to launch a full-scale fightback in Nazi-occupied Europe, the Prime Minister was eager to maintain an aggressive strategy. ‘The completely defensive habit of mind which has ruined the French must not be allowed to ruin all our initiative. It is of the highest consequence to keep the largest numbers of German forces all along the coasts of the countries they have conquered, and we should immediately set to work to organise raiding forces on these coasts where the populations are friendly. Such forces might be composed of self-contained, thoroughly equipped units . . . How wonderful it would be if the Germans could be made to wonder where they were going to be struck next instead of forcing us to try to wall in the Island and roof it over!’
Churchill called these proposed elite units ‘striking companies’, and his Chiefs of Staff gave his impassioned suggestion a cautious welcome. Some of them were old enough to recall the Boer War forty years earlier – no doubt with some discomfort – when bands of a few dozen irregulars succeeded in tying down thousands of British troops. Churchill certainly remembered the Boer guerrillas well. As a war correspondent, he was captured by them in an ambush and held as a POW before managing to escape. When the draft proposal from his planners landed on his desk, containing the words ‘Kommando-style’, Churchill had no hesitation in rubber-stamping it. Knowing that Britain was unable to launch an invasion on his Western flank, Hitler concentrated his resources on the eastern and southern fronts of his rapidly expanding empire. The defences along the west coasts of Europe were barely upgraded and it was this weakness that the Commandos looked to exploit.
Work to raise the new Commando units within a ‘Special Service Brigade’ under the command of Combined Operations began almost immediately. The highly regarded Brigadier Joseph Charles Haydon, who a few months earlier had organised a special mission to evacuate the Dutch royal family, was handed the task of overseeing the creation of a new elite force within the British Army. He handpicked eleven commanders and left it to them to choose their junior officers and NCOs so that each unit would have its own distinct identity and stamp of its commander’s personality.
Overeagerness to put Commandos into action at the earliest possible date led to the failure of two pinprick raids on Boulogne and Guernsey. Hastily planned and poorly executed by troops lacking sufficient training and suitable equipment, the Commando initiative hardly got off to a flying start. The general feeling back in Whitehall was that if that was the best our elite forces could manage, then Hitler could laugh himself to sleep at night. The almost comic shortcomings and mishaps of the raids demonstrated the need for much harder training, higher fitness levels, superior weapons and kit and improved means of transporting the units to and from the target site.
In March 1941, Operation CLAYMORE, the first large-scale Commando raid, was launched. The aim of the raid was to destroy the fish oil factories on the Lofoten Islands in northern Norway. Fish oil was an important commodity for the Germans: it provided Vitamin A which was vital for the health of their U-boat crews who were causing such havoc among Allied shipping out in the Atlantic. The crews went weeks without seeing daylight, and fish oil was the perfect substitute. The oil was also important for the production of nitro-glycerine in the manufacturing of explosives. Much planning went into the assault that involved two full Commandos – roughly 1,000 men – and seven Royal Navy vessels. The Commandos stormed ashore, but to widespread disappointment, they met no resistance. The operation was a success of sorts. They destroyed their targets, suffered no casualties, sunk 18,000 tons of shipping, captured 200 German prisoners and gathered 300 volunteers to join the Free Norwegian Forces. But to sceptics of the
Churchill called these proposed elite units ‘striking companies’, and his Chiefs of Staff gave his impassioned suggestion a cautious welcome. Some of them were old enough to recall the Boer War forty years earlier – no doubt with some discomfort – when bands of a few dozen irregulars succeeded in tying down thousands of British troops. Churchill certainly remembered the Boer guerrillas well. As a war correspondent, he was captured by them in an ambush and held as a POW before managing to escape. When the draft proposal from his planners landed on his desk, containing the words ‘Kommando-style’, Churchill had no hesitation in rubber-stamping it. Knowing that Britain was unable to launch an invasion on his Western flank, Hitler concentrated his resources on the eastern and southern fronts of his rapidly expanding empire. The defences along the west coasts of Europe were barely upgraded and it was this weakness that the Commandos looked to exploit.
Work to raise the new Commando units within a ‘Special Service Brigade’ under the command of Combined Operations began almost immediately. The highly regarded Brigadier Joseph Charles Haydon, who a few months earlier had organised a special mission to evacuate the Dutch royal family, was handed the task of overseeing the creation of a new elite force within the British Army. He handpicked eleven commanders and left it to them to choose their junior officers and NCOs so that each unit would have its own distinct identity and stamp of its commander’s personality.
Overeagerness to put Commandos into action at the earliest possible date led to the failure of two pinprick raids on Boulogne and Guernsey. Hastily planned and poorly executed by troops lacking sufficient training and suitable equipment, the Commando initiative hardly got off to a flying start. The general feeling back in Whitehall was that if that was the best our elite forces could manage, then Hitler could laugh himself to sleep at night. The almost comic shortcomings and mishaps of the raids demonstrated the need for much harder training, higher fitness levels, superior weapons and kit and improved means of transporting the units to and from the target site.
In March 1941, Operation CLAYMORE, the first large-scale Commando raid, was launched. The aim of the raid was to destroy the fish oil factories on the Lofoten Islands in northern Norway. Fish oil was an important commodity for the Germans: it provided Vitamin A which was vital for the health of their U-boat crews who were causing such havoc among Allied shipping out in the Atlantic. The crews went weeks without seeing daylight, and fish oil was the perfect substitute. The oil was also important for the production of nitro-glycerine in the manufacturing of explosives. Much planning went into the assault that involved two full Commandos – roughly 1,000 men – and seven Royal Navy vessels. The Commandos stormed ashore, but to widespread disappointment, they met no resistance. The operation was a success of sorts. They destroyed their targets, suffered no casualties, sunk 18,000 tons of shipping, captured 200 German prisoners and gathered 300 volunteers to join the Free Norwegian Forces. But to sceptics of the
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