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Authors: John Erickson
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down to less than half-strength, Voronov planned to make massive use of artillery to blast passages for the infantry. Once drafted, Plan Koltso was put on an aircraft for Moscow on 27 December. As Voronov sat back to wait, the chance of serious revision of the plan seemed to him remote since the General Staff had generally confirmed the ideas in a series of exchanges over the telephone.
However, Voronov’s plan came in for some rough handling by the Stavka , which the signal of 28 December made plain:
Comrade Voronov:
The main shortcoming of the plan you presented for Koltso lies in the fact that the main and the supporting attacks diverge from each other and doubtful outcomes which might prejudice success are nowhere eliminated.
In the Stavka’s view, your main task in the first stage of the operation must be the splitting up and annihilation of the western grouping of encircled enemy troops in the Kravtsov–Baburkin–Marinovka–Karpovka area in order to turn the main attack by our troops south from the Dmitrovka–Baburkin area into the Karpovka railway station district, and to direct a supporting attack by 57th Army from the Kravtsov–Sklyarov area into linking up with the main attack, so that both join at Karpovsk railway station.
In line with this should be organized an attack by 66th Army through Orlovka towards Krasnyi-Oktyabr and to meet this—an attack mounted by 62nd Army so that both attacks would link up and thus cut off the factory district from the main enemy forces.
The Stavka instructs you to revise your plan on the basis of these foregoing suggestions. The Stavka confirms the date for opening operations [6 January 1943] as presented by you in your first plan. The first phase of the operation will terminate 5–6 days after its commencement. The plan for the second stage of operations will be presented through the General Staff on January 9, utilizing the first results of the first stage. [VIZ , 1962 (5), note to p. 77.]
Nevertheless, Voronov gained something: the Stavka agreed to a unified command, decided on reinforcing the artillery needed for the operation and despatched 20,000 men as an infantry component. On 1 January 1943, 62nd, 64th and 57th Armies were subordinated to the Don Front, giving Voronov and Rokossovskii a force of thirty-nine rifle divisions, ten rifle brigades, thirty-eight High Command Artillery Reserve regiments, ten Guards Mortar (Katyusha) regiments, five tank brigades, thirteen tank regiments, three armoured trains, seventeen AA regiments, six ‘fortified garrisons’ and fourteen flame-thrower companies. The entire force on the inner encirclement comprised forty-seven divisions (218,000 men), 5,610 guns and mortars, 169 tanks and 300 planes. It was little wonder that Stalin wanted this force freed for other operations as speedily as possible.
On the morning of 3 January, Voronov, Rokossovskii and Malinin met to review the state of the preparations for the attack in three days’ time. There was little to encourage optimism. The reinforcements and supplies lagged behind on the railways, although Voronov had pressed Khrulev to speed things up. To attack on time was a risk; to ask for a postponement meant running foul of Stalin. There was nothing for it, however, in view of the delays with men and ammunitions, but to seek four more days, reasons for which Voronov set out in his letter to the Stavka:
To proceed with the execution of Koltso at the time authorized by you does not seem possible owing to the 4–5 day delay in the arrival of reinforcement units, trains with reinforcement drafts and ammunition trains.
To speed up their movement we agreed to unloading many trains and transport columns at a considerable distance from the points agreed in the plans for detraining and unloading. That measure involved the loss of a great deal of time in then shifting units, reinforcements and ammunition up to the front.
Our correctly proportioned plan was then thrown out of
However, Voronov’s plan came in for some rough handling by the Stavka , which the signal of 28 December made plain:
Comrade Voronov:
The main shortcoming of the plan you presented for Koltso lies in the fact that the main and the supporting attacks diverge from each other and doubtful outcomes which might prejudice success are nowhere eliminated.
In the Stavka’s view, your main task in the first stage of the operation must be the splitting up and annihilation of the western grouping of encircled enemy troops in the Kravtsov–Baburkin–Marinovka–Karpovka area in order to turn the main attack by our troops south from the Dmitrovka–Baburkin area into the Karpovka railway station district, and to direct a supporting attack by 57th Army from the Kravtsov–Sklyarov area into linking up with the main attack, so that both join at Karpovsk railway station.
In line with this should be organized an attack by 66th Army through Orlovka towards Krasnyi-Oktyabr and to meet this—an attack mounted by 62nd Army so that both attacks would link up and thus cut off the factory district from the main enemy forces.
The Stavka instructs you to revise your plan on the basis of these foregoing suggestions. The Stavka confirms the date for opening operations [6 January 1943] as presented by you in your first plan. The first phase of the operation will terminate 5–6 days after its commencement. The plan for the second stage of operations will be presented through the General Staff on January 9, utilizing the first results of the first stage. [VIZ , 1962 (5), note to p. 77.]
Nevertheless, Voronov gained something: the Stavka agreed to a unified command, decided on reinforcing the artillery needed for the operation and despatched 20,000 men as an infantry component. On 1 January 1943, 62nd, 64th and 57th Armies were subordinated to the Don Front, giving Voronov and Rokossovskii a force of thirty-nine rifle divisions, ten rifle brigades, thirty-eight High Command Artillery Reserve regiments, ten Guards Mortar (Katyusha) regiments, five tank brigades, thirteen tank regiments, three armoured trains, seventeen AA regiments, six ‘fortified garrisons’ and fourteen flame-thrower companies. The entire force on the inner encirclement comprised forty-seven divisions (218,000 men), 5,610 guns and mortars, 169 tanks and 300 planes. It was little wonder that Stalin wanted this force freed for other operations as speedily as possible.
On the morning of 3 January, Voronov, Rokossovskii and Malinin met to review the state of the preparations for the attack in three days’ time. There was little to encourage optimism. The reinforcements and supplies lagged behind on the railways, although Voronov had pressed Khrulev to speed things up. To attack on time was a risk; to ask for a postponement meant running foul of Stalin. There was nothing for it, however, in view of the delays with men and ammunitions, but to seek four more days, reasons for which Voronov set out in his letter to the Stavka:
To proceed with the execution of Koltso at the time authorized by you does not seem possible owing to the 4–5 day delay in the arrival of reinforcement units, trains with reinforcement drafts and ammunition trains.
To speed up their movement we agreed to unloading many trains and transport columns at a considerable distance from the points agreed in the plans for detraining and unloading. That measure involved the loss of a great deal of time in then shifting units, reinforcements and ammunition up to the front.
Our correctly proportioned plan was then thrown out of
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