Read Online Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War by Paul Kennedy - Free Book Online
Authors: Paul Kennedy
Tags: General, History, World War II, Military, Political Science, International Relations, Technology & Engineering, Marine & Naval
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overworked. This allowed the attackers to destroy the Dutch
Terkoelei
and the British
Coracero
. As nightfall came, and with fine visibility, the U-boats moved in on the convoy once more. But then a B-24 appeared and in fairly quick succession sighted and depth-charged first a pair of submarines and then another group of three, and then—completely out of depth charges—machine-gunned a sixth. None of the subs was damaged, but all were unnerved. The Liberator had stayed eighteen hours in the air, two hours longer than the normal recommended time. However, quietness was not given to SC 122,which lost another two valuable ships, the
Zouave
(to a direct hit from U 305) and the
Port Auckland
(wrecked by the same submarine but probably finished off by Kinzel).
These daylight sinkings of two more merchantmen had sent HMS
Volunteer
racing to the starboard of the convoy, but its own direction finders had become defective, and the other few escorts were picking up survivors. One guesses that Luther had either great courage, great obstinacy, or both, but it was only with the sinking of the
Terkoelei
and
Coracero
that the convoy commander “thought the time had come to ask for help.” (One of the wonderful side benefits of reading the messages of these escort commanders, or a single ship’s captain, is the chance to marvel at their tendency to understatement.) It was at this point that one of the faster American merchantmen, the
Mathew Luckenbach,
decided to break free from the convoy and steam ahead, despite repeated messages from the escorts and the convoy commodore; she was sunk, with few survivors, two days later.
Even before Luther’s message for help, both admiralties decided to commit more resources to the battle. This was much easier for Doenitz, since he had fresh U-boats already in the Atlantic. The British planners faced a much tougher task, simply because there were a lot of other valuable convoys in the North Atlantic at exactly the same time. The two Gibraltar convoys KMS 11 (sixty-two merchantmen, with nine escorts) and KMF 11 (nine transports, with two escorts plus destroyers pulled from other duties) would probably have to fight their way across the Bay of Biscay, where they might face not only another cluster of U-boats but also the possibility of long-range German bombers; none of their escorts could be spared. Convoy ON 172 (seventeen merchantmen, with six escorts), south of Cape Farewell, was not only too far away but also in an area where another U-boat group was forming. And convoy ON 173 (thirty-nine ships, with six escorts), steaming far to the north of the battle, was very weak itself. Reinforcing corvettes dispatched from St. John’s were not fast enough to catch up until later, and the two U.S. destroyers ordered from Iceland were damaged by the heavy seas on March 17 and 18.
The same was true of Allied aircraft, so critically important and yet so few. Also, possessing at this time poor ship-to-plane contact, the Liberators, Sunderlands, and the rest often failed to link up with theconvoys. So further Allied shipping losses occurred on March 18. One of them, with brutal irony, was the
Walter Q. Gresham,
among the very first of the new American-built Liberty ships whose mass production would eventually solve the shipping shortages; the second was another modern vessel, the Canadian
Star
. By the time the vastly overworked corvette HMS
Anemone
had picked up survivors from these two ships to add to her earlier rescues, she had 163 exhausted civilians on board, including six women and two children. Then she rejoined station and spent all the following night driving away U-boat attacks on HX 229. Sometimes the asdic worked, sometimes not; the Hedgehog grenades failed twice; and while the depth charges worked, by the time they had reached their preset depth the submarines had slipped away. A multitude of survivors slept on the
Anemone
that night; Convoy SC 122 was luckier in that it possessed a proper
Terkoelei
and the British
Coracero
. As nightfall came, and with fine visibility, the U-boats moved in on the convoy once more. But then a B-24 appeared and in fairly quick succession sighted and depth-charged first a pair of submarines and then another group of three, and then—completely out of depth charges—machine-gunned a sixth. None of the subs was damaged, but all were unnerved. The Liberator had stayed eighteen hours in the air, two hours longer than the normal recommended time. However, quietness was not given to SC 122,which lost another two valuable ships, the
Zouave
(to a direct hit from U 305) and the
Port Auckland
(wrecked by the same submarine but probably finished off by Kinzel).
These daylight sinkings of two more merchantmen had sent HMS
Volunteer
racing to the starboard of the convoy, but its own direction finders had become defective, and the other few escorts were picking up survivors. One guesses that Luther had either great courage, great obstinacy, or both, but it was only with the sinking of the
Terkoelei
and
Coracero
that the convoy commander “thought the time had come to ask for help.” (One of the wonderful side benefits of reading the messages of these escort commanders, or a single ship’s captain, is the chance to marvel at their tendency to understatement.) It was at this point that one of the faster American merchantmen, the
Mathew Luckenbach,
decided to break free from the convoy and steam ahead, despite repeated messages from the escorts and the convoy commodore; she was sunk, with few survivors, two days later.
Even before Luther’s message for help, both admiralties decided to commit more resources to the battle. This was much easier for Doenitz, since he had fresh U-boats already in the Atlantic. The British planners faced a much tougher task, simply because there were a lot of other valuable convoys in the North Atlantic at exactly the same time. The two Gibraltar convoys KMS 11 (sixty-two merchantmen, with nine escorts) and KMF 11 (nine transports, with two escorts plus destroyers pulled from other duties) would probably have to fight their way across the Bay of Biscay, where they might face not only another cluster of U-boats but also the possibility of long-range German bombers; none of their escorts could be spared. Convoy ON 172 (seventeen merchantmen, with six escorts), south of Cape Farewell, was not only too far away but also in an area where another U-boat group was forming. And convoy ON 173 (thirty-nine ships, with six escorts), steaming far to the north of the battle, was very weak itself. Reinforcing corvettes dispatched from St. John’s were not fast enough to catch up until later, and the two U.S. destroyers ordered from Iceland were damaged by the heavy seas on March 17 and 18.
The same was true of Allied aircraft, so critically important and yet so few. Also, possessing at this time poor ship-to-plane contact, the Liberators, Sunderlands, and the rest often failed to link up with theconvoys. So further Allied shipping losses occurred on March 18. One of them, with brutal irony, was the
Walter Q. Gresham,
among the very first of the new American-built Liberty ships whose mass production would eventually solve the shipping shortages; the second was another modern vessel, the Canadian
Star
. By the time the vastly overworked corvette HMS
Anemone
had picked up survivors from these two ships to add to her earlier rescues, she had 163 exhausted civilians on board, including six women and two children. Then she rejoined station and spent all the following night driving away U-boat attacks on HX 229. Sometimes the asdic worked, sometimes not; the Hedgehog grenades failed twice; and while the depth charges worked, by the time they had reached their preset depth the submarines had slipped away. A multitude of survivors slept on the
Anemone
that night; Convoy SC 122 was luckier in that it possessed a proper
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