Read Online The Third World War by John Hackett - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: John Hackett
Tags: Military
Ads: Link
attack, perhaps on the USSR itself. There could be no doubt, the argument ran, that the Soviet Union realized this too. It was here, the British seemed to think, that true deterrence lay.
To British politicians in the seventies, under pressure from some of their supporters to cut the defence vote at almost any cost, the approach was an attractive one. It was, in essence, indistinguishable from that of the 1957 White Paper. Whatever it might now be called, British defence policy was still that of trip-wire and massive retaliation, disfigured somewhat by claims that economies, which left front-line troops less capable of fighting, were in fact contributions to military efficiency. Whether this would remain indefinitely acceptable to the United States, which was clearly expected to hold the baby, was another matter.
Professional military men in the parliamentary democracies of the West are generally honest people, loyal to those they serve and reluctant to take part in politics. Many were anxious and deeply disturbed over the situation here described. But as long as the public demanded of their politicians nothing more, and showed little inclination to put up the money for anything better, there was not much that the military men could do. The difficulty was compounded in Britain where, although the Civil Service had been allowed greater freedom of political expression during the late seventies, the tradition that the military must not debate government defence policy in public was still rigorously applied. It was paradoxical that in a country where free speech was so cherished the military remained so firmly muzzled. Nevertheless, in institutes and societies devoted to the debate of public affairs, with which Britain abounded, some awareness grew up among responsible people of the real situation and, in particular, of the dangerously changed character of the air threat to the British Isles and the urgent need to repair its air defences.
The heart and core of the Alliance remained, as it always had been, the United States. There, in the mid-seventies, four tendencies began to converge. First, there was a growing awareness of the true dimensions of the threat. It was accompanied by none of the hysteria occasionally evident in the early fifties but was nonetheless impressive. Second, there was increasing impatience with the reluctance of the European Allies to take a fair share in their own defencean impatience that grew more marked as growing prosperity left the European allies with less and less excuse. Third, it began to be questioned even in Europe whether it would be easy to persuade any American president to invite the incinera-tion of Chicago, for example, if the Northern Army Group in Germany were broken through and there was nothing left to SACEUR but nuclear weapons. Finally, the feeling grew that flexible response should mean just what it said. This implied that a radical review of the defences of the Alliance at the non-nuclear level including the massive contribution of the United States itselfwas overdue.
The European allies did not long remain in ignorance of the trend of opinion on the other side of the Atlantic and the force behind it. In Britain, which was no bad indicator of European opinion, the public began to develop a more receptive attitude. Pressure to make better provision for the air defence of the British Isles, upon which an American effort in Europe would so much depend, now met with a more favourable response. In some of the countries whose troops were assigned to Allied Command Europe, the initiative and example of the United States began at last to be followed. It was certainly clear in Britain that the public was beginning to take a positive interest in defence which the politicians could not forever disregard.
Quite small things often have a decisive effect— SACEUR realized that the lack of reserves in depth in the NORTHAG area, coupled with the inability of NORTHAG either to offer a
To British politicians in the seventies, under pressure from some of their supporters to cut the defence vote at almost any cost, the approach was an attractive one. It was, in essence, indistinguishable from that of the 1957 White Paper. Whatever it might now be called, British defence policy was still that of trip-wire and massive retaliation, disfigured somewhat by claims that economies, which left front-line troops less capable of fighting, were in fact contributions to military efficiency. Whether this would remain indefinitely acceptable to the United States, which was clearly expected to hold the baby, was another matter.
Professional military men in the parliamentary democracies of the West are generally honest people, loyal to those they serve and reluctant to take part in politics. Many were anxious and deeply disturbed over the situation here described. But as long as the public demanded of their politicians nothing more, and showed little inclination to put up the money for anything better, there was not much that the military men could do. The difficulty was compounded in Britain where, although the Civil Service had been allowed greater freedom of political expression during the late seventies, the tradition that the military must not debate government defence policy in public was still rigorously applied. It was paradoxical that in a country where free speech was so cherished the military remained so firmly muzzled. Nevertheless, in institutes and societies devoted to the debate of public affairs, with which Britain abounded, some awareness grew up among responsible people of the real situation and, in particular, of the dangerously changed character of the air threat to the British Isles and the urgent need to repair its air defences.
The heart and core of the Alliance remained, as it always had been, the United States. There, in the mid-seventies, four tendencies began to converge. First, there was a growing awareness of the true dimensions of the threat. It was accompanied by none of the hysteria occasionally evident in the early fifties but was nonetheless impressive. Second, there was increasing impatience with the reluctance of the European Allies to take a fair share in their own defencean impatience that grew more marked as growing prosperity left the European allies with less and less excuse. Third, it began to be questioned even in Europe whether it would be easy to persuade any American president to invite the incinera-tion of Chicago, for example, if the Northern Army Group in Germany were broken through and there was nothing left to SACEUR but nuclear weapons. Finally, the feeling grew that flexible response should mean just what it said. This implied that a radical review of the defences of the Alliance at the non-nuclear level including the massive contribution of the United States itselfwas overdue.
The European allies did not long remain in ignorance of the trend of opinion on the other side of the Atlantic and the force behind it. In Britain, which was no bad indicator of European opinion, the public began to develop a more receptive attitude. Pressure to make better provision for the air defence of the British Isles, upon which an American effort in Europe would so much depend, now met with a more favourable response. In some of the countries whose troops were assigned to Allied Command Europe, the initiative and example of the United States began at last to be followed. It was certainly clear in Britain that the public was beginning to take a positive interest in defence which the politicians could not forever disregard.
Quite small things often have a decisive effect— SACEUR realized that the lack of reserves in depth in the NORTHAG area, coupled with the inability of NORTHAG either to offer a
Similar Books
