Read Online The Ravenous Brain: How the New Science of Consciousness Explains Our Insatiable Search for Meaning by Daniel Bor - Free Book Online
Authors: Daniel Bor
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Even if it were made perfectly clear that Nao had a silicon brain, the Chinese group would very likely no longer be interested in the bet. Nao would appear fully conscious when tested, both in his mannerisms and conversation—and that would be all the Chinese group would need to steer clear of this silly scam.
I’m willing to confess that my brain-silicon-transplant thought experiment rests on untested intuitions, just as the original thought experiment did. For instance, it may never be practically possible to capture every salient cellular detail of our brains so that they could be exactly simulated within a computer. But at least Nao helps to rebalance things, by suggesting that any appeal to the mysterious, special, noncomputational nature of our minds rests on naive assumptions about how the brain works.
In the end, the most famous attack on the idea that meaning can be found in computer programs, Searle’s Chinese Room, doesn’t seem to be all that convincing, mainly because it implied that the programming required for language communication was grossly simpler than it actually is. Instead, we must at least be open to the idea that our minds really are our brains, which in turn are acting as computers running a certain (parallel) kind of program. Consequently, we could, in principle, be converted into silicon computers at some point, where real meaning and awareness would persist. There is certainly no convincing argument against this view, and I happen to believe it is extremely likely that silicon computers could, in the future, be just as conscious as humans.
The fact of the matter is that we are deluged with the idea of conscious robots in plausible ways in books or on the big screen, and they are believable to us because they are shown to have stupendously complex artificial brains. When we watch Data from Star Trek , or many of the characters in Blade Runner , for instance, we have absolutely no trouble entertaining the possibility that artificially created beings could be conscious in very similar ways to us. Indeed, almost all of these characters live inside worlds where a common theme is the unjust lack of rights they receive as machines. As characters, these androids are at least as aware as the humans enforcing their prejudiced rules.
ERODING THE WALLS OF SUBJECTIVITY
Throughout this chapter, the one enduring philosophical idea, the one argument that seems most robust and least answerable by science, is Descartes’ notion that our consciousness is inevitably subjective. We can never be certain what anyone else experiences, and vice versa. We can replicate any physical property in the world—for instance, manufacture an identical PC on every continent—but we can’t replicate experiences, which are locked inside of the head of the single owner of those experiences. This assertion seems obvious and right, but does it also rely on a set of untested intuitions?
In Vernon, British Columbia, lives a large extended family. Within this busy household, there is a pair of four-year-old identical twin girls, Tatiana and Krista Hogan, who are in many ways like any girls their age. They can be cheeky and playful, and sweet and caring, and when they get tired, they are just as talented as any other four-year-olds at becoming fractious and demanding. What makes them unique is that they are joined at the head and brain, with one twin forced always to face away from the other. Crucially, they seem to have a neural bridge between each other’s thalamus, one of the most central and important regions in the brain. Among other things, this area is a sensory relay station. Although no rigorous scientific studies have so far been carried out on Tatiana and Krista, the anecdotal reports are utterly tantalizing. For instance, if you cover one girl’s eyes and show a teddy bear to the other girl, the unsighted child can identify the toy. If you touch one girl, the other can point to where her twin has been touched.
I’m willing to confess that my brain-silicon-transplant thought experiment rests on untested intuitions, just as the original thought experiment did. For instance, it may never be practically possible to capture every salient cellular detail of our brains so that they could be exactly simulated within a computer. But at least Nao helps to rebalance things, by suggesting that any appeal to the mysterious, special, noncomputational nature of our minds rests on naive assumptions about how the brain works.
In the end, the most famous attack on the idea that meaning can be found in computer programs, Searle’s Chinese Room, doesn’t seem to be all that convincing, mainly because it implied that the programming required for language communication was grossly simpler than it actually is. Instead, we must at least be open to the idea that our minds really are our brains, which in turn are acting as computers running a certain (parallel) kind of program. Consequently, we could, in principle, be converted into silicon computers at some point, where real meaning and awareness would persist. There is certainly no convincing argument against this view, and I happen to believe it is extremely likely that silicon computers could, in the future, be just as conscious as humans.
The fact of the matter is that we are deluged with the idea of conscious robots in plausible ways in books or on the big screen, and they are believable to us because they are shown to have stupendously complex artificial brains. When we watch Data from Star Trek , or many of the characters in Blade Runner , for instance, we have absolutely no trouble entertaining the possibility that artificially created beings could be conscious in very similar ways to us. Indeed, almost all of these characters live inside worlds where a common theme is the unjust lack of rights they receive as machines. As characters, these androids are at least as aware as the humans enforcing their prejudiced rules.
ERODING THE WALLS OF SUBJECTIVITY
Throughout this chapter, the one enduring philosophical idea, the one argument that seems most robust and least answerable by science, is Descartes’ notion that our consciousness is inevitably subjective. We can never be certain what anyone else experiences, and vice versa. We can replicate any physical property in the world—for instance, manufacture an identical PC on every continent—but we can’t replicate experiences, which are locked inside of the head of the single owner of those experiences. This assertion seems obvious and right, but does it also rely on a set of untested intuitions?
In Vernon, British Columbia, lives a large extended family. Within this busy household, there is a pair of four-year-old identical twin girls, Tatiana and Krista Hogan, who are in many ways like any girls their age. They can be cheeky and playful, and sweet and caring, and when they get tired, they are just as talented as any other four-year-olds at becoming fractious and demanding. What makes them unique is that they are joined at the head and brain, with one twin forced always to face away from the other. Crucially, they seem to have a neural bridge between each other’s thalamus, one of the most central and important regions in the brain. Among other things, this area is a sensory relay station. Although no rigorous scientific studies have so far been carried out on Tatiana and Krista, the anecdotal reports are utterly tantalizing. For instance, if you cover one girl’s eyes and show a teddy bear to the other girl, the unsighted child can identify the toy. If you touch one girl, the other can point to where her twin has been touched.
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