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Authors: Thomas Fleming
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ambassador Cecil Spring Rice, whose dislike of Wilson frequently surfaced in his dispatches. In the front row, two of La Follette’s oldest friends—journalist Gilson Gardner and reformer Amos Pinchot, pioneer members of the progressive movement—remained for the entire speech. They had not spoken to the senator in five years, because they had backed Theodore Roosevelt for the Progressive Party’s nomination in 1912. La Follette had regarded that decision as a betrayal. But they had come to hear him, because they too opposed the war.
La Follette launched a searching appraisal of the origins of the war. Germany was only partly responsible. All the belligerent powers bore some blame. But the overarching cause was England’s determination to destroy Germany as a commercial rival. He devoted several minutes to England’s unsavory conduct in the 1911 crisis over Morocco. Here, Germany, England and France had signed a treaty permitting individual Germans to do business in the country. But England and France executed a secret treaty, agreeing to drive the Germans out. In return, France abandoned its claims to commercial rights in Egypt. When England backed the expulsion of the Germans, Europe almost went to war. La Follette quoted the English journalist William T. Stead, who called this underhanded diplomacy “an almost incredible crime against treaty faith.” 72
Grimly La Follette reiterated:“It was our absolute right as a neutral to ship food to the people of Germany.” It was a right the United States had asserted since its foundation as a nation.“The failure to treat the belligerent nations alike, to reject the illegal war zones of both Germany and Great Britain, is wholly accountable for our present dilemma.” Instead of admitting this failure, the country was trying to “inflame the mind of our people into the frenzy of war.” 73
There were only two ways out of this quandary. The first would be for the United States to admit its mistake and enforce its rights against Great Britain as strenuously as it had insisted on its rights against Germany. The other alternative would be to withhold food from both sides.
Without attempting a peroration beyond this stark choice, La Follette stopped speaking at 6:45 P.M. Tears streamed down his cheeks. To Amos Pinchot, he looked like a despairing man who had “failed to keep his child from doing itself irreparable harm.” Gilson Gardner turned to Pinchot and said,“That is the greatest speech we will either of us ever hear.” 74
XIX
Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi leaped to his feet and began living up to his middle name. Williams had his own agenda. He saw the war as a chance to redeem the secessionist South in the eyes of the ruling North. In his speeches, he often dilated on how Southerners would volunteer en masse and go to war to the strains of “Dixie.” This vision added fuel to his ire. La Follette, he sneered, had given a speech “that would have better become Herr Bethmann-Hollweg,” a reference to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the chancellor of Germany. Williams called the speech “pro-German, pretty nearly pro-Goth and pro-Vandal.” It was also “anti American president, anti-American Congress and anti-American people.” The Mississippian continued insulting La Follette, violating all the rules of Senate courtesy, for another seven pages of the Congressional Record . No senator tried to stop him. Several times, he drew guffaws from the galleries. 75
Williams’s harangue was followed by more oratory, all of it pro-war. Finally, at eleven minutes after eleven, the Senate voted. The crowded gallery listened in absolute silence. Many of the lawmakers’ voices quivered with emotion. La Follette’s “No” rang out with characteristic firmness. When the clerk announced the final tally, 82 to 6, not a hand clapped, not a voice cheered in the galleries. Somehow, declaring war no longer seemed a cause for celebration. In the corridor, as
La Follette launched a searching appraisal of the origins of the war. Germany was only partly responsible. All the belligerent powers bore some blame. But the overarching cause was England’s determination to destroy Germany as a commercial rival. He devoted several minutes to England’s unsavory conduct in the 1911 crisis over Morocco. Here, Germany, England and France had signed a treaty permitting individual Germans to do business in the country. But England and France executed a secret treaty, agreeing to drive the Germans out. In return, France abandoned its claims to commercial rights in Egypt. When England backed the expulsion of the Germans, Europe almost went to war. La Follette quoted the English journalist William T. Stead, who called this underhanded diplomacy “an almost incredible crime against treaty faith.” 72
Grimly La Follette reiterated:“It was our absolute right as a neutral to ship food to the people of Germany.” It was a right the United States had asserted since its foundation as a nation.“The failure to treat the belligerent nations alike, to reject the illegal war zones of both Germany and Great Britain, is wholly accountable for our present dilemma.” Instead of admitting this failure, the country was trying to “inflame the mind of our people into the frenzy of war.” 73
There were only two ways out of this quandary. The first would be for the United States to admit its mistake and enforce its rights against Great Britain as strenuously as it had insisted on its rights against Germany. The other alternative would be to withhold food from both sides.
Without attempting a peroration beyond this stark choice, La Follette stopped speaking at 6:45 P.M. Tears streamed down his cheeks. To Amos Pinchot, he looked like a despairing man who had “failed to keep his child from doing itself irreparable harm.” Gilson Gardner turned to Pinchot and said,“That is the greatest speech we will either of us ever hear.” 74
XIX
Senator John Sharp Williams of Mississippi leaped to his feet and began living up to his middle name. Williams had his own agenda. He saw the war as a chance to redeem the secessionist South in the eyes of the ruling North. In his speeches, he often dilated on how Southerners would volunteer en masse and go to war to the strains of “Dixie.” This vision added fuel to his ire. La Follette, he sneered, had given a speech “that would have better become Herr Bethmann-Hollweg,” a reference to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the chancellor of Germany. Williams called the speech “pro-German, pretty nearly pro-Goth and pro-Vandal.” It was also “anti American president, anti-American Congress and anti-American people.” The Mississippian continued insulting La Follette, violating all the rules of Senate courtesy, for another seven pages of the Congressional Record . No senator tried to stop him. Several times, he drew guffaws from the galleries. 75
Williams’s harangue was followed by more oratory, all of it pro-war. Finally, at eleven minutes after eleven, the Senate voted. The crowded gallery listened in absolute silence. Many of the lawmakers’ voices quivered with emotion. La Follette’s “No” rang out with characteristic firmness. When the clerk announced the final tally, 82 to 6, not a hand clapped, not a voice cheered in the galleries. Somehow, declaring war no longer seemed a cause for celebration. In the corridor, as
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