any moment.
We have not achieved perfect peace, which philosophers have been writing about for centuries and which Immanuel Kant described as âperpetual peace.â This idea has always had enormous appeal. But it will never be achieved, except at diplomatic think tanks and in the grave. During my last meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in 1974, I jotted down this note on a pad of paper: âPeace is like a delicate plant. It has to be constantly tended and nurtured if it is to survive. If we neglect it, it will wither and die.â
After the collapse of communism in the Cold War and the defeat of aggression in the Persian Gulf War, many observers concluded that we were witnessing the beginning of a new world order. They were wrong. The Cold War divided the world, but peace did not unite it. Instead of order, we find disorder in many areas of the world. The United States and the Soviet Union have kept the lid on potential small wars, but since World War II there have been one hundred and fifty of them. Eight million more people have been killed in those small wars than lost their lives in World War I. Most of those wars would have occurred had there been no superpower conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of small wars has substantially increased. Today, seventy-seven conflicts, based on tribal, national, ethnic, or religious hatreds, are being fought, and ruthless dictators such as Saddam Hussein, Kim Il Sung, and Muammar Qaddafi are poised to attack their neighbors.
During the Cold War, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union knew that they had the power to destroy eachother and the rest of the world. This sharply reduced the possibility of global nuclear war. Pariah nations such as North Korea and Iraq, which are now trying to join the nuclear club, would not have these restraints. Consequently, the danger of a nuclear war is greater now than during the Cold War. Stopping nuclear proliferation therefore must be a top priority for all of the major nuclear powersâRussia, China, the United States, Great Britain, and France.
All of these issuesâthe former Soviet Union, the future of Europe, the rivalry in East Asia, the stability of the Persian Gulf, and avoiding nuclear anarchyârepresent strategic priorities for the United States. None of them can be resolved without a commitment of American world leadership. We cannot react to every emergency call like an international 911 operator. But we must respond to those that affect our vital interests in the world.
The debacle in Somalia was a lesson in how not to conduct U.S. foreign policy. What began as a highly popular humanitarian relief program under President Bush became a highly controversial U.N. nation-building project under President Clinton. As the worldâs richest nation, we should always be generous in providing humanitarian aid to other nations. But we should not commit U.S. military forces to U.N. nation-building projects unless our vital interests are involved, a test that neither Somalia nor Haiti satisfied. When we do intervene militarily to protect our vital interests, we should follow President Bushâs example in the Persian Gulf War, using the U.N., not being used by it.
The fallout from Americaâs indecisive conduct in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia reaches far beyond those small nations. As Washington Post correspondent Stephen Rosenfeld has observed, âWould a country that reversed course after suffering one dayâs casualties in Mogadishu be likely to stand up to a nuclear-armed North Korea, Iraq, or Iran threatening their American-allied neighbors? Is it even faintly conceivable that the United States would extend and that Israel would accept an American nuclear guarantee as a substitute for Israelâs own bomb?â
Above all, we should not allow our peripheral conflicts, such as those in Somalia and Haiti, to divert our attention from major conflicts where our interests
We have not achieved perfect peace, which philosophers have been writing about for centuries and which Immanuel Kant described as âperpetual peace.â This idea has always had enormous appeal. But it will never be achieved, except at diplomatic think tanks and in the grave. During my last meeting with Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in 1974, I jotted down this note on a pad of paper: âPeace is like a delicate plant. It has to be constantly tended and nurtured if it is to survive. If we neglect it, it will wither and die.â
After the collapse of communism in the Cold War and the defeat of aggression in the Persian Gulf War, many observers concluded that we were witnessing the beginning of a new world order. They were wrong. The Cold War divided the world, but peace did not unite it. Instead of order, we find disorder in many areas of the world. The United States and the Soviet Union have kept the lid on potential small wars, but since World War II there have been one hundred and fifty of them. Eight million more people have been killed in those small wars than lost their lives in World War I. Most of those wars would have occurred had there been no superpower conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of small wars has substantially increased. Today, seventy-seven conflicts, based on tribal, national, ethnic, or religious hatreds, are being fought, and ruthless dictators such as Saddam Hussein, Kim Il Sung, and Muammar Qaddafi are poised to attack their neighbors.
During the Cold War, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union knew that they had the power to destroy eachother and the rest of the world. This sharply reduced the possibility of global nuclear war. Pariah nations such as North Korea and Iraq, which are now trying to join the nuclear club, would not have these restraints. Consequently, the danger of a nuclear war is greater now than during the Cold War. Stopping nuclear proliferation therefore must be a top priority for all of the major nuclear powersâRussia, China, the United States, Great Britain, and France.
All of these issuesâthe former Soviet Union, the future of Europe, the rivalry in East Asia, the stability of the Persian Gulf, and avoiding nuclear anarchyârepresent strategic priorities for the United States. None of them can be resolved without a commitment of American world leadership. We cannot react to every emergency call like an international 911 operator. But we must respond to those that affect our vital interests in the world.
The debacle in Somalia was a lesson in how not to conduct U.S. foreign policy. What began as a highly popular humanitarian relief program under President Bush became a highly controversial U.N. nation-building project under President Clinton. As the worldâs richest nation, we should always be generous in providing humanitarian aid to other nations. But we should not commit U.S. military forces to U.N. nation-building projects unless our vital interests are involved, a test that neither Somalia nor Haiti satisfied. When we do intervene militarily to protect our vital interests, we should follow President Bushâs example in the Persian Gulf War, using the U.N., not being used by it.
The fallout from Americaâs indecisive conduct in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia reaches far beyond those small nations. As Washington Post correspondent Stephen Rosenfeld has observed, âWould a country that reversed course after suffering one dayâs casualties in Mogadishu be likely to stand up to a nuclear-armed North Korea, Iraq, or Iran threatening their American-allied neighbors? Is it even faintly conceivable that the United States would extend and that Israel would accept an American nuclear guarantee as a substitute for Israelâs own bomb?â
Above all, we should not allow our peripheral conflicts, such as those in Somalia and Haiti, to divert our attention from major conflicts where our interests
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