resurgence of the American economy and the Presidentâs rise in the polls, Andropov is caught between a rock and a hard place. If he deliberately delays a summit until after the election, he will find himself facing a President with a new mandate and a stronger bargaining position. Andropov needs a summit before the American election more than President Reagan does. We should not give it to him on the cheap.
The words coming out of Moscow seem to indicate that they would like a summit. Their deeds would indicate otherwise. Some pundits have seized upon certain âsignalsâ they interpret as being positive. But permitting a half-dozen Pentacostalists to emigrate, making some semantic concessions on human rights at the Madrid conference, allowing progress toward expanded cultural and diplomatic ties, and lifting martial law in Poland while transferring most of its repressive featuresto the civil code are not actions that deserve serious consideration. Real peace is too important for tokenism. Unless substantial progress is assured on arms control and on reducing Soviet adventurism in Central America, we should not agree to hold a summit.
If the summit produces too little, there are two dangers. The first is disillusionment. The first Reagan-Andropov meeting will receive enormous worldwide attention. Expectations will be high. If the summit fails to live up to them, the letdown will be catastrophic. The disappointment could lead both sides to give up on the process of peace and increase preparations for war.
The second danger is euphoria. Sometimes simply the fact of a summit gives many in the West unrealistic hopes for the future. They mistakenly believe that we have reached the end of the journey to peace rather than just made a beginning. This makes it more difficult for Western leaders to gain public support for the decisive actions and strong military forces that are needed to make hard-headed detente work.
Summits must produce more than tokenism. They cannot make miracles, but they can make progress. As Churchill once said, âIt would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled.â
The first Soviet-American summit in Moscow in 1972 was scheduled only after the Soviets agreed to the Berlin settlement in 1971. We believed that if we could reach an agreement on an issue that had plagued East-West relations for 30 years and had at times brought us to the brink of war, we could reasonably expect to make progress on other major issues.
Similarly, before we schedule the next summit, personal representatives of Presidents Reagan and Andropov should undertake a series of intensive, absolutely confidential negotiations to explore what progress can be made in reaching agreement on major issues. This would be the most promising forum in which to search for some form of accommodation that advances the general interests of both parties by compromisingon the specific interests of each. It would allow the two sides to subtly feel out the differing degrees to which various elements of the other partyâs positions are negotiable, and to try varying combinations of give-and-take.
The summit agenda must be broad. It must include arms control, trade, and conduct in areas where our political differences collide, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. In these preparatory talks, links should be forged between these issues. For example, the Russians must be made to understand that there is no way the Congress could or should approve arms control or trade agreements reached at a summit when Soviet surrogates continue to try to build another beachhead in Central America.
The Soviets will loudly object to such linkage, but they will understand it. After all, their paranoia about having âfriendlyâ buffer states on their borders puts them in a poor position for objecting to our concern about what happens to our neighbors.
The words coming out of Moscow seem to indicate that they would like a summit. Their deeds would indicate otherwise. Some pundits have seized upon certain âsignalsâ they interpret as being positive. But permitting a half-dozen Pentacostalists to emigrate, making some semantic concessions on human rights at the Madrid conference, allowing progress toward expanded cultural and diplomatic ties, and lifting martial law in Poland while transferring most of its repressive featuresto the civil code are not actions that deserve serious consideration. Real peace is too important for tokenism. Unless substantial progress is assured on arms control and on reducing Soviet adventurism in Central America, we should not agree to hold a summit.
If the summit produces too little, there are two dangers. The first is disillusionment. The first Reagan-Andropov meeting will receive enormous worldwide attention. Expectations will be high. If the summit fails to live up to them, the letdown will be catastrophic. The disappointment could lead both sides to give up on the process of peace and increase preparations for war.
The second danger is euphoria. Sometimes simply the fact of a summit gives many in the West unrealistic hopes for the future. They mistakenly believe that we have reached the end of the journey to peace rather than just made a beginning. This makes it more difficult for Western leaders to gain public support for the decisive actions and strong military forces that are needed to make hard-headed detente work.
Summits must produce more than tokenism. They cannot make miracles, but they can make progress. As Churchill once said, âIt would, I think, be a mistake to assume that nothing can be settled with Soviet Russia unless or until everything is settled.â
The first Soviet-American summit in Moscow in 1972 was scheduled only after the Soviets agreed to the Berlin settlement in 1971. We believed that if we could reach an agreement on an issue that had plagued East-West relations for 30 years and had at times brought us to the brink of war, we could reasonably expect to make progress on other major issues.
Similarly, before we schedule the next summit, personal representatives of Presidents Reagan and Andropov should undertake a series of intensive, absolutely confidential negotiations to explore what progress can be made in reaching agreement on major issues. This would be the most promising forum in which to search for some form of accommodation that advances the general interests of both parties by compromisingon the specific interests of each. It would allow the two sides to subtly feel out the differing degrees to which various elements of the other partyâs positions are negotiable, and to try varying combinations of give-and-take.
The summit agenda must be broad. It must include arms control, trade, and conduct in areas where our political differences collide, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Central America. In these preparatory talks, links should be forged between these issues. For example, the Russians must be made to understand that there is no way the Congress could or should approve arms control or trade agreements reached at a summit when Soviet surrogates continue to try to build another beachhead in Central America.
The Soviets will loudly object to such linkage, but they will understand it. After all, their paranoia about having âfriendlyâ buffer states on their borders puts them in a poor position for objecting to our concern about what happens to our neighbors.
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