Read Online Then They Came For Me by Maziar Bahari, Aimee Molloy - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Maziar Bahari, Aimee Molloy
Tags: Historical, History, Politics & Social Sciences, Political, Biographies & Memoirs, Law, middle east, Canadian, Leaders & Notable People, Human Rights, Turkey, Memoirs, Middle Eastern, Politics & Government, Specific Topics, Constitutional Law, iran, International & World Politics
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split within the Guards. After many reformists within the regime supported the student riot in 1999, Khamenei ordered the creation of a series of ideological courses, which they called Basirat, or Wisdom, for a selected group of younger members of the Guards. Basirat was more than an indoctrination process; it was also a filtering process for creating the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence unit, which eventually became the country’s main intelligence-gathering and security organization.
According to my friend Amir, the Guards’ intelligence unit had been instrumental in rigging the 2005 election, when Ahmadinejad became president. It was during the four years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency that the Guards had taken over many important economic centers of power in Iran, including the oil industry and the nuclear program. The Guards became Iran’s biggest industrialists, owning many front companies under different pretenses and names in Iran and abroad. There had been several reports of current and former members of the Guards setting up companies in Iran, Dubai, and Canada—which, on the surface, had no connection with the Guards—for the purposeof laundering money for the Guards. In order to continue its monopoly over Iran’s economy, the Guards needed a friendly government in power. Amir said that Guards leaders were preparing to use every resource at their disposal to get Ahmadinejad reelected.
If elected, Mousavi would not be able to stop the Guards, but a transparent government, which he was promising to create, would no doubt interfere with the Guards’ control of Iran’s politics and economy.
Amir told me that after the 2005 election, one of the commanders of the Guards had asked that Amir and all his close associates be removed from the Ministry of Interior. “He knew that my team would never accept tampering with people’s votes,” Amir said. “So they fired all of us.”
The current Minister of Interior, Sadegh Mahsouli, took the cake when it came to corruption. A Guards commander in the 1980s, he had forced many people to sell their houses to him at a fraction of what they were worth. He and his Guards buddies then demolished those houses and built high-rises on the properties. Mahsouli had also taken millions of dollars in bribes from Kurdish and Shia Iraqi refugees who were forced, by Saddam Hussein’s government, to move to Iran in 1991, during the First Gulf War.
In March 2008, when Mahsouli was appointed minister, I decided to write an article about him, but after a few interviews, Amir warned me that I should be very careful about publishing my findings. “The Guards have become like a mafia,” he said at the time, looking me in the eye. “They have taken over the country and can easily eliminate you if they wish.”
I remembered Amir’s warning from more than a year ago as I watched him now, holding his chin with one hand and tapping nervously on his desk with the other. The sun was shining through the blinds, creating ominous lines on Amir’s face; he looked as if he were behind bars. “With Mahsouli in charge ofthe elections, I’m beginning to fear that Ahmadinejad has almost guaranteed his reelection,” Amir said. “They have done their best to manipulate the public before the elections, and now they’re frightened that their plans may not work. Mahsouli is exploring different ways to rig the votes.”
Although Amir opposed everything Khamenei stood for, he had several photos of himself and Khamenei on his desk at home. In one of the photographs, Amir was sitting next to Khamenei as he lay in a hospital bed.
Once, Amir saw me looking at the pictures.
“I’ve known Mr. Khamenei for more than forty years,” he said, taking the first photograph in his hand and cleaning the wooden frame with his index finger. “After the assassination attempt against him in June 1981, his right hand was paralyzed and he almost lost his life. Mr. Khamenei was like a brother to me then, and I
According to my friend Amir, the Guards’ intelligence unit had been instrumental in rigging the 2005 election, when Ahmadinejad became president. It was during the four years of Ahmadinejad’s presidency that the Guards had taken over many important economic centers of power in Iran, including the oil industry and the nuclear program. The Guards became Iran’s biggest industrialists, owning many front companies under different pretenses and names in Iran and abroad. There had been several reports of current and former members of the Guards setting up companies in Iran, Dubai, and Canada—which, on the surface, had no connection with the Guards—for the purposeof laundering money for the Guards. In order to continue its monopoly over Iran’s economy, the Guards needed a friendly government in power. Amir said that Guards leaders were preparing to use every resource at their disposal to get Ahmadinejad reelected.
If elected, Mousavi would not be able to stop the Guards, but a transparent government, which he was promising to create, would no doubt interfere with the Guards’ control of Iran’s politics and economy.
Amir told me that after the 2005 election, one of the commanders of the Guards had asked that Amir and all his close associates be removed from the Ministry of Interior. “He knew that my team would never accept tampering with people’s votes,” Amir said. “So they fired all of us.”
The current Minister of Interior, Sadegh Mahsouli, took the cake when it came to corruption. A Guards commander in the 1980s, he had forced many people to sell their houses to him at a fraction of what they were worth. He and his Guards buddies then demolished those houses and built high-rises on the properties. Mahsouli had also taken millions of dollars in bribes from Kurdish and Shia Iraqi refugees who were forced, by Saddam Hussein’s government, to move to Iran in 1991, during the First Gulf War.
In March 2008, when Mahsouli was appointed minister, I decided to write an article about him, but after a few interviews, Amir warned me that I should be very careful about publishing my findings. “The Guards have become like a mafia,” he said at the time, looking me in the eye. “They have taken over the country and can easily eliminate you if they wish.”
I remembered Amir’s warning from more than a year ago as I watched him now, holding his chin with one hand and tapping nervously on his desk with the other. The sun was shining through the blinds, creating ominous lines on Amir’s face; he looked as if he were behind bars. “With Mahsouli in charge ofthe elections, I’m beginning to fear that Ahmadinejad has almost guaranteed his reelection,” Amir said. “They have done their best to manipulate the public before the elections, and now they’re frightened that their plans may not work. Mahsouli is exploring different ways to rig the votes.”
Although Amir opposed everything Khamenei stood for, he had several photos of himself and Khamenei on his desk at home. In one of the photographs, Amir was sitting next to Khamenei as he lay in a hospital bed.
Once, Amir saw me looking at the pictures.
“I’ve known Mr. Khamenei for more than forty years,” he said, taking the first photograph in his hand and cleaning the wooden frame with his index finger. “After the assassination attempt against him in June 1981, his right hand was paralyzed and he almost lost his life. Mr. Khamenei was like a brother to me then, and I
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