Read Online Pirates of Somalia by Jay Bahadur - Free Book Online
Authors: Jay Bahadur
Tags: África, History, Travel, Military, Political Science, Security (National & International), Naval, North
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custody. The US Navy subsequently transported them to Oman, after which they were brought to Thailand and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for piracy. (The hijackers served only a few years of their prison term; in 2007, President Hersi arranged their release under unknown circumstances.)
What had prompted their ill-advised gamble was not completely clear. One report suggested that the hijacking was provoked by the non-payment of the guards’ monthly $200 salary. Orey insisted that the men had been paid in full, but had simply gotten greedy.
In either case, the hijacking was an utter disaster for SomCan, costing the company its job with the Puntland government—at least temporarily.
* * *
SomCan received a second chance three years later. Two years after the company’s dismissal, in 2007, the Saudi private security firm Al-Habiibi briefly assumed coast guard duties in Puntland, but was fired in February 2008 for refusing an order to liberate the hijacked Russian tugboat Svitzer Korsakov . Then-president General Mohamud Muse Hersi turned back to SomCan, which was more willing than Al-Habiibi to serve as pirate hunters.
From between the pages of his daily planner, Orey produced a folded copy of SomCan’s current employment contract, signed with Hersi’s government in July 2008. As had been the case with Hart, all licensing and fine revenues were to be split 51 per cent–49 per cent, with the Puntland government responsible for supplying the coast guard’s ships, weapons, and equipment.
In recent days, the pirates had been presenting a challenge not seen during SomCan’s previous coast-guarding tour, but Orey was confident that his company was ready. “It is over the last eight months that we have done our best work,” he said. In October 2008, for example, SomCan had mounted a successful operation to liberate the hijacked MV Wail , a Panamanian-registered bulk carrier containing a consignment of cement owned by a local Somali businessman. Captain Ishmael, who led the rescue operation, described how the SomCan flagship, flanked by its two speedboats, had surrounded the pirates and dispatched a negotiator to discuss the situation. As the speedboat carrying SomCan’s envoy approached the hijacked transport, the pirates opened fire, killing the craft’s operator. In the ensuing firefight, SomCan marines captured ten of the hijackers, sustaining one injury and minor damage to their ship.
SomCan’s other encounters with pirates had been less bloody, and even more successful. Orey cited three naval assaults against hijacked fishing ships held near Hafun, which in each case resulted in the bandits abandoning the vessel and melting before SomCan’s onslaught. The objects of these rescues were all local Somali or Yemeni vessels, which, according to Orey, the pirates had intended to use as long-range motherships.
Despite these successes, Orey was quick to acknowledge that SomCan had a long way to go. Although the company possessed three cast-off patrol boats obtained from the Japanese coast guard—as well as two speedboats—the cost of fuel usually limited it to deploying only a third of its “fleet.” 9 The company operated no coastal radar tracking stations and did not employ satellite surveillance; the only intelligence it received was conveyed by radio or telephone. SomCan was, in effect, a “Dial-a-Coast-Guard,” whose counter-piracy activities were limited to after-the-fact responses: either commando-style raids on captive vessels, or, if given timely tip-offs, anticipatory assaults on land.
Even setting aside the difficulties in response time, the SomCan patrol ship’s armament rendered it run-of-the-mill competition for many of the illegal fishing vessels it was routinely tasked with observing and intercepting. A few weeks earlier, Orey had been personally supervising a routine patrol from Bossaso to Hafun. As the SomCan ship was returning to port, it came across four foreign fishing vessels in
What had prompted their ill-advised gamble was not completely clear. One report suggested that the hijacking was provoked by the non-payment of the guards’ monthly $200 salary. Orey insisted that the men had been paid in full, but had simply gotten greedy.
In either case, the hijacking was an utter disaster for SomCan, costing the company its job with the Puntland government—at least temporarily.
* * *
SomCan received a second chance three years later. Two years after the company’s dismissal, in 2007, the Saudi private security firm Al-Habiibi briefly assumed coast guard duties in Puntland, but was fired in February 2008 for refusing an order to liberate the hijacked Russian tugboat Svitzer Korsakov . Then-president General Mohamud Muse Hersi turned back to SomCan, which was more willing than Al-Habiibi to serve as pirate hunters.
From between the pages of his daily planner, Orey produced a folded copy of SomCan’s current employment contract, signed with Hersi’s government in July 2008. As had been the case with Hart, all licensing and fine revenues were to be split 51 per cent–49 per cent, with the Puntland government responsible for supplying the coast guard’s ships, weapons, and equipment.
In recent days, the pirates had been presenting a challenge not seen during SomCan’s previous coast-guarding tour, but Orey was confident that his company was ready. “It is over the last eight months that we have done our best work,” he said. In October 2008, for example, SomCan had mounted a successful operation to liberate the hijacked MV Wail , a Panamanian-registered bulk carrier containing a consignment of cement owned by a local Somali businessman. Captain Ishmael, who led the rescue operation, described how the SomCan flagship, flanked by its two speedboats, had surrounded the pirates and dispatched a negotiator to discuss the situation. As the speedboat carrying SomCan’s envoy approached the hijacked transport, the pirates opened fire, killing the craft’s operator. In the ensuing firefight, SomCan marines captured ten of the hijackers, sustaining one injury and minor damage to their ship.
SomCan’s other encounters with pirates had been less bloody, and even more successful. Orey cited three naval assaults against hijacked fishing ships held near Hafun, which in each case resulted in the bandits abandoning the vessel and melting before SomCan’s onslaught. The objects of these rescues were all local Somali or Yemeni vessels, which, according to Orey, the pirates had intended to use as long-range motherships.
Despite these successes, Orey was quick to acknowledge that SomCan had a long way to go. Although the company possessed three cast-off patrol boats obtained from the Japanese coast guard—as well as two speedboats—the cost of fuel usually limited it to deploying only a third of its “fleet.” 9 The company operated no coastal radar tracking stations and did not employ satellite surveillance; the only intelligence it received was conveyed by radio or telephone. SomCan was, in effect, a “Dial-a-Coast-Guard,” whose counter-piracy activities were limited to after-the-fact responses: either commando-style raids on captive vessels, or, if given timely tip-offs, anticipatory assaults on land.
Even setting aside the difficulties in response time, the SomCan patrol ship’s armament rendered it run-of-the-mill competition for many of the illegal fishing vessels it was routinely tasked with observing and intercepting. A few weeks earlier, Orey had been personally supervising a routine patrol from Bossaso to Hafun. As the SomCan ship was returning to port, it came across four foreign fishing vessels in
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