, followed a legal path that resulted in his appointment as a judge of the Court ofCommon Pleas in 1754. From 1771 to 1778 he was Lord Chancellor. The younger Bathurst succeeded to the earldom when his father died in 1794. He was fifty when Lord Liverpool asked him on June 10, 1812, to become secretary for war and the colonies.
Contemporaries saw Bathurstâs appointment as a sign that the Liverpool administration was scraping the barrel for talent. His previous posts had been of an inconspicuous nature, requiring only pedestrian administrative skill. The ever-watchful Lady Harriet Arbuthnot thought him âa very bad minister for present times, he likes everything to go in the old way, likes a job for the sake of a job, not to get money into his own pocket for there cannot be a more disinterested man, but he hates all innovations.â 5
While Bathurst figured among the true Tories, who disdained the emerging liberal economic theories, and was a devout High Church Anglican, he was more open to innovation than Lady Arbuthnot credited. Bathurstâs manner was his enemy, for he was self-effacing to a fault
Scattered through the small, dank rooms was a modest staff that consisted of two undersecretaries, a chief clerk, nineteen clerks, a private secretary, a précis writer, a librarian, and several translators. 2 In 1801, the war and colonial bureaucracies had been amalgamated because the two inextricably overlapped. Although the theory seemed sound, executionresulted in an office constantly bursting at the seams with files and paperwork while being inevitably short-staffed.
Tradition held that responsibility for ensuring each ministry operated efficiently rested with the minister. This meant that the minister was expected to personally handle all important matters. Furthermore, there was a clear division of function between the political men, such as Bathurst, and the permanent officials in the office, such as the undersecretaries. It fell to the minister to decide policy, which was modified only âin response to the criticism of colleagues in the Cabinet.â 3 The permanent officials then implemented the policy, but generally played no major part in its development or in orchestrating modifications once policy met the test of reality.
Lord Liverpoolâs cabinet was much inclined toward this traditional bureaucratic model because the prime minister was noted for âhis assiduity as a man of business.â 4 Liverpool was never given to standing back and letting others manage things. Rather, he was deeply involved in all important matters of state. Viscount Castlereagh was so similarly inclined that most dispatches emanating from Foreign Affairs were not only drafted by him but a product of his own hand.
Such exercise of control came at a price: a ministryâs effectiveness was limited by the ability of the minister to process its regular business while also developing sound policy in response to critically important issues or developments. The workload for ministers holding major portfolios was crushingly heavy, and this was particularly the case in 1812 for Castlereagh and Bathurst, for they were jointly responsible for the war with France and now the one with America. A workhorse, Castlereagh prided himself on mastery of every detail, so was as well suited for such great responsibility as anybody could have been. Bathurstâs abilities were less clear.
His early political appointments resulted from close friendship with William Pitt âthe Youngerâ and his familyâs record of government service dating back to the Restoration. His distinguished grandfather had served in the House of Lords after gaining a peerage in 1712, becoming privy councillor in 1742. His father, the 2nd Earl Bathurst, who bestowed his first given name on his eldest son at his birth on May 22, 1762, followed a legal path that resulted in his appointment as a judge of the Court ofCommon Pleas in 1754. From 1771 to 1778 he was Lord Chancellor. The younger Bathurst succeeded to the earldom when his father died in 1794. He was fifty when Lord Liverpool asked him on June 10, 1812, to become secretary for war and the colonies.
Contemporaries saw Bathurstâs appointment as a sign that the Liverpool administration was scraping the barrel for talent. His previous posts had been of an inconspicuous nature, requiring only pedestrian administrative skill. The ever-watchful Lady Harriet Arbuthnot thought him âa very bad minister for present times, he likes everything to go in the old way, likes a job for the sake of a job, not to get money into his own pocket for there cannot be a more disinterested man, but he hates all innovations.â 5
While Bathurst figured among the true Tories, who disdained the emerging liberal economic theories, and was a devout High Church Anglican, he was more open to innovation than Lady Arbuthnot credited. Bathurstâs manner was his enemy, for he was self-effacing to a fault
Similar Books
