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Authors: John Hackett
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planning the defence of the Federal Republic was of no very great consequence in the southern half of it, where difficult terrain gave the Allied forces available there (under American command in the Central Army Group [CENTAG]) some chance of holding a stronger enemy. For the weaker forces deployed in easier and more open country, under British command, in the Northern Army Group ( NORTHAG ), there was far less hope of this. Many would say there was none, and that the only hope of countering an invasion in the north by conventional means lay in abandoning what was described as ‘forward defence’ (which looked uncomfortably linear) and fighting instead a battle of manoeuvre in depth.
Observance of West German susceptibilities over surrender of territory, however, obliged NORTHAG to plan for a forward battle. If the troops (some of whom were stationed a long way back in their home countries, in Belgium and Holland) could be got up in time the attack, under this concept, would be met on, or near, the Demarcation Line with East Germany. With much greater weight on the other side, as well as the initiative in choice of time and place, there could hardly be any chance of holding it there. However it began, the battle was bound to develop in depth, with the outcome being determined by the action of reserves held further back for counter-penetration operations in the first place and then for a counteroffensive.
Such reserves did not exist, even on paper. Why not?
Because, the answer would run, when it became clear that the available conventional forces could not hold the enemy the situation would be restored by the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. There was therefore no great need for conventional forces deployed in depth.
Though the forward location of special weapon stores (in which nuclear warheads were kept) meant that some would be overrun before the weapons could be used, there would still be plenty left. Delay in securing their release, however, was inevitable, even supposing a very early resolution of the agonizing dilemma which impaled the FRG , in whose territory very many of these warheads, if not most, would land. The Allied rubric, moreover, enjoined that no release could be expected before all conventional means had already been tried and exhaustedthat is, in effect, before the conventional battle had been lost, leaving a situation which could almost certainly no longer be ‘restored’.
The wisdom of locating stores of nuclear warheads in vulnerable forward areas was brought in question in 1977, when it was pointed out that nuclear attack was much more likely on fixed, static concentrations than on troop formations in the field, and that in consequence missile attack from submarine launchers might be more sensible than from launchers on the battlefield. By 1984 there had been some reduction in forward holdings but these were still considerable.
Accepting the declared NATO concept of the Triad’, however, and assuming that tactical nuclear weapons were introduced, a nuclear battle would result. For this the Russians were equipped and trained. The British (and most of the other Allies) were not. No major British weapon system in use in 1978, even the newest, offered plausible protection to crewmen fighting in a nuclear environment. Training in movement over contaminated ground was rudimentary, equipment for decontamina-tion and provision for its practiceand even for the acquisition and dissemination of radiation intelligence was far from adequate. British defence policy, in contra-distinction to that of the Soviet Union, clearly embodied no real requirement to fight on a nuclear battlefield. It even seemed that the British contribution to the defence of Europe in the Central Region of the Allied Command contained a deliberate insufficiency, whose purpose was to force on the United States not so much an early release of battlefield nuclear weapons as an almost immediate movement into strategic nuclear
Observance of West German susceptibilities over surrender of territory, however, obliged NORTHAG to plan for a forward battle. If the troops (some of whom were stationed a long way back in their home countries, in Belgium and Holland) could be got up in time the attack, under this concept, would be met on, or near, the Demarcation Line with East Germany. With much greater weight on the other side, as well as the initiative in choice of time and place, there could hardly be any chance of holding it there. However it began, the battle was bound to develop in depth, with the outcome being determined by the action of reserves held further back for counter-penetration operations in the first place and then for a counteroffensive.
Such reserves did not exist, even on paper. Why not?
Because, the answer would run, when it became clear that the available conventional forces could not hold the enemy the situation would be restored by the use of battlefield nuclear weapons. There was therefore no great need for conventional forces deployed in depth.
Though the forward location of special weapon stores (in which nuclear warheads were kept) meant that some would be overrun before the weapons could be used, there would still be plenty left. Delay in securing their release, however, was inevitable, even supposing a very early resolution of the agonizing dilemma which impaled the FRG , in whose territory very many of these warheads, if not most, would land. The Allied rubric, moreover, enjoined that no release could be expected before all conventional means had already been tried and exhaustedthat is, in effect, before the conventional battle had been lost, leaving a situation which could almost certainly no longer be ‘restored’.
The wisdom of locating stores of nuclear warheads in vulnerable forward areas was brought in question in 1977, when it was pointed out that nuclear attack was much more likely on fixed, static concentrations than on troop formations in the field, and that in consequence missile attack from submarine launchers might be more sensible than from launchers on the battlefield. By 1984 there had been some reduction in forward holdings but these were still considerable.
Accepting the declared NATO concept of the Triad’, however, and assuming that tactical nuclear weapons were introduced, a nuclear battle would result. For this the Russians were equipped and trained. The British (and most of the other Allies) were not. No major British weapon system in use in 1978, even the newest, offered plausible protection to crewmen fighting in a nuclear environment. Training in movement over contaminated ground was rudimentary, equipment for decontamina-tion and provision for its practiceand even for the acquisition and dissemination of radiation intelligence was far from adequate. British defence policy, in contra-distinction to that of the Soviet Union, clearly embodied no real requirement to fight on a nuclear battlefield. It even seemed that the British contribution to the defence of Europe in the Central Region of the Allied Command contained a deliberate insufficiency, whose purpose was to force on the United States not so much an early release of battlefield nuclear weapons as an almost immediate movement into strategic nuclear
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