Read Online The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance by Rupert Matthews - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Rupert Matthews
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Most units had received these orders by the early hours of the morning, but some had not – since they had moved from their original locations in accordance with the first orders. The third orders had told all units to go to Quatre Bras as quickly as possible. Only a few units had received these orders by dawn since in most cases the messengers could not find them – either because they had moved, or because the messengers got lost in the dark or simply due to the confusion caused by so many units being on the move at once.
The result was that by dawn many units were without orders, many had not reached where they thought they were meant to be and others had no idea what they were supposed to be doing.
For instance, Captain Mercer of the Royal Horse Artillery had as his second set of orders to go to Braine-le-Comte and there to await Major MacDonald of the RHA, who would give him further orders when and if necessary. Mercer got to the rendezvous, though not without having lost his ammunition wagons. They turned up three hours later having taken a different road, but there was no sign of MacDonald. By lunchtime Mercer was still without orders, though thousands of men were streaming past him heading east. When he spotted General Vandeleur of the Dutch dragoons, Mercer rode over to ask advice. ‘I know nothing about you, sir,’ came the brusque reply and Vandeleur rode on.
At 3 pm another battery of the RHA came clattering by, led by Major Bull. Again Mercer asked advice. Bull said that Mercer should follow him, even though he had no orders either and was instead following a regiment of dragoons who did have firm orders. Mercer set off with his guns and an hour later was overtaken by the errant Major MacDonald who handed him orders to accompany the Household Brigade of cavalry. Unfortunately neither Mercer nor MacDonald knew where the Household Brigade was, so Mercer carried on with Major Bull and the dragoons. He eventually ended up at Quatre Bras after nightfall.
The sheer scale of the confusion was not appreciated by Wellington, nor by his staff led by de Lancey. The British army had standard tables that gave times that should be allowed for messengers to travel cross-country and deliver orders and for the unit receiving the orders to get underway. De Lancey applied these standardized times to the third set of orders and worked out where each unit should be. The vast majority of them were not there, of course. However Wellington would base his actions that day on de Lancey’s estimates.
Commanders at Brye
At about 10 am Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras to find the crossroads defended by some 8,000 men with more arriving by the minute. The French, he was told, had launched some small-scale probing attacks about two hours earlier but had been quiet since. Assuming all was well, Wellington rode on to the east to try to find Blücher. The two men and their staffs met at the windmill at Brye.
The following conversation was only slightly hindered by the fact that Wellington spoke no German while Blücher and Gneisenau spoke no English. Müffling acted as interpreter. When the pleasantries were over, Wellington asked a question that appeared to be simple, but was not. ‘What do you want me to do?’
Blücher and Gneisenau knew exactly what they wanted Wellington to do and were delighted by his co-operative attitude. After all, they both had lingering doubts about British commitment to the cause and all three knew of the diplomatic disputes that had taken place in Vienna and that might break out again at any time.
Blücher’s plan of campaign envisaged his army standing on the defensive at Ligny to halt the French advance, while Wellington marched from Quatre Bras to take the French in the left flank and ensure their destruction. It seemed a simple enough plan, but there were problems. For a start, Blücher had only part of his army with him at Ligny. The I Corps of Zieten was there, but had been disordered
The result was that by dawn many units were without orders, many had not reached where they thought they were meant to be and others had no idea what they were supposed to be doing.
For instance, Captain Mercer of the Royal Horse Artillery had as his second set of orders to go to Braine-le-Comte and there to await Major MacDonald of the RHA, who would give him further orders when and if necessary. Mercer got to the rendezvous, though not without having lost his ammunition wagons. They turned up three hours later having taken a different road, but there was no sign of MacDonald. By lunchtime Mercer was still without orders, though thousands of men were streaming past him heading east. When he spotted General Vandeleur of the Dutch dragoons, Mercer rode over to ask advice. ‘I know nothing about you, sir,’ came the brusque reply and Vandeleur rode on.
At 3 pm another battery of the RHA came clattering by, led by Major Bull. Again Mercer asked advice. Bull said that Mercer should follow him, even though he had no orders either and was instead following a regiment of dragoons who did have firm orders. Mercer set off with his guns and an hour later was overtaken by the errant Major MacDonald who handed him orders to accompany the Household Brigade of cavalry. Unfortunately neither Mercer nor MacDonald knew where the Household Brigade was, so Mercer carried on with Major Bull and the dragoons. He eventually ended up at Quatre Bras after nightfall.
The sheer scale of the confusion was not appreciated by Wellington, nor by his staff led by de Lancey. The British army had standard tables that gave times that should be allowed for messengers to travel cross-country and deliver orders and for the unit receiving the orders to get underway. De Lancey applied these standardized times to the third set of orders and worked out where each unit should be. The vast majority of them were not there, of course. However Wellington would base his actions that day on de Lancey’s estimates.
Commanders at Brye
At about 10 am Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras to find the crossroads defended by some 8,000 men with more arriving by the minute. The French, he was told, had launched some small-scale probing attacks about two hours earlier but had been quiet since. Assuming all was well, Wellington rode on to the east to try to find Blücher. The two men and their staffs met at the windmill at Brye.
The following conversation was only slightly hindered by the fact that Wellington spoke no German while Blücher and Gneisenau spoke no English. Müffling acted as interpreter. When the pleasantries were over, Wellington asked a question that appeared to be simple, but was not. ‘What do you want me to do?’
Blücher and Gneisenau knew exactly what they wanted Wellington to do and were delighted by his co-operative attitude. After all, they both had lingering doubts about British commitment to the cause and all three knew of the diplomatic disputes that had taken place in Vienna and that might break out again at any time.
Blücher’s plan of campaign envisaged his army standing on the defensive at Ligny to halt the French advance, while Wellington marched from Quatre Bras to take the French in the left flank and ensure their destruction. It seemed a simple enough plan, but there were problems. For a start, Blücher had only part of his army with him at Ligny. The I Corps of Zieten was there, but had been disordered
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