Read Online Death of a Dissident by Alex Goldfarb - Free Book Online
Authors: Alex Goldfarb
Ads: Link
wartime president; the New Year’s Eve debacle inGrozny was too fresh. As the delegates gathered to listen to Chubais give his speech, the ferocious fighting in Chechnya continued.
Nonetheless, Chubais’s speech was triumphant. He had just completed the first stage of massive privatization, whereby vouchers given to each and every Russian citizen could be traded for equity in state-owned enterprises. Many vouchers, to be sure, were bought up by speculators and “red directors,” former Soviet factory heads, but even so, Chubais succeeded in making several million people stockholders.
Most observers had predicted runaway inflation and chaos, but the pessimists were discredited: inflation was held in check. The statistics of privatization spoke for themselves. Yeltsin remained in power, despite the intrigues of the Communists. “Our reform is irreversible!” Chubais proclaimed.
In response, Soros, a widely admired guru in Davos, called the new Russian capitalists “robber barons.”
“I was hoping to see an orderly transition to an open society, a market-oriented democratic system based on the rule of law,” he complained. “That attempt has basically failed. But you do have the emergence of a new system: robber capitalism.”
To be sure, he added, “it is raw and ugly, but a very vital, self-organizing system. It can succeed because there are now economic interests that know how to defend themselves.” But the problem is that “the system is creating a tremendous sense of social injustice and a decline in civilized values, the sense of frustration and disorientation that could lead to a political backlash and a xenophobic, nationalistic mood.”
Over the years, Soros and Chubais held several conversations, mostly during George’s frequent visits to Moscow related to his various philanthropic initiatives. I often joined them, but it was a dialogue of the deaf with the dumb. Chubais, the free-market worshipper, kept repeating that private property would eventually resolve all social and political problems; that democracy and freedom, social morals, the rule of law, and a liberal system of government would flow from capitalism just as surely as efficient prices flowed from Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
Soros, on the other hand, somewhere between a Keynesian and a covert socialist, believed that in moments of crisis, state interference was unavoidable. He advised Chubais to reintroduce customs tariffs to protect the most vulnerable sectors of Russia’s economy and to support Soros’s own campaign in Washington to create a social safety net for Russia, paid for by Western economic aid, a “social Marshall plan” that would prime the pump of demand by putting billions of dollars into the hands of ordinary Russians. Chubais wanted Soros to lead the way by investing in Russia himself, but Soros was too busy setting up multimillion-dollar charities and did not want to mix business and philanthropy. Besides, with the Communists gaining strength, he considered Russia too risky for investors.
Now, at Berezovsky’s tea table, it was Boris’s turn to try to lure George into a business partnership. Boris ardently believed that sooner or later, his 200 million ORT television viewers would turn into an enormous advertising market and his investment in the network would be richly rewarded. Meanwhile, however, he faced a deficit of $170 million, and he couldn’t afford it. He explained that he wanted to ask Soros for a loan of $100 million or so, with collateral in ORT shares plus an option to buy more. It was a package potentially worth a billion, he claimed. Moreover, by supporting the new progressive TV, Soros could really help democracy in Russia. After all, he noted, Soros had given $100 million to help Russian scientists without getting anything in exchange.
“By the way, why does he call us robber barons? Does he think that we’re all gangsters here, like Al Capone?” Boris inquired.
“Not exactly,” I
Nonetheless, Chubais’s speech was triumphant. He had just completed the first stage of massive privatization, whereby vouchers given to each and every Russian citizen could be traded for equity in state-owned enterprises. Many vouchers, to be sure, were bought up by speculators and “red directors,” former Soviet factory heads, but even so, Chubais succeeded in making several million people stockholders.
Most observers had predicted runaway inflation and chaos, but the pessimists were discredited: inflation was held in check. The statistics of privatization spoke for themselves. Yeltsin remained in power, despite the intrigues of the Communists. “Our reform is irreversible!” Chubais proclaimed.
In response, Soros, a widely admired guru in Davos, called the new Russian capitalists “robber barons.”
“I was hoping to see an orderly transition to an open society, a market-oriented democratic system based on the rule of law,” he complained. “That attempt has basically failed. But you do have the emergence of a new system: robber capitalism.”
To be sure, he added, “it is raw and ugly, but a very vital, self-organizing system. It can succeed because there are now economic interests that know how to defend themselves.” But the problem is that “the system is creating a tremendous sense of social injustice and a decline in civilized values, the sense of frustration and disorientation that could lead to a political backlash and a xenophobic, nationalistic mood.”
Over the years, Soros and Chubais held several conversations, mostly during George’s frequent visits to Moscow related to his various philanthropic initiatives. I often joined them, but it was a dialogue of the deaf with the dumb. Chubais, the free-market worshipper, kept repeating that private property would eventually resolve all social and political problems; that democracy and freedom, social morals, the rule of law, and a liberal system of government would flow from capitalism just as surely as efficient prices flowed from Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
Soros, on the other hand, somewhere between a Keynesian and a covert socialist, believed that in moments of crisis, state interference was unavoidable. He advised Chubais to reintroduce customs tariffs to protect the most vulnerable sectors of Russia’s economy and to support Soros’s own campaign in Washington to create a social safety net for Russia, paid for by Western economic aid, a “social Marshall plan” that would prime the pump of demand by putting billions of dollars into the hands of ordinary Russians. Chubais wanted Soros to lead the way by investing in Russia himself, but Soros was too busy setting up multimillion-dollar charities and did not want to mix business and philanthropy. Besides, with the Communists gaining strength, he considered Russia too risky for investors.
Now, at Berezovsky’s tea table, it was Boris’s turn to try to lure George into a business partnership. Boris ardently believed that sooner or later, his 200 million ORT television viewers would turn into an enormous advertising market and his investment in the network would be richly rewarded. Meanwhile, however, he faced a deficit of $170 million, and he couldn’t afford it. He explained that he wanted to ask Soros for a loan of $100 million or so, with collateral in ORT shares plus an option to buy more. It was a package potentially worth a billion, he claimed. Moreover, by supporting the new progressive TV, Soros could really help democracy in Russia. After all, he noted, Soros had given $100 million to help Russian scientists without getting anything in exchange.
“By the way, why does he call us robber barons? Does he think that we’re all gangsters here, like Al Capone?” Boris inquired.
“Not exactly,” I
Similar Books
