Read Online The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance by Rupert Matthews - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Rupert Matthews
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an officer in 1792 and just four years later attained general rank. In 1804 he was one of the first officers to be created marshal of the empire by Napoleon and thereafter was one of Napoleon’s favourite commanders. He fought in Spain against Wellington, where he achieved some successes before being moved to join the invasion of Russia in 1812. It was during this campaign that he gained the nickname of ‘Bravest of the Brave’. In 1814 he led the marshals who demanded Napoleon’s abdication and then transferred his loyalties to the restored King Louis XVIII of France.
Marshal Ney, 1769 - 1815
Chapter 4
‘The Prussians were very roughly handled’
Wellington in a letter to Lady Frances Webster, 16 June 1815
Although the main focus of attention was in the Netherlands, the war had actually already started hundreds of kilometres away to the south. Acting without orders and entirely contrary to the agreed plan of campaign, the Austrian commander in northern Italy, General Frimont, had decided to invade France.
Frimont’s move was unexpected, but it did make sense. He was concerned that Napoleon might decide to open the war with a lightning strike into Italy, and with good reason. Frimont’s army had just fought the campaign against Murat in Naples. The men were tired, stocks of ammunition were low and units were scattered on garrison duty.
Frimont knew that secret pro-revolutionary societies were active in the large cities of northern Italy – Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice and elsewhere. These societies had promised to rise in support of Murat when he arrived so long as he brought them weapons. Assuredly they would rise if Napoleon entered Italy. If the reformists of the big Italian cities rose with success it was likely that the revolutionaries of the larger German cities would do likewise. That would make the positions of the Austrian Schwarzenberg and the Russian Tolly difficult or even impossible if the armies of the smaller German states deserted the alliance.
A quick victory in northern Italy could be achieved and at little cost – and it might turn the entire tide of the war. Frimont was right to be worried.
Frimont had two objectives in moving forward. First he wanted to seize the mountain passes, which would be easier to defend than the open plains of northern Italy. Second, he determined to probe the French positions to get some idea of how strong the French armies in the area actually were.
Frimont split his army into two. The I Corps under Field Marshal Radivojevich was to advance into France over the mountains close to the Swiss frontier. The II Corps under Count Bubna was to advance over the Mount Cenis Pass further south. The advance began late on 14 June. At first the Austro-Italian army encountered no resistance at all. For the next five days, while the entire Waterloo Campaign was being fought, Frimont’s forces advanced slowly along the difficult roads to get into southern France.
News of Napoleon’s move into the Netherlands reached Engelhardt and the German Corps on 16 June. Engelhardt got his men moving that afternoon, marching towards Arlon in the southern Netherlands. He was intending to threaten the right flank and rear of Napoleon’s advancing army. This might disrupt the French supply lines, or might persuade Napoleon to detach units from his main army to block the German advance. In the event, Napoleon did not receive news of Engelhardt’s advance until after the Battle of Waterloo was over.
British army in confusion
Back in the Netherlands, Wellington’s army had been reduced to a state of utter confusion. Three sets of orders had been sent out between 5 pm and 2 am during the night. In most cases, units had received their first orders during the evening. These had instructed units to gather at a divisional meeting place over night and to be ready to move at dawn. The second set of orders had told units to concentrate at Nivelles, or in some cases nearby.
Marshal Ney, 1769 - 1815
Chapter 4
‘The Prussians were very roughly handled’
Wellington in a letter to Lady Frances Webster, 16 June 1815
Although the main focus of attention was in the Netherlands, the war had actually already started hundreds of kilometres away to the south. Acting without orders and entirely contrary to the agreed plan of campaign, the Austrian commander in northern Italy, General Frimont, had decided to invade France.
Frimont’s move was unexpected, but it did make sense. He was concerned that Napoleon might decide to open the war with a lightning strike into Italy, and with good reason. Frimont’s army had just fought the campaign against Murat in Naples. The men were tired, stocks of ammunition were low and units were scattered on garrison duty.
Frimont knew that secret pro-revolutionary societies were active in the large cities of northern Italy – Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice and elsewhere. These societies had promised to rise in support of Murat when he arrived so long as he brought them weapons. Assuredly they would rise if Napoleon entered Italy. If the reformists of the big Italian cities rose with success it was likely that the revolutionaries of the larger German cities would do likewise. That would make the positions of the Austrian Schwarzenberg and the Russian Tolly difficult or even impossible if the armies of the smaller German states deserted the alliance.
A quick victory in northern Italy could be achieved and at little cost – and it might turn the entire tide of the war. Frimont was right to be worried.
Frimont had two objectives in moving forward. First he wanted to seize the mountain passes, which would be easier to defend than the open plains of northern Italy. Second, he determined to probe the French positions to get some idea of how strong the French armies in the area actually were.
Frimont split his army into two. The I Corps under Field Marshal Radivojevich was to advance into France over the mountains close to the Swiss frontier. The II Corps under Count Bubna was to advance over the Mount Cenis Pass further south. The advance began late on 14 June. At first the Austro-Italian army encountered no resistance at all. For the next five days, while the entire Waterloo Campaign was being fought, Frimont’s forces advanced slowly along the difficult roads to get into southern France.
News of Napoleon’s move into the Netherlands reached Engelhardt and the German Corps on 16 June. Engelhardt got his men moving that afternoon, marching towards Arlon in the southern Netherlands. He was intending to threaten the right flank and rear of Napoleon’s advancing army. This might disrupt the French supply lines, or might persuade Napoleon to detach units from his main army to block the German advance. In the event, Napoleon did not receive news of Engelhardt’s advance until after the Battle of Waterloo was over.
British army in confusion
Back in the Netherlands, Wellington’s army had been reduced to a state of utter confusion. Three sets of orders had been sent out between 5 pm and 2 am during the night. In most cases, units had received their first orders during the evening. These had instructed units to gather at a divisional meeting place over night and to be ready to move at dawn. The second set of orders had told units to concentrate at Nivelles, or in some cases nearby.
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