of the deepening crisis. A complex man who rose to power under Brezhnev and Andropov but who ultimately rejected much of their political and economic legacies, he impressed the world with his personal grace, powerful intellect, and acute political sense. He had supreme self-confidence, iron self-control, and a healthy degree of self-esteem. Not as quick as Khrushchev, Gorbachev carefully thought through a proposition before he spoke. He was an homme sérieux, in both the literal and broader senses. Khrushchev tried to cover up Soviet weaknesses by bragging outrageously about Soviet superiority. Brezhnev had without question achieved nuclear parity, but still never missed an opportunity to insist defensively that the Soviet Union and the United States were equals as world powers. Gorbachev was so confident of the Soviet Unionâs strengths that he was not afraid to talk about its weaknesses.
But Gorbachev was not, and is not, a closet democrat, secret capitalist, or furtive pacifist. Those who portrayed him as such missed the point. Gorbachev was not a one-dimensional personality. He was a troika: a loyal Communist, a patriotic Russian nationalist, and a brilliant pragmatic politician who liked power, knew how to use it, and did whatever he believed necessary to keep it.
In overhauling Soviet foreign policy and launching domestic reforms, he acted not out of choice but necessity. In 1985, shortly after Gorbachev took power, I asked Hu Yaobang, then the general secretary of the Chinese Communist party, whether the new Soviet leader would adopt economic reforms similar to Chinaâs. âIf he does not,â he answered, âthe Soviet Union will disappear as a great power by the middle of the twenty-first century.â Hu was right: Gorbachev had no other option. To preserve the Soviet Unionâs status as a great power, he had to retrench abroad and reform at home.
For over seventy years, Soviet economic policy served Soviet foreign policy. Under Gorbachev, foreign policy served economic policy. But it was a change of the head, not the heart. He knew that without access to Western technology, capital, and markets the Soviet economy would remain dead in the water. In each reversal of policy, he knew that he had to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to create an economic lifeline to the West:
âIn third world regional conflicts such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, Moscow was wasting tens of billions of dollars and thousands of livesâplus alienating all of the worldâs major powersâin order to advance at best peripheral interests. Gorbachev chose to scale back Moscowâs direct engagement in those conflicts, even at the risk of losing his clients.
âWhen anticommunist revolutions erupted in Eastern Europe, Moscow faced the choice between preserving its Communist regimes through force but losing the goodwill of Western Europe or permitting the collapse of empire but winning new and wealthy allies in Western Europe. Gorbachev chose to lose his satellites in the East in order to win support and aid from the West.
âWith a resurgent United States under President Reagan embarking on its high-tech Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)âwhich threatened to neutralize the Soviet advantage in first-strike land-based missilesâMoscow confronted the need to ante up hundreds of billions of rubles to stay in the game. After doggedly trying and failing to stop SDI through arms control, Gorbachev recognized after checking with his banker that the Soviet Union had to fold its hand.
âIn the Persian Gulf War, Moscow had to choose between supporting its traditional ally, Iraq, and retaining its newly won respectability in the West. Though the Soviet Union helped Saddam Hussein covertly with military advisersand spare parts and sought to save him from decisive defeat through last-minute diplomacy, Gorbachev ultimately endorsed the U.S.-led coalitionâs use of force to
But Gorbachev was not, and is not, a closet democrat, secret capitalist, or furtive pacifist. Those who portrayed him as such missed the point. Gorbachev was not a one-dimensional personality. He was a troika: a loyal Communist, a patriotic Russian nationalist, and a brilliant pragmatic politician who liked power, knew how to use it, and did whatever he believed necessary to keep it.
In overhauling Soviet foreign policy and launching domestic reforms, he acted not out of choice but necessity. In 1985, shortly after Gorbachev took power, I asked Hu Yaobang, then the general secretary of the Chinese Communist party, whether the new Soviet leader would adopt economic reforms similar to Chinaâs. âIf he does not,â he answered, âthe Soviet Union will disappear as a great power by the middle of the twenty-first century.â Hu was right: Gorbachev had no other option. To preserve the Soviet Unionâs status as a great power, he had to retrench abroad and reform at home.
For over seventy years, Soviet economic policy served Soviet foreign policy. Under Gorbachev, foreign policy served economic policy. But it was a change of the head, not the heart. He knew that without access to Western technology, capital, and markets the Soviet economy would remain dead in the water. In each reversal of policy, he knew that he had to make whatever sacrifices were necessary to create an economic lifeline to the West:
âIn third world regional conflicts such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, Moscow was wasting tens of billions of dollars and thousands of livesâplus alienating all of the worldâs major powersâin order to advance at best peripheral interests. Gorbachev chose to scale back Moscowâs direct engagement in those conflicts, even at the risk of losing his clients.
âWhen anticommunist revolutions erupted in Eastern Europe, Moscow faced the choice between preserving its Communist regimes through force but losing the goodwill of Western Europe or permitting the collapse of empire but winning new and wealthy allies in Western Europe. Gorbachev chose to lose his satellites in the East in order to win support and aid from the West.
âWith a resurgent United States under President Reagan embarking on its high-tech Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)âwhich threatened to neutralize the Soviet advantage in first-strike land-based missilesâMoscow confronted the need to ante up hundreds of billions of rubles to stay in the game. After doggedly trying and failing to stop SDI through arms control, Gorbachev recognized after checking with his banker that the Soviet Union had to fold its hand.
âIn the Persian Gulf War, Moscow had to choose between supporting its traditional ally, Iraq, and retaining its newly won respectability in the West. Though the Soviet Union helped Saddam Hussein covertly with military advisersand spare parts and sought to save him from decisive defeat through last-minute diplomacy, Gorbachev ultimately endorsed the U.S.-led coalitionâs use of force to
Similar Books
