the Compulsory Work Service. By the end of 1943 some 650,000 Frenchmen and women had been shipped off to slave for the Reich.
Those who sought to avoid the STO fled into the remoter stretches of the French countryside, becoming maquisards. The name Maquis appears to have been taken from the word for ‘bush’ or ‘scrub’, the kind of terrain they tended to hide out in. At first, a Maquis wasn’t someone who necessarily took up arms. Many were keen only to avoid being fed into Nazi Germany’s vast slave-labour operation, from which few would return. But there were those too who were desperate to fight.
Against this growing body of Maquis, the Reich employed the full panoply of state oppression. France was garrisoned by two types of force: German combat troops, tasked to prevent an Allied landing and liberation; and occupation troops, responsible for keeping iron control over the French population. The former were some of the best fighting soldiers available; the latter were often former prisoners of war – Russians, Ukrainians, and even Indians and North Africans – who had opted to switch sides rather than languish in the POW camps.
The occupation troops were generally ill-disciplined and cruel. Commanded by Germans, they fell under the control of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office): the Nazi intelligence services and secret police, known more commonly as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and the Gestapo. They made wide use of informers and quislings, particularly from within the Milice – the pro-Nazi French militia raised under German occupation. The Milice was trained and armed by the SS, Hitler’s personal shock troops, and ordered to hunt down the Maquis.
When facing such an array of powerful and unsavoury adversaries, the Alsace Maquis appeared hopelessly outgunned. But if Druce’s men could get proper supplies of weaponry airdropped to them, Colonel Grandval’s Maquis would doubtless prove a force to be reckoned with. Aided by their Jedburgh advisers, they should be well placed to set the Vosges aflame.
One other thing was crystal clear after the long trek to the Maquis’ mountaintop hideout: they couldn’t count on covering much ground over such precipitous and punishing terrain. Druce’s men had managed to travel just 10 miles in ten hours.
That evening they pooled their rations with the Maquis, whose food supplies consisted mostly of a coffee substitute made from roasted acorns, coarse brown bread, meat and a ready supply of vegetables. Their hosts rustled up a meal and, once the famished and exhausted newcomers had eaten, they settled down to rest, safe in the knowledge that the Maquis had set watch for the night.
In the Op Loyton war diary, Druce described their Lac de la Maix base as being ‘well-organised and well-run’, and set ‘in a good defensive position’ on the hilltop. He wrote of being treated to ‘an excellent meal’ and of ‘sleeping the clock around’. For now at least, he and his men felt secure.
Druce awoke early the following morning to fine sunlight lancing through the branches and birdsong serenading the dawn. It was such a peaceful, bracing scene – the mountain air cool and invigorating at such an altitude – that it was hard to believe the world could be at war. Druce found that the climb followed by the long sleep had completely cured any lingering muzzy-headedness, and he figured it was time to get down to the serious business of waging war.
In their rushed pre-departure briefing Colonel Franks had made it clear that time was of the essence with Op Loyton. Druce needed to get the main force in as quickly as possible. Yet, at the same time, he didn’t want to signal the all clear until he had a good sense of the lie of the land, and especially of the Maquis’ capabilities.
Colonel Grandval’s local commander at Lac de la Maix was Lieutenant Félix LeFranc. He was supported by a small nucleus of former French Army officers. There were some eighty Maquis
Those who sought to avoid the STO fled into the remoter stretches of the French countryside, becoming maquisards. The name Maquis appears to have been taken from the word for ‘bush’ or ‘scrub’, the kind of terrain they tended to hide out in. At first, a Maquis wasn’t someone who necessarily took up arms. Many were keen only to avoid being fed into Nazi Germany’s vast slave-labour operation, from which few would return. But there were those too who were desperate to fight.
Against this growing body of Maquis, the Reich employed the full panoply of state oppression. France was garrisoned by two types of force: German combat troops, tasked to prevent an Allied landing and liberation; and occupation troops, responsible for keeping iron control over the French population. The former were some of the best fighting soldiers available; the latter were often former prisoners of war – Russians, Ukrainians, and even Indians and North Africans – who had opted to switch sides rather than languish in the POW camps.
The occupation troops were generally ill-disciplined and cruel. Commanded by Germans, they fell under the control of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office): the Nazi intelligence services and secret police, known more commonly as the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and the Gestapo. They made wide use of informers and quislings, particularly from within the Milice – the pro-Nazi French militia raised under German occupation. The Milice was trained and armed by the SS, Hitler’s personal shock troops, and ordered to hunt down the Maquis.
When facing such an array of powerful and unsavoury adversaries, the Alsace Maquis appeared hopelessly outgunned. But if Druce’s men could get proper supplies of weaponry airdropped to them, Colonel Grandval’s Maquis would doubtless prove a force to be reckoned with. Aided by their Jedburgh advisers, they should be well placed to set the Vosges aflame.
One other thing was crystal clear after the long trek to the Maquis’ mountaintop hideout: they couldn’t count on covering much ground over such precipitous and punishing terrain. Druce’s men had managed to travel just 10 miles in ten hours.
That evening they pooled their rations with the Maquis, whose food supplies consisted mostly of a coffee substitute made from roasted acorns, coarse brown bread, meat and a ready supply of vegetables. Their hosts rustled up a meal and, once the famished and exhausted newcomers had eaten, they settled down to rest, safe in the knowledge that the Maquis had set watch for the night.
In the Op Loyton war diary, Druce described their Lac de la Maix base as being ‘well-organised and well-run’, and set ‘in a good defensive position’ on the hilltop. He wrote of being treated to ‘an excellent meal’ and of ‘sleeping the clock around’. For now at least, he and his men felt secure.
Druce awoke early the following morning to fine sunlight lancing through the branches and birdsong serenading the dawn. It was such a peaceful, bracing scene – the mountain air cool and invigorating at such an altitude – that it was hard to believe the world could be at war. Druce found that the climb followed by the long sleep had completely cured any lingering muzzy-headedness, and he figured it was time to get down to the serious business of waging war.
In their rushed pre-departure briefing Colonel Franks had made it clear that time was of the essence with Op Loyton. Druce needed to get the main force in as quickly as possible. Yet, at the same time, he didn’t want to signal the all clear until he had a good sense of the lie of the land, and especially of the Maquis’ capabilities.
Colonel Grandval’s local commander at Lac de la Maix was Lieutenant Félix LeFranc. He was supported by a small nucleus of former French Army officers. There were some eighty Maquis
Similar Books
