Read Online Asia's Cauldron by Robert D. Kaplan - Free Book Online Page B

between 1965 and 1972—Admiral Nhien provided me with another dogged Vietnamese performance. Beside him was a large bust of Ho Chi Minh and a massivemap showing all the competing claims in the “East Sea” as he repeatedly referred to it. For forty-five minutes he went on, noting every Chinese military action in the Paracels and Spratlys: in particular the 1974 takeover of the western part of the Paracels from a tottering Saigon government. The cow’s tongue, he admitted, was less a Chinese legal claim than a “historic dream” of Beijing’s, which, in addition to being a subject of debate itself within Beijing power circles, might eventually be ceded in whole or in part in future negotiations. Nevertheless, the Chinese, by building a blue-water navy and commanding East Asia’s economy as they do, might still come to dominate the South China Sea as the United States came to dominate the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. Senior Colonel Dzung Kim Le explained that the very expansion of the Chinese economy—however slowed—will lead to a more pronounced naval presence in the South China Sea, coupled with the desire to exploit energy resources there. By declaring an intention to hold its ground in the face of this emerging development, Vietnam is calling forth a nationalism—in all its unyielding intensity—that was last on display during the period of land wars decades ago.
    Vietnamese told me again and again that the South China Sea signifies more than just a system of territorial disputes: it is the crossroads of global maritime commerce, vital to the energy needs of South Korea and Japan, and the place where China could one day check the power of the United States in Asia. Vietnam truly lies at the historic and cultural heart of what Obama administration policymakers increasingly label the “Indo-Pacific”—India plus East Asia.
    Nothing better illustrates the Vietnamese desire to be a major player in the region than their purchase of six state-of-the-art Kilo-class submarines from Russia. A Western defense expert told me that the sale makes no logical sense. “There is going to be real sticker-shock for the Vietnamese when they find out just how much it costs merely to maintain these subs.” More important, the Vietnamese will have to train crews to use them, a generational undertaking. “To counterChinese subs, they would have been better off concentrating on antisubmarine warfare and littoral defense.” Clearly, the Vietnamese bought these submarines as prestige items, to demonstrate that
we’re serious
. According to this defense expert, the Vietnamese are “freaked out” by the construction of a Chinese underground nuclear submarine base on Hainan Island in the Gulf of Tonkin.
    The multibillion-dollar deal with Russia for the submarines includes a $200 million refurbishment of Cam Ranh Bay, one of the finest deep-water anchorages in Southeast Asia, astride the South China Sea maritime routes, and a major base of operations for the U.S. military during the American War. The Vietnamese have stated that their aim is to make Cam Ranh Bay available for use to foreign navies. Ian Storey, a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, says that an unspoken Vietnamese desire is that the Cam Ranh Bay overhaul will “strengthen defense ties with America and facilitate the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia as a counter to China’s rising power.” Cam Ranh Bay plays perfectly into the Pentagon’s
places not bases
strategy, whereby American ships and planes can regularly visit foreign military outposts for repairs and resupply without the need for formal, politically sensitive basing arrangements. U.S. naval platforms—aircraft carriers, destroyers, and resupply and hospital ships—are already visiting Vietnamese ports on a periodic basis. Ngo Quang Xuan, the Foreign Affairs Committee vice