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Authors: Andrew Cook
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which the special security arrangements would be relaxed were matters for the police to decide. Subject to the concurrence of the police we would be prepared to:-
(a) withdraw the 2 IB men travelling on the train;
(b) withdraw the TPO Inspector travelling on the nights when HVPs were heaviest;
(c) agree to a reduction in the number of escorting BT police.
The other security arrangements which had been made by the Post Office would remain as permanent features.
3. It was agreed that in discussing the extent to which the police could relax their efforts, we should express the hope that they would continue their supervision at TPO stopping points.
4. During the scare the civil police forces had maintained close radio contact with the Up TPOs throughout their respective territories. They might want to curtail this procedure to checking in and out of each constabulary. We would prefer calls from the train to the police every 10 minutes (the time interval Chief Constables had been asked nationally to agree to) but it was agreed that the frequency of calls must ultimately be left to the Chief Constables.
5. Mr Osmond explained that he was committed to attending the meeting and would take Mr Edwards with him. It was agreed that they should speak on behalf of all Post Office interests and Messrs. McMorran and Shires need not attend. Mr McMorran would advise the Chief Constable, Hampshire accordingly. Mr McMorran also agreed to let Mr Osmond have a list of the security arrangements on the SWTPO made by the PO and a list of TPO stopping points which had telecommunication with the Police.
6. Mr McMorran mentioned DDG’s enquiry as to who gave the information about ‘Primrose’ to the press. Mr Osmond confirmed that so far as he was aware it was not given by a member of the Post Office staff. He did not know whether the press release had been inspired by the police but agreed to let PSD/PMB/S know if he got any information from the meeting at Winchester.
7. Mr Osmond asked about progress with development of an odometer. Mr McMorran said ED/W had now reached the point where a practical test was imminent: there had been a lot of design snags to overcome.
Note: Mr Hyatt ED/W, has since stated that development work has been slow because the novelty of the device had thrown up serious design problems which had never before been tackled eg the need to take account of wheel wear, and wheel slip, to ensure accurate mileage recording. It would probably be a month or two yet before design could be finalised.
(G McMORRAN)
22 April 1964 23
By the end of April, Commander Hatherill had decided that the threat level had reduced sufficiently to stand-down many of the security measures on the SW TPO route. However, he and his Flying Squad subordinates seemed little interested in pursuing the question of who had sparked off the whole episode by furnishing the inside information necessary to rob the Weymouth-Waterloo express.
Notes
1 . DPP 2/3717, Report 15 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/5/10). Only the first paragraph of the report on the Great Dover Street incident, reproduced here, is publicly available. From the end of this paragraph onwards, the entire page that follows has been redacted and remains closed until 2045.
2 . Frank Williams, No Fixed Address , p. 76 ff.
3 . According to a former Flying Squad officer, who was a close colleague of Frank Williams and who accompanied him later that evening on the Roy James arrest, this was not in fact what happened, but what was retrospectively entered into the police report. According to the officer, who spoke privately to the author in July 2010, Williams himself made the ‘anonymous’ call to place it on record having already arranged the time and location of the drop with his contact. Frederick Foreman also alludes to this incident and his own involvement in his book The Godfather of British Crime (John
(a) withdraw the 2 IB men travelling on the train;
(b) withdraw the TPO Inspector travelling on the nights when HVPs were heaviest;
(c) agree to a reduction in the number of escorting BT police.
The other security arrangements which had been made by the Post Office would remain as permanent features.
3. It was agreed that in discussing the extent to which the police could relax their efforts, we should express the hope that they would continue their supervision at TPO stopping points.
4. During the scare the civil police forces had maintained close radio contact with the Up TPOs throughout their respective territories. They might want to curtail this procedure to checking in and out of each constabulary. We would prefer calls from the train to the police every 10 minutes (the time interval Chief Constables had been asked nationally to agree to) but it was agreed that the frequency of calls must ultimately be left to the Chief Constables.
5. Mr Osmond explained that he was committed to attending the meeting and would take Mr Edwards with him. It was agreed that they should speak on behalf of all Post Office interests and Messrs. McMorran and Shires need not attend. Mr McMorran would advise the Chief Constable, Hampshire accordingly. Mr McMorran also agreed to let Mr Osmond have a list of the security arrangements on the SWTPO made by the PO and a list of TPO stopping points which had telecommunication with the Police.
6. Mr McMorran mentioned DDG’s enquiry as to who gave the information about ‘Primrose’ to the press. Mr Osmond confirmed that so far as he was aware it was not given by a member of the Post Office staff. He did not know whether the press release had been inspired by the police but agreed to let PSD/PMB/S know if he got any information from the meeting at Winchester.
7. Mr Osmond asked about progress with development of an odometer. Mr McMorran said ED/W had now reached the point where a practical test was imminent: there had been a lot of design snags to overcome.
Note: Mr Hyatt ED/W, has since stated that development work has been slow because the novelty of the device had thrown up serious design problems which had never before been tackled eg the need to take account of wheel wear, and wheel slip, to ensure accurate mileage recording. It would probably be a month or two yet before design could be finalised.
(G McMORRAN)
22 April 1964 23
By the end of April, Commander Hatherill had decided that the threat level had reduced sufficiently to stand-down many of the security measures on the SW TPO route. However, he and his Flying Squad subordinates seemed little interested in pursuing the question of who had sparked off the whole episode by furnishing the inside information necessary to rob the Weymouth-Waterloo express.
Notes
1 . DPP 2/3717, Report 15 (originally closed until 2045; redacted version opened 25/5/10). Only the first paragraph of the report on the Great Dover Street incident, reproduced here, is publicly available. From the end of this paragraph onwards, the entire page that follows has been redacted and remains closed until 2045.
2 . Frank Williams, No Fixed Address , p. 76 ff.
3 . According to a former Flying Squad officer, who was a close colleague of Frank Williams and who accompanied him later that evening on the Roy James arrest, this was not in fact what happened, but what was retrospectively entered into the police report. According to the officer, who spoke privately to the author in July 2010, Williams himself made the ‘anonymous’ call to place it on record having already arranged the time and location of the drop with his contact. Frederick Foreman also alludes to this incident and his own involvement in his book The Godfather of British Crime (John
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