Read Online Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War by Paul Kennedy - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Paul Kennedy
Tags: General, History, World War II, Military, Political Science, International Relations, Technology & Engineering, Marine & Naval
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decisive. There were far too few escorts, and a late rush of aerial and surface support was indeed too late.
Then there was the imbalance in intelligence, for this was probably
the
time when B-Dienst was at the height of its competence, reading Admiralty messages at an impressive rate. Of course, individual submarines missed messages intended for them and steamed in the wrong direction, though sometimes with a favorable, unexpected sinking to follow. But, taken all together, those boats were being directed by Doenitz in a rigorous, demanding fashion—it was not just that he was in charge of one orchestra, but rather that he was directing, hustling, energizing
four
orchestras, four separate U-boat groups, sometimes more than a thousand miles from each other. By contrast, at this particular time Allied intelligence about German intentions seems to have been horribly behindhand. Even when Enigma decrypts came through to Western Approaches Command, they were likely to be late—and such delays came at a high price in the North Atlantic.
Another important element, as noted above, was that of air cover, or, rather, the lack of it. If anything confirmed the geopolitical significance of the mid-Atlantic air gap, it was the
location
of the losses of Allied merchantmen in the awful months when 1942 unfolded into 1943. Of course, U-boats were sinking Allied cargoes off Trinidad, Buenos Aires, and the Cape; the Gibraltar route, being so close to German naval and aerial bases in western France, was always under attack. But when one turns to the vital sea line of communications between North America and Britain, the evidence is overwhelming. Captain Roskill’s official history gives us a map of the sinkings of the merchantmen: every one was in the air gap. 17
This was the place where the three-way game with the convoy, the surface escorts, and the U-boats was played out. Even a weakly escorted convoy with some daylight aerial coverage, such as SC 122, had a betterchance during those hours than another weakly escorted convoy with no aircraft at all, such as HX 229. But what if the Battle of the Atlantic became a four-way game—merchant ships, naval escorts, U-boats,
and
aircraft—for the entirety of the voyage? What if, tactically, Allied aircraft operating both day and night made surface attacks by submarines simply too dangerous?
T HE N ORTH A TLANTIC A IR G AP AND C ONVOYS
During the first half of the war, almost all Allied merchantmen, whether in convoy or not, were sunk by U-boats in this mid-Atlantic gap; it was not to be covered until the coming of very long-range Allied aircraft in mid-1943.
Click here to download a PDF of this map.
A fourth factor was, simply, the quality of the respective weapons systems. The key U-boat that was deployed at this time, the Type VIIC, was a narrow, cramped, and very basic piece of equipment, a mere 800 tons in weight and 220 feet long, carrying forty-four crew members stuck in unbelievable conditions. It was also extremely workmanlike and reliable, and it could dive fast if trouble loomed on the horizon. Another series, Type IX, was larger, with much greater endurance and heavier surface firepower, but it was a rather clumsy vessel if a British or Canadian escort was bearing down on it. Fortunately for Doenitz, he had plenty of the older class in the North Atlantic, allowing him to divert the bigger boats to distant stations, where they could play to their strengths.
By contrast, the Allied hardware at this stage was unsatisfactory. A number of twenty-five-year-old ships had had new equipment stitched onto their bow or aft decks, a desperate half measure until newer vessels arrived. Almost everything was experimental, and liable to have teething troubles. As noted, escorts lost their sonar readings for around fifteen minutes after firing a depth charge or a torpedo. Important, too, was the fact that most newer weapons, which did have great potential, were encountering operational
Then there was the imbalance in intelligence, for this was probably
the
time when B-Dienst was at the height of its competence, reading Admiralty messages at an impressive rate. Of course, individual submarines missed messages intended for them and steamed in the wrong direction, though sometimes with a favorable, unexpected sinking to follow. But, taken all together, those boats were being directed by Doenitz in a rigorous, demanding fashion—it was not just that he was in charge of one orchestra, but rather that he was directing, hustling, energizing
four
orchestras, four separate U-boat groups, sometimes more than a thousand miles from each other. By contrast, at this particular time Allied intelligence about German intentions seems to have been horribly behindhand. Even when Enigma decrypts came through to Western Approaches Command, they were likely to be late—and such delays came at a high price in the North Atlantic.
Another important element, as noted above, was that of air cover, or, rather, the lack of it. If anything confirmed the geopolitical significance of the mid-Atlantic air gap, it was the
location
of the losses of Allied merchantmen in the awful months when 1942 unfolded into 1943. Of course, U-boats were sinking Allied cargoes off Trinidad, Buenos Aires, and the Cape; the Gibraltar route, being so close to German naval and aerial bases in western France, was always under attack. But when one turns to the vital sea line of communications between North America and Britain, the evidence is overwhelming. Captain Roskill’s official history gives us a map of the sinkings of the merchantmen: every one was in the air gap. 17
This was the place where the three-way game with the convoy, the surface escorts, and the U-boats was played out. Even a weakly escorted convoy with some daylight aerial coverage, such as SC 122, had a betterchance during those hours than another weakly escorted convoy with no aircraft at all, such as HX 229. But what if the Battle of the Atlantic became a four-way game—merchant ships, naval escorts, U-boats,
and
aircraft—for the entirety of the voyage? What if, tactically, Allied aircraft operating both day and night made surface attacks by submarines simply too dangerous?
T HE N ORTH A TLANTIC A IR G AP AND C ONVOYS
During the first half of the war, almost all Allied merchantmen, whether in convoy or not, were sunk by U-boats in this mid-Atlantic gap; it was not to be covered until the coming of very long-range Allied aircraft in mid-1943.
Click here to download a PDF of this map.
A fourth factor was, simply, the quality of the respective weapons systems. The key U-boat that was deployed at this time, the Type VIIC, was a narrow, cramped, and very basic piece of equipment, a mere 800 tons in weight and 220 feet long, carrying forty-four crew members stuck in unbelievable conditions. It was also extremely workmanlike and reliable, and it could dive fast if trouble loomed on the horizon. Another series, Type IX, was larger, with much greater endurance and heavier surface firepower, but it was a rather clumsy vessel if a British or Canadian escort was bearing down on it. Fortunately for Doenitz, he had plenty of the older class in the North Atlantic, allowing him to divert the bigger boats to distant stations, where they could play to their strengths.
By contrast, the Allied hardware at this stage was unsatisfactory. A number of twenty-five-year-old ships had had new equipment stitched onto their bow or aft decks, a desperate half measure until newer vessels arrived. Almost everything was experimental, and liable to have teething troubles. As noted, escorts lost their sonar readings for around fifteen minutes after firing a depth charge or a torpedo. Important, too, was the fact that most newer weapons, which did have great potential, were encountering operational
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