Read Online The Pakistan Conspiracy, A Novel Of Espionage by Francesca Salerno - Free Book Online
Authors: Francesca Salerno
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with their nukes and 190 million people, most of them impoverished and angry. It’s impossible to estimate how many Paks are actively jihadist. It’s not a small number. There is absence of civilian governance and decision-making at all levels. Grim economic and energy situations. Corruption everywhere. The only thing that seems to work in Pakistan is the Army.”
“And it’s the Army that has exclusive control of the nukes,” Kate said.
“But the Army is made up of individuals, people with beliefs and agendas. And some of those individuals surely have strong sympathies with Al Qaeda even at the level of brigadier and above.”
“That’s true, but would anyone with that level of authority let loose a nuclear bomb within Pakistan? We know for sure that it would take several co-conspirators to make that happen. No single individual could do it alone, not even the Chief of Army Staff.”
“OK, I agree with that. I could quibble with pieces of it. Permissive action links, the absence of a civilian chain of command. But I won’t. We’ve spent $100 million helping the Paks improve nuclear security since 9/11 and the Army always seems to have a lid on the nuclear sites.”
“It’s unimaginable to me that Al Qaeda would penetrate Pakistan’s nuclear sites.”
“Here’s a ‘what if’ for you: Let’s say the Pakistani Taliban engaged the Army in an area not far from a base where nuclear weapons are stored. The Army decides they need to move them, and the convoy is then incredibly vulnerable to capture.”
“Mort Feldman wrote a cable about that scenario a year ago,” Kate said. “He discussed it with Mahmood Mahmood, who served a stint in the Strategic Forces Command before he got his first star and moved to ISI.”
“That’s the outfit responsible for deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?”
“Exactly, based in Rawalpindi. Mahmood was a colonel back then. Served with the SFC for seven years. He showed us that their procedures for moving nuclear arms was well-thought-out, modeled on training we provided.”
“There’s always a weak point,” Wheatley said. “Moving your nuclear assets is always risky. What scares the hell out of me is that the Army says personnel assigned to nuclear facilities are all vetted by the ISI. And we know for sure that the ISI was instrumental in creating the Pakistani Taliban in the first place. There are moles within the ISI sympathetic to the militants. The bastards with the beards.”
“I don’t think anyone would guarantee that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are totally secure,” Kate agreed.
“So you have a situation, potentially, where despite the vetting procedures in place, Taliban or Al Qaeda manages to get work in a nuclear facility, somewhere like the A. Q. Khan lab, and steals enriched uranium or fissile material.”
“It’s a risk,” Kate agreed. “Vetting personnel isn’t foolproof. But access to fissile materials is not the same as access to a completed bomb.”
“They could make a dirty bomb,” Wheatley said. “Wrap the radioactive stuff around C4, dynamite...”
“Sure, but that’s not in the same ballpark as a functioning nuclear device. Hundreds dead instead of thousands. Or millions.”
Wheatley got up from his desk. He picked up a thick folder from the small circular conference table in a corner of the office.
“I want you to go through this traffic,” he said. “I’ve already read these myself, you’ll see my markings and comments, but I want your take on it. I’m half-tempted to send you back out there right now, but I have a feeling that some of this nuclear bomb stuff is just a red herring. You can imagine how much attention this gets at the White House and on the Hill, distracting us from everything else. Meanwhile, no one has heard anything about Al-Zawahiri for weeks. My fear is that we haven’t put the two of them together. That’s the real
“And it’s the Army that has exclusive control of the nukes,” Kate said.
“But the Army is made up of individuals, people with beliefs and agendas. And some of those individuals surely have strong sympathies with Al Qaeda even at the level of brigadier and above.”
“That’s true, but would anyone with that level of authority let loose a nuclear bomb within Pakistan? We know for sure that it would take several co-conspirators to make that happen. No single individual could do it alone, not even the Chief of Army Staff.”
“OK, I agree with that. I could quibble with pieces of it. Permissive action links, the absence of a civilian chain of command. But I won’t. We’ve spent $100 million helping the Paks improve nuclear security since 9/11 and the Army always seems to have a lid on the nuclear sites.”
“It’s unimaginable to me that Al Qaeda would penetrate Pakistan’s nuclear sites.”
“Here’s a ‘what if’ for you: Let’s say the Pakistani Taliban engaged the Army in an area not far from a base where nuclear weapons are stored. The Army decides they need to move them, and the convoy is then incredibly vulnerable to capture.”
“Mort Feldman wrote a cable about that scenario a year ago,” Kate said. “He discussed it with Mahmood Mahmood, who served a stint in the Strategic Forces Command before he got his first star and moved to ISI.”
“That’s the outfit responsible for deployment of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons?”
“Exactly, based in Rawalpindi. Mahmood was a colonel back then. Served with the SFC for seven years. He showed us that their procedures for moving nuclear arms was well-thought-out, modeled on training we provided.”
“There’s always a weak point,” Wheatley said. “Moving your nuclear assets is always risky. What scares the hell out of me is that the Army says personnel assigned to nuclear facilities are all vetted by the ISI. And we know for sure that the ISI was instrumental in creating the Pakistani Taliban in the first place. There are moles within the ISI sympathetic to the militants. The bastards with the beards.”
“I don’t think anyone would guarantee that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are totally secure,” Kate agreed.
“So you have a situation, potentially, where despite the vetting procedures in place, Taliban or Al Qaeda manages to get work in a nuclear facility, somewhere like the A. Q. Khan lab, and steals enriched uranium or fissile material.”
“It’s a risk,” Kate agreed. “Vetting personnel isn’t foolproof. But access to fissile materials is not the same as access to a completed bomb.”
“They could make a dirty bomb,” Wheatley said. “Wrap the radioactive stuff around C4, dynamite...”
“Sure, but that’s not in the same ballpark as a functioning nuclear device. Hundreds dead instead of thousands. Or millions.”
Wheatley got up from his desk. He picked up a thick folder from the small circular conference table in a corner of the office.
“I want you to go through this traffic,” he said. “I’ve already read these myself, you’ll see my markings and comments, but I want your take on it. I’m half-tempted to send you back out there right now, but I have a feeling that some of this nuclear bomb stuff is just a red herring. You can imagine how much attention this gets at the White House and on the Hill, distracting us from everything else. Meanwhile, no one has heard anything about Al-Zawahiri for weeks. My fear is that we haven’t put the two of them together. That’s the real
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