generally – not just Percival – was the product of unrealistic assessments of both the Allied and Japanese capabilities – the belief that the Japanese advance could be stopped in its tracks by artillery being a case in point. The British and Commonwealth forces did have a considerable quantity of high-quality artillery, but had not developed the necessary integration within divisional structures to make it effective.
Equally, the policy of a gradual withdrawal while preparing for a ‘main battle’ would have been a challenge for a highly trained and well-articulated army with confidence in itself and its leaders. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the troops of Malaya Command, but it was not a trained and cohesive force. Poor leadership, bad decisions and unworkable policies, combined with a complete absence of armour, inefficient communications and totally inadequate air cover made Malaya Command formations extremely vulnerable to the daring and well-coordinated manoeuvres of the Japanese Army.
Whether the campaign would be a matter of forcing the Japanese to attack a strong defensive line and bring about static warfare, or of forcing them to take heavy casualties en route to a concentrated battle in southern Malaya was really not a decision that Percival could make; General Yamashita would not allow him that luxury. His policy was based on what Japanese commanders called a ‘driving charge’. His troops were to force battle on the enemy at every opportunity and to pursue him relentlessly, specifically to prevent him regrouping either to build a defensive line or concentrate for a major battle.
In order to achieve and maintain the tempo necessary for such a policy, Yamashita’s army needed to focus their attack along the excellent road system. This was not lost on British commanders, who tried repeatedly to deny passage to enemy forces. Theseattempts were sometimes relatively successful in the short term, but were never really effective. In part this was due to the Japanese superiority in armour. The Allied anti-tank weapons were not ineffective, but they lacked the mobility of tanks. When the Japanese encountered serious resistance they simply moved infantry off the road and searched for flanks of the defenders. Once they had located the limits of the Allied deployment, they ‘hooked’ back on to the road behind the defenders and encircled them, preventing communications and reinforcements, or at least forcing a withdrawal. This quickly led to a culture of retreat. At a tactical level, battalion and brigade commanders were reluctant to risk the destruction of their command in actions that were, ostensibly, peripheral to the ‘main battle’ planned for the near future; in fact, they were repeatedly advised not to risk heavy casualties. At a more personal level it bred a degree of reluctance among the troops. If the Japanese could not be stopped, why should a soldier risk his life if his unit was going to be withdrawn in the near future anyway?
Tomoyuki Yamashita
Born in 1885 in the Kochi prefecture, Shikoku, Tomoyuki Yamashita joined the army in 1905 and first saw active service against the Germans in Shantung, China, in 1914. He graduated from the Imperial Army War College in 1916 and was a military attaché at Berne from 1919–22. He was an advocate of a political movement known as the ‘Imperial way’, which put him at odds with several of his contemporaries and superiors. Yamashita served as Japan’s military attaché in Vienna, Austria, in 1928, but had retired to Japan to command an infantry regiment by the end of 1930. His view that Japan should extricate herself from the war in China and avoid war with Britain and the United States made him unpopular, and for some time he was relegated to a backwater post in the Kwantung Army.
He was appointed to the command of the Twenty-Fifth Army only a month before the invasion and became known as the ‘Tiger of Malaya’ on account of his
Equally, the policy of a gradual withdrawal while preparing for a ‘main battle’ would have been a challenge for a highly trained and well-articulated army with confidence in itself and its leaders. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the troops of Malaya Command, but it was not a trained and cohesive force. Poor leadership, bad decisions and unworkable policies, combined with a complete absence of armour, inefficient communications and totally inadequate air cover made Malaya Command formations extremely vulnerable to the daring and well-coordinated manoeuvres of the Japanese Army.
Whether the campaign would be a matter of forcing the Japanese to attack a strong defensive line and bring about static warfare, or of forcing them to take heavy casualties en route to a concentrated battle in southern Malaya was really not a decision that Percival could make; General Yamashita would not allow him that luxury. His policy was based on what Japanese commanders called a ‘driving charge’. His troops were to force battle on the enemy at every opportunity and to pursue him relentlessly, specifically to prevent him regrouping either to build a defensive line or concentrate for a major battle.
In order to achieve and maintain the tempo necessary for such a policy, Yamashita’s army needed to focus their attack along the excellent road system. This was not lost on British commanders, who tried repeatedly to deny passage to enemy forces. Theseattempts were sometimes relatively successful in the short term, but were never really effective. In part this was due to the Japanese superiority in armour. The Allied anti-tank weapons were not ineffective, but they lacked the mobility of tanks. When the Japanese encountered serious resistance they simply moved infantry off the road and searched for flanks of the defenders. Once they had located the limits of the Allied deployment, they ‘hooked’ back on to the road behind the defenders and encircled them, preventing communications and reinforcements, or at least forcing a withdrawal. This quickly led to a culture of retreat. At a tactical level, battalion and brigade commanders were reluctant to risk the destruction of their command in actions that were, ostensibly, peripheral to the ‘main battle’ planned for the near future; in fact, they were repeatedly advised not to risk heavy casualties. At a more personal level it bred a degree of reluctance among the troops. If the Japanese could not be stopped, why should a soldier risk his life if his unit was going to be withdrawn in the near future anyway?
Tomoyuki Yamashita
Born in 1885 in the Kochi prefecture, Shikoku, Tomoyuki Yamashita joined the army in 1905 and first saw active service against the Germans in Shantung, China, in 1914. He graduated from the Imperial Army War College in 1916 and was a military attaché at Berne from 1919–22. He was an advocate of a political movement known as the ‘Imperial way’, which put him at odds with several of his contemporaries and superiors. Yamashita served as Japan’s military attaché in Vienna, Austria, in 1928, but had retired to Japan to command an infantry regiment by the end of 1930. His view that Japan should extricate herself from the war in China and avoid war with Britain and the United States made him unpopular, and for some time he was relegated to a backwater post in the Kwantung Army.
He was appointed to the command of the Twenty-Fifth Army only a month before the invasion and became known as the ‘Tiger of Malaya’ on account of his
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