him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. The only defence is in offence, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves. I just mention that . . . so that people may realize what is waiting for them when the next war comes.
One cannot help reflecting that, after the hundreds of millions of years during which the human race has been on this earth, it is only within our generation that we have secured the mastery of the air. I certainly do not know how the youth of the world may feel, but it is not a cheerful thought to the older men that, having got that mastery of the air, we are going to defile the earth from the air as we have defiled the soil during all the years that mankind has been on it. This is a question for the younger men far more than for us. They are the men who fly in the air.
‘By 1933, and even more by 1934, Baldwin had developed what can best be described as the “Armada Complex” ’ in the words of a political historian of these years. 6 ‘The Defence of the Realm – particularly from the air – was his personal and almost total obsession.’
Thus the Royal Air Force and its bombers stood at the very heart of the political and public debate between the wars. Yet in 1941, after two years in action, it was to come as a paralysing shock toBritain’s leaders to discover that Bomber Command was not only incapable of bombing a precise objective, but even of locating a given enemy city by night. The theory of the self-defending daylight bomber formation had been tested and found wanting over the Heligoland Bight and would finally be proved untenable by the American 8th Air Force. Seldom in the history of warfare has a force been so sure of the end it sought – fulfilment of the Trenchard doctrine – and yet so ignorant of how this might be achieved, as the RAF between the wars.
As a bomber squadron commander, Wing-Commander Arthur Harris explored such techniques as marking a target at night with flares, but was compelled to abandon the experiment because the flares then available were quite inadequate for the task. Harris and his contemporary Charles Portal, who would be Chief of Air Staff for much of the war, competed fiercely year after year for squadron bombing trophies, but the exercises for which these were awarded bore as much relation to the reality of wartime bomber operations as a funfair rifle-range to the front line at Stalingrad. Although efforts were made to improve the quality of weather forecasting, there was no attempt to face the fact that wartime operations would inevitably take place in differing conditions for much of the year, that indeed the weather would dominate the conduct of the entire bomber offensive. Before 1939 crews simply did not fly in bad weather. Cross-country flying exercises over England taught them nothing about the difficulties of navigating at night for long distances over blacked-out countries, for they grew accustomed to following railway lines and city lights. In the last two years before the war, 478 Bomber Command crews force-landed on exercises in England, having lost their way. Realistic training might have been carried out over the Atlantic or the North Sea, but the loss of aircraft and crews that would undoubtedly have ensued was quite unacceptable in the climate of peace.
These were the years when if there was to be any hope of striking effectively against Germany when war came, it was vital to build a comprehensive intelligence picture of the German economy.But as late as 1938, the British Secret Service budget was only equal to the annual cost of running one destroyer. Economics were scarcely comprehended outside the ranks of a few specialists. A very small branch of Air Intelligence was created to study targeting under a retired squadron leader. The Secret Service officer Major Desmond Morton controlled the Industrial Intelligence
One cannot help reflecting that, after the hundreds of millions of years during which the human race has been on this earth, it is only within our generation that we have secured the mastery of the air. I certainly do not know how the youth of the world may feel, but it is not a cheerful thought to the older men that, having got that mastery of the air, we are going to defile the earth from the air as we have defiled the soil during all the years that mankind has been on it. This is a question for the younger men far more than for us. They are the men who fly in the air.
‘By 1933, and even more by 1934, Baldwin had developed what can best be described as the “Armada Complex” ’ in the words of a political historian of these years. 6 ‘The Defence of the Realm – particularly from the air – was his personal and almost total obsession.’
Thus the Royal Air Force and its bombers stood at the very heart of the political and public debate between the wars. Yet in 1941, after two years in action, it was to come as a paralysing shock toBritain’s leaders to discover that Bomber Command was not only incapable of bombing a precise objective, but even of locating a given enemy city by night. The theory of the self-defending daylight bomber formation had been tested and found wanting over the Heligoland Bight and would finally be proved untenable by the American 8th Air Force. Seldom in the history of warfare has a force been so sure of the end it sought – fulfilment of the Trenchard doctrine – and yet so ignorant of how this might be achieved, as the RAF between the wars.
As a bomber squadron commander, Wing-Commander Arthur Harris explored such techniques as marking a target at night with flares, but was compelled to abandon the experiment because the flares then available were quite inadequate for the task. Harris and his contemporary Charles Portal, who would be Chief of Air Staff for much of the war, competed fiercely year after year for squadron bombing trophies, but the exercises for which these were awarded bore as much relation to the reality of wartime bomber operations as a funfair rifle-range to the front line at Stalingrad. Although efforts were made to improve the quality of weather forecasting, there was no attempt to face the fact that wartime operations would inevitably take place in differing conditions for much of the year, that indeed the weather would dominate the conduct of the entire bomber offensive. Before 1939 crews simply did not fly in bad weather. Cross-country flying exercises over England taught them nothing about the difficulties of navigating at night for long distances over blacked-out countries, for they grew accustomed to following railway lines and city lights. In the last two years before the war, 478 Bomber Command crews force-landed on exercises in England, having lost their way. Realistic training might have been carried out over the Atlantic or the North Sea, but the loss of aircraft and crews that would undoubtedly have ensued was quite unacceptable in the climate of peace.
These were the years when if there was to be any hope of striking effectively against Germany when war came, it was vital to build a comprehensive intelligence picture of the German economy.But as late as 1938, the British Secret Service budget was only equal to the annual cost of running one destroyer. Economics were scarcely comprehended outside the ranks of a few specialists. A very small branch of Air Intelligence was created to study targeting under a retired squadron leader. The Secret Service officer Major Desmond Morton controlled the Industrial Intelligence
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