second day. As Bagramian’s armies advanced from the south, Yeremenko’s 42nd army, 10th Guards Army and 3rd Shock Army would advance from the east, pushing into what was expected to be a rapidly collapsing German position. 3
In addition to the forces he originally planned to use, Bagramian was pleased to have 61st Army assigned to him. However, the force was not as powerful as he might have expected. The army had been involved in constant fighting for several months, its commander reported, and its divisions were significantly weakened. Nevertheless, Bagramian decided to insert 61st Army between 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army, with the intention of attacking north from Vainode. 4
The Germans were aware of the impending attack, and in order to disrupt Soviet preparations, X Corps ordered 14th Panzer Division to push the front line forward. The attack began on 24 October, catching the Soviet forces by surprise and making good initial progress. Seeing a possible opportunity to make further gains, X Corps ordered 4th Panzer Division to dispatch a company of tanks to support an advance by 30th Infantry Division. 4th Panzer Division was being held in a rear area, and it took until mid-afternoon for its armour to reach and cross the front line. By the time General Betzel joined his lead elements, he found that they were making minimal progress, and almost all of the tanks committed to the attack were bogged down in swampy ground. By the end of the day, the attack was abandoned, and the tanks laboriously hauled back. 5
The first battle of Courland commenced on 27 October. The day started with dense fog, and the Soviet artillery and aerial preparation did not commence until the mist began to lift. By then, ground units had already commenced their attacks, seizing jumping-off positions in the sector held by Nordland . Assigned to support III SS Panzer Corps, 4th Panzer Division dispatched a panzergrenadier regiment, supported by the division’s 37 operational Panther tanks, to the village of Audari, to the northeast of Priekule.
Commanders on both sides waited impatiently for hard news from the front; for 4th Panzer Division, information arrived from a small group of tanks led by Oberleutnant Gerlach. Deployed to support the original front line before the Soviet assault, the Panther tanks continued to hold out all day, helping to break up the Red Army’s attacks. At first, the Soviet 67th, 51st and 75th Guards Rifle Divisions appeared to be making good progress, pushing back the western flank of 30th Infantry Division and penetrating perhaps three miles into the German positions to the east of Priekule. As the picture became clearer, 4th Panzer Division was ordered to counter-attack, in order to restore the front. Shortly after midday, Betzel’s division attacked in two groups, and in heavy fighting, drove 51st and 67th Guards Rifle Divisions back towards their start line. Combat continued until long after nightfall, leaving the Soviet troops in possession of the eastern half of their gains. Even in this sector, the leading units were at least five miles short of their objective, the vital railway line running east from Liepāja.
4th Panzer Division’s counter-attack epitomised the flexibilities of German operational doctrine that had played such a huge part in initial German successes in the war. Betzel was given a broad operational mission, and rapidly deployed his force in two groups. He accompanied the advancing battlegroups, and as their eastern flank became increasingly exposed, he was able to redeploy the division’s reconnaissance battalion to deal with any threat. As was the case in all such operations, the division Chief of Staff, Peter Sauerbruch, took command of division headquarters and ensured coordination and communication between all elements, giving Betzel freedom to ensure that the combat formations of the division were used to maximum effect. According to the division’s combat returns, the day’s
In addition to the forces he originally planned to use, Bagramian was pleased to have 61st Army assigned to him. However, the force was not as powerful as he might have expected. The army had been involved in constant fighting for several months, its commander reported, and its divisions were significantly weakened. Nevertheless, Bagramian decided to insert 61st Army between 4th Shock Army and 6th Guards Army, with the intention of attacking north from Vainode. 4
The Germans were aware of the impending attack, and in order to disrupt Soviet preparations, X Corps ordered 14th Panzer Division to push the front line forward. The attack began on 24 October, catching the Soviet forces by surprise and making good initial progress. Seeing a possible opportunity to make further gains, X Corps ordered 4th Panzer Division to dispatch a company of tanks to support an advance by 30th Infantry Division. 4th Panzer Division was being held in a rear area, and it took until mid-afternoon for its armour to reach and cross the front line. By the time General Betzel joined his lead elements, he found that they were making minimal progress, and almost all of the tanks committed to the attack were bogged down in swampy ground. By the end of the day, the attack was abandoned, and the tanks laboriously hauled back. 5
The first battle of Courland commenced on 27 October. The day started with dense fog, and the Soviet artillery and aerial preparation did not commence until the mist began to lift. By then, ground units had already commenced their attacks, seizing jumping-off positions in the sector held by Nordland . Assigned to support III SS Panzer Corps, 4th Panzer Division dispatched a panzergrenadier regiment, supported by the division’s 37 operational Panther tanks, to the village of Audari, to the northeast of Priekule.
Commanders on both sides waited impatiently for hard news from the front; for 4th Panzer Division, information arrived from a small group of tanks led by Oberleutnant Gerlach. Deployed to support the original front line before the Soviet assault, the Panther tanks continued to hold out all day, helping to break up the Red Army’s attacks. At first, the Soviet 67th, 51st and 75th Guards Rifle Divisions appeared to be making good progress, pushing back the western flank of 30th Infantry Division and penetrating perhaps three miles into the German positions to the east of Priekule. As the picture became clearer, 4th Panzer Division was ordered to counter-attack, in order to restore the front. Shortly after midday, Betzel’s division attacked in two groups, and in heavy fighting, drove 51st and 67th Guards Rifle Divisions back towards their start line. Combat continued until long after nightfall, leaving the Soviet troops in possession of the eastern half of their gains. Even in this sector, the leading units were at least five miles short of their objective, the vital railway line running east from Liepāja.
4th Panzer Division’s counter-attack epitomised the flexibilities of German operational doctrine that had played such a huge part in initial German successes in the war. Betzel was given a broad operational mission, and rapidly deployed his force in two groups. He accompanied the advancing battlegroups, and as their eastern flank became increasingly exposed, he was able to redeploy the division’s reconnaissance battalion to deal with any threat. As was the case in all such operations, the division Chief of Staff, Peter Sauerbruch, took command of division headquarters and ensured coordination and communication between all elements, giving Betzel freedom to ensure that the combat formations of the division were used to maximum effect. According to the division’s combat returns, the day’s
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