political system, they were now clearly part of the wartime establishment. As the war went on, and many on the left became disillusioned with Germany’s cause, considerable numbers of their political representatives, including fifteen Reichstag deputies, as well as large numbers of the original party’s most passionate activists, peeled off to form a breakaway Social Democrat party that called for an immediate peace. Ebert’s faction, still considerably the larger, became known as ‘Majority Social Democrats’, while the anti-war left took the name of ‘Independent Social Democrats’. That was how things remained until the autumn of 1918 arrived, and with it the sudden and, to many, surprising collapse in German hopes of victory.
Prince Max was forced to take on the chancellorship because in September the armed forces – more specifically Ludendorff – had looked at the military situation and decided that the army could not go on. On 29 September, Ludendorff marched into a meeting of the High Command and announced as much. The Macedonian and Italian fronts could no longer hold. With Bulgaria, Germany’s chief Balkan ally, suing for peace, Turkey on its knees and Austria-Hungary likewise on the brink of surrender, even if by some miracle Germany managed to hold on to what was left of her gains on the Western Front, she could not survive more than a matter of weeks before the enemy came roaring up from the south.
Not only had Ludendorff announced the imminence of defeat, but the general – hitherto a fiercely anti-democratic Pan-German nationalist – had also told the appalled commanders, including Wilhelm II, that they would have to concede real liberal reforms. Only in this way could they keep the support of the masses, and mollify the enemy with whom they would soon have to negotiate. Had not President Wilson of the United States, in whose rapidly expanding industrial power and limitless reserve of fighting men the Entente was placing its hopes of victory, not proclaimed as part of his ‘Fourteen Points’ a conviction that the coming peace should be based not on revenge and conquest but on the democratic self-determination of peoples? Then let Germany become the political creature that America desired!
Count Hertling, a Catholic Bavarian nobleman in his mid-seventies who had been a largely figurehead Chancellor for the past year or so, refused to serve a parliamentary regime. On Hertling’s recommendation, the Kaiser called on Maximilian Alexander Friedrich Wilhelm von Baden. Nephew and heir presumptive of the Grand Duke of Baden, in south-west Germany, Prince Max was known for his relatively liberal views. He had opposed unrestricted submarine warfare (the step, vigorously promoted by Ludendorff and the ultra-nationalists, which had finally brought America into the war against Germany), was prominent in the Red Cross, and until the end of American neutrality had chaired a German-American prisoner of war aid society set up under the auspices of the Young Men’s Christian Association. He immediately invited Social Democrat, Catholic (Centre) Party and Liberal Reichstag deputies to join his government. The day after his appointment, as instructed by the High Command, the Prince formally submitted to the enemy powers his request for talks that would lead to an armistice and ultimately to a peace treaty based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
Whether it was a matter of the military recovering its nerve, or of there having been a plan all along aimed at shuffling off the blame for a humiliating peace on to democratic politicians, towards the end of October Prince Max and his ministers found that Ludendorff had reverted from peace campaigner back to his old, diehard, victory-or-death self. The military and political realities that had caused Ludendorff’s decision a month earlier to push for peace had not changed. However, although Prince Max’s government had agreed to abandon the submarine campaign and to
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