Read Online Then They Came For Me by Maziar Bahari, Aimee Molloy - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Maziar Bahari, Aimee Molloy
Tags: Historical, History, Politics & Social Sciences, Political, Biographies & Memoirs, Law, middle east, Canadian, Leaders & Notable People, Human Rights, Turkey, Memoirs, Middle Eastern, Politics & Government, Specific Topics, Constitutional Law, iran, International & World Politics
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now and then he sent Amir some
gaz
, which always put him in a good mood. But that day, the
gaz
didn’t seem to be having the desired effect. Amir was worried and agitated. He rested his head on his left hand and scratched his chin nervously as he talked to me.
I barely had time to get out my notebook and pen before he launched into an explanation of what he expected would happen with the election: if there was no vote rigging, Mousavi would win the majority of votes, and the election. But, he explained, that was a very big if.
Amir noted that Ahmadinejad seemed to have been preparing himself for this election—and the potential for defeat—for a long time, mostly by appointing the right people to key political positions, especially in the Ministry of Interior. For Ahmadinejad, the right people usually meant members of a new, more inexperienced, and therefore more malleable generation of the Revolutionary Guards, men who had not fought in the Iran-Iraq War. “Men who have experienced war will never support this idiot’s bellicose rhetoric,” Amir said. “War heroes hate war and know it can only cause mayhem and destruction. It isthis new adventurous and corrupt generation of the Guards who act as the foot soldiers of Mr. Khamenei and support Ahmadinejad’s extremism.”
The Revolutionary Guards had been continually expanding its power, and redefining itself, since the organization’s inception in 1979 as a military force. After Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Iran in September 1980, many young men joined the Revolutionary Guards, wanting to defend their country. During the war, the Guards’ power expanded into other areas. While the official Iranian army mostly carried out its military duties, the Guards started import-export companies and built industries. After the November 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, the United States and its allies imposed economic and military sanctions against Iran. The Guards obtained illegal arms from the international arms black market and developed its own engineering organization to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the Iraqis. Its leaders started a new front in the regime’s war against the West and Israel, by training Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. Under Ruhollah Khomeini, the Guards practically had free rein. By the time the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq was signed in 1988, the Guards had become one of the mightiest institutions in Iran.
Its influence expanded further after Khomeini’s death in 1989, when Ali Khamenei replaced him as the supreme leader of Iran and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president. Rafsanjani believed that Iran had to be economically developed and Iranians prosperous before human rights and freedom of expression could be introduced into Iranian life. In the postwar chaos, many Guards members took advantage of this opportunity. Pushing the competition out through threats, intimidation, and brute force, the Guards’ main engineering company, Khatam ol Anbia (the Last Prophet), became Iran’s main industrial contractor, receiving many lucrative contracts in the infrastructure, oil, and petrochemical sectors.
After the war, many members of the Guards resigned and started their own import-export companies with branches outside of Iran. They used their connections inside the government to monopolize parts of the market. The corruption of former guardsmen became legendary as they threatened their competitors, avoided customs, and evaded duty taxes.
As the supreme leader, Khamenei chooses and dismisses each and every commander of the Guards. By selecting only people who are extremely loyal to him as commanders of the Guards, Khamenei tried to turn the Guards into his own private army. Yet many commanders resisted becoming slaves of Khamenei’s, and while they largely remained loyal to him, they also maintained a good relationship with other prominent members of the regime, such as Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami.
This caused a
gaz
, which always put him in a good mood. But that day, the
gaz
didn’t seem to be having the desired effect. Amir was worried and agitated. He rested his head on his left hand and scratched his chin nervously as he talked to me.
I barely had time to get out my notebook and pen before he launched into an explanation of what he expected would happen with the election: if there was no vote rigging, Mousavi would win the majority of votes, and the election. But, he explained, that was a very big if.
Amir noted that Ahmadinejad seemed to have been preparing himself for this election—and the potential for defeat—for a long time, mostly by appointing the right people to key political positions, especially in the Ministry of Interior. For Ahmadinejad, the right people usually meant members of a new, more inexperienced, and therefore more malleable generation of the Revolutionary Guards, men who had not fought in the Iran-Iraq War. “Men who have experienced war will never support this idiot’s bellicose rhetoric,” Amir said. “War heroes hate war and know it can only cause mayhem and destruction. It isthis new adventurous and corrupt generation of the Guards who act as the foot soldiers of Mr. Khamenei and support Ahmadinejad’s extremism.”
The Revolutionary Guards had been continually expanding its power, and redefining itself, since the organization’s inception in 1979 as a military force. After Saddam Hussein’s army invaded Iran in September 1980, many young men joined the Revolutionary Guards, wanting to defend their country. During the war, the Guards’ power expanded into other areas. While the official Iranian army mostly carried out its military duties, the Guards started import-export companies and built industries. After the November 1979 takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, the United States and its allies imposed economic and military sanctions against Iran. The Guards obtained illegal arms from the international arms black market and developed its own engineering organization to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the Iraqis. Its leaders started a new front in the regime’s war against the West and Israel, by training Hezbollah militia in Lebanon. Under Ruhollah Khomeini, the Guards practically had free rein. By the time the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq was signed in 1988, the Guards had become one of the mightiest institutions in Iran.
Its influence expanded further after Khomeini’s death in 1989, when Ali Khamenei replaced him as the supreme leader of Iran and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president. Rafsanjani believed that Iran had to be economically developed and Iranians prosperous before human rights and freedom of expression could be introduced into Iranian life. In the postwar chaos, many Guards members took advantage of this opportunity. Pushing the competition out through threats, intimidation, and brute force, the Guards’ main engineering company, Khatam ol Anbia (the Last Prophet), became Iran’s main industrial contractor, receiving many lucrative contracts in the infrastructure, oil, and petrochemical sectors.
After the war, many members of the Guards resigned and started their own import-export companies with branches outside of Iran. They used their connections inside the government to monopolize parts of the market. The corruption of former guardsmen became legendary as they threatened their competitors, avoided customs, and evaded duty taxes.
As the supreme leader, Khamenei chooses and dismisses each and every commander of the Guards. By selecting only people who are extremely loyal to him as commanders of the Guards, Khamenei tried to turn the Guards into his own private army. Yet many commanders resisted becoming slaves of Khamenei’s, and while they largely remained loyal to him, they also maintained a good relationship with other prominent members of the regime, such as Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami.
This caused a
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