intelligence work during the war. By the early 1950’s Earle was working with Allen Dulles and C. D. Jackson xxiv on various intelligence projects, including “some of the problems of ‘psychological warfare’ directed toward our allies.” 78 Jackson said, “The three big ingredients of psychological warfare are money, no holds barred and no questions asked.” 79
Nelson Rockefeller, whose title was changed to Special Assistant for Cold War Strategy replaced C. D. Jackson as Special Assistant for Psychological Strategy in 1954. Officially Nelson was to give advice and assistance in the development of increased understanding and cooperation among all peoples. Unofficially the nature of the post was Presidential Coordinator for the CIA. As part of Nelson’s responsibilities he attended meetings of the Cabinet, the Council on Foreign Economic Policy and the National Security Council, the highest policy making body in the government. He also functioned as the head of a secret unit called the Planning Coordination Group, consisting of himself, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles. This unit was charged with implementing National Security Council decisions. 80
In 1979 John Loftus, working for the Office of Special Investigations made a trip to Suitland, Maryland to search the archives classified files for information on Nazi’s that had been brought into the country. He was astounded to find twenty underground vaults, each one an acre in size, crammed floor to ceiling with classified files. 81 Loftus says that Nelson Rockefeller and Vice President Nixon had supervised the cover-up and burial of these files so that President Eisenhower could claim “plausible deniability.” 82 In fact, years later when President Gerald Ford established a presidential commission to investigate the CIA, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller was named to head it. John Loftus reports that knowledgeable observers compared the appointment to setting the fox to guard the henhouse, because of Rockefeller’s links to the intelligence community and his knowledge of covert activities. 83
In a recently declassified CIA file, the intelligence gathering community is summed up quite well,
“The life blood of intelligence is information. Collection of information is the most characteristic activity of the entire intelligence business. Accordingly, an intelligence organization cannot exist until it does a broad and systematic job of collecting. But in this very task lie methodological problems, which are so tough as to be almost insolvable, and in their unsolved state are a perpetual source of inefficiency.
A certain important fraction of the knowledge which intelligence must produce is collected through highly developed secret techniques. Herein begins perhaps the major methodological problem of the collection stage of the intelligence process.
It begins with compartmentation of the clandestine services. This compartmentation is dictated by the established necessity of secrecy. An absolute minimum of people must know “anything” about the operation, and the greatest amount of caution and dissimulation must attend its every move. But unless the clandestine services watch sharply it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance, it destroys it own reason for existence.
With a high wall of impenetrable secrecy, it is constantly in danger of collecting the wrong information and not collecting the right. This danger is intensified by the very way the clandestine services operate. It involves highly complicated “tradecraft” techniques, clandestine agent recruitment and handling, nets and subnets, security and reliability of communications, and so on. Isolated by the security barrier, the perfecting of these techniques sometimes threatens to become and end in itself.” 84
All the key
Michelle Betham
Stephanie Rowe
Dawne Prochilo, Dingbat Publishing, Kate Tate
Regina Scott
Jack Lacey
Chris Walley
Chris Walters
Mary Karr
Dona Sarkar
Bonnie R. Paulson