actions that seemed to do little or nothing to impede the Japanese advance. General Bennett was utterly dismissive of all soldiers except the Australians and cheerfully undermined all of his colleagues and most of his subordinates.
Withdrawal to Singapore, 24–31 January 1942.
The plan to engage the Japanese in a ‘main battle’ in Johore gained general acceptance among the commanders; the problem lay in the fact that the Japanese advance was too rapid to allow the Allies to concentrate their forces. Air superiority made movement by day dangerous and poor communications made movement by night very difficult. In fact, the Japanese were not able to make the best use of their air power because their ground forces had very little communication with the air arm. Once the RAF had been defeated, Japanese pilots were mostly limited to seeking targets of opportunity. With better integration between aircraft and troops the campaign would have been even shorter. With precious few aircraft at all, the Allies were unable to make any impression on the fragile Japanese lines of communication. A small number of modest raids were staged from the sea, but little was achieved.
The main battle in Johore never really materialised and the Allies staged a withdrawal to Singapore in the last days of January 1942. Percival believed that the island could withstand a siege – it was, after all, described as a ‘fortress’. The term was, however, misleading. In British military parlance ‘fortress’ was an administrative term used to describe an area with a large concentration of troops. It did not imply that there were extensive fortifications, but understandably this was a distinction that meant nothing to almost everybody concerned.
The coastal batteries had not been designed to provide fire plans to deter a crossing of the Johore Strait and the defensive positions on the northern shore were too far apart to support one another or to provide a continuous line of strongholds. The installations were vulnerable to isolation and to a great extent the Japanese knew where they were. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Japan had mounted a major intelligence operation in Singapore. Agents working as bar girls, photographers, barbers and in a host of other occupations had provided a steady stream of information relating to military works and developments of all kinds. Even before the battle for Singapore had started, morale had become a serious problem. Troops were losing confidence in the commanders and in the prospects for relief. Large numbers of deserters could be seen in downtown Singapore or in the harbour areas trying to board ships for Australia, India or the Dutch East Indies.
Events on the mainland, the swift, relentless Japanese advance, forced Percival to order the withdrawal to the island rather earlier than he had planned, to avoid his forces there being overrun and defeated in detail.
The situation was actually even more precarious than Percival realised. Although he was not aware of it, the Japanese were making very good progress and believed that there was a real possibility that the entirety of Heath’s III Corps could be cut off from the rest of Malaya Command and be forced to surrender, which would greatly reduce the strength available to protectthe island once the withdrawal was complete. Percival held a conference at Heath’s headquarters and a programme for evacuation was agreed which would see the last troops cross the causeway to Singapore on 31 January.
31. Coastal gun emplacement, Sentosa, Singapore. (Author’s collection)
32. British optical range finder as issued to coastal artillery positions for identifying hostile ships, but for when the threat would come overland rather than from the sea. (Author’s collection)
33. A 15in coastal gun on Singapore.
The remaining searchlight and anti-aircraft assets on the mainland were promptly removed to the causeway area to give as much protection as possible to the
Withdrawal to Singapore, 24–31 January 1942.
The plan to engage the Japanese in a ‘main battle’ in Johore gained general acceptance among the commanders; the problem lay in the fact that the Japanese advance was too rapid to allow the Allies to concentrate their forces. Air superiority made movement by day dangerous and poor communications made movement by night very difficult. In fact, the Japanese were not able to make the best use of their air power because their ground forces had very little communication with the air arm. Once the RAF had been defeated, Japanese pilots were mostly limited to seeking targets of opportunity. With better integration between aircraft and troops the campaign would have been even shorter. With precious few aircraft at all, the Allies were unable to make any impression on the fragile Japanese lines of communication. A small number of modest raids were staged from the sea, but little was achieved.
The main battle in Johore never really materialised and the Allies staged a withdrawal to Singapore in the last days of January 1942. Percival believed that the island could withstand a siege – it was, after all, described as a ‘fortress’. The term was, however, misleading. In British military parlance ‘fortress’ was an administrative term used to describe an area with a large concentration of troops. It did not imply that there were extensive fortifications, but understandably this was a distinction that meant nothing to almost everybody concerned.
The coastal batteries had not been designed to provide fire plans to deter a crossing of the Johore Strait and the defensive positions on the northern shore were too far apart to support one another or to provide a continuous line of strongholds. The installations were vulnerable to isolation and to a great extent the Japanese knew where they were. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Japan had mounted a major intelligence operation in Singapore. Agents working as bar girls, photographers, barbers and in a host of other occupations had provided a steady stream of information relating to military works and developments of all kinds. Even before the battle for Singapore had started, morale had become a serious problem. Troops were losing confidence in the commanders and in the prospects for relief. Large numbers of deserters could be seen in downtown Singapore or in the harbour areas trying to board ships for Australia, India or the Dutch East Indies.
Events on the mainland, the swift, relentless Japanese advance, forced Percival to order the withdrawal to the island rather earlier than he had planned, to avoid his forces there being overrun and defeated in detail.
The situation was actually even more precarious than Percival realised. Although he was not aware of it, the Japanese were making very good progress and believed that there was a real possibility that the entirety of Heath’s III Corps could be cut off from the rest of Malaya Command and be forced to surrender, which would greatly reduce the strength available to protectthe island once the withdrawal was complete. Percival held a conference at Heath’s headquarters and a programme for evacuation was agreed which would see the last troops cross the causeway to Singapore on 31 January.
31. Coastal gun emplacement, Sentosa, Singapore. (Author’s collection)
32. British optical range finder as issued to coastal artillery positions for identifying hostile ships, but for when the threat would come overland rather than from the sea. (Author’s collection)
33. A 15in coastal gun on Singapore.
The remaining searchlight and anti-aircraft assets on the mainland were promptly removed to the causeway area to give as much protection as possible to the
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