Read Online Pearl Harbor Christmas by Stanley Weintraub - Free Book Online
Authors: Stanley Weintraub
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sending Weygand, whom he had known since 1918, a message couched subtly in terms of a Christmas or New Year’s greeting—which he would do on December 27.
The conference broke up at noon so that Churchill could meet with representatives of the British and Empire press. He conceded that the situation in Malaya was dire and that Hong Kong was close to falling but that Britain had avoided “the worst possible situation”—being attacked by Japan alone, with America remaining out of the war. “On balance we could not be dissatisfied with the turn of events.” With Russia “fighting back magnificently” and the “powerful assistance” of the United States to come, he looked ahead “with hope and confidence.”
The first major conference of principal players, at 1:45 P.M., followed a quick vegetarian lunch (kedgeree and grilled tomatoes) at the White House. All the ranking conferees were present, plus Harry Hopkins and General “Pa” Watson as resident appointments secretary. General Marshall took notes. Roosevelt began by presenting a draft declaration “that no one power would make peace without an agreement with the associate powers”—the smaller nations already at war or plunged into the war. He reported agreement with Churchill on sending bombers and three American divisions to Britain, withholding American troops from the “Near East” (Egypt), and maintaining a “flying route” across Africa via Brazil. The British vowed (perhaps with fingers hidden and crossed) to “hold” Singapore while the United States built up forces in Australia to assist “operations in the north including . . . the Philippines.” With Churchill, the President assumed that Japan had unleashed all its offensive strength and would not risk attacking Russia.
The Prime Minister conceded shortages in everything, from munitions to manpower, and wanted the Americans to take over Iceland from British forces to free them for deployment elsewhere. He thought that French North Africa was ripe for invasion unless the Germans got there first. The British could have “55,000 men with transports ready for shipment for such a purpose and that they could be in Africa in twenty-three days.” (It was as unrealistic as his expectation that the British could hold Singapore for half a year.) He suggested that if Vichy cooperated, even passively, “the future France would be protected at the peace table.” Roosevelt added “that he considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are in the [European] war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic.” (He had no idea how unready the United States was for concerted action anywhere, even had the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor not happened.) Similarly unrealistic, as French malaise was profound, Secretary Stimson “spoke of the importance of timing in relation to movements into [Northern] Ireland and those projected for the Mediterranean, with relation to its effect on the French people. He thought that our movement into Ireland would have a very definite effect on the French mind, which would facilitate arrangements for a movement into Tunisia and Morocco by the British and French.” No one questioned his illogic. America was a new player.
Reviewing other fronts, Churchill warned that although the British presence in Libya and Egypt was precarious, “it would be a tremendous disaster to give up the [Suez] Canal—Turkey would go, Africa would be overrun.” He suggested an expedition against Vichy French Dakar, on the hump of West Africa, to secure the air route from Brazil and as a jumping-off point for further operations. “I assume,” Marshall questioned in his minutes, “this was on a basis of some agreement with the French.” And Churchill again promised, in Marshall’s notes, “Singapore to hold out. It ought to be a matter of six months before the Japanese can close in.” (The
The conference broke up at noon so that Churchill could meet with representatives of the British and Empire press. He conceded that the situation in Malaya was dire and that Hong Kong was close to falling but that Britain had avoided “the worst possible situation”—being attacked by Japan alone, with America remaining out of the war. “On balance we could not be dissatisfied with the turn of events.” With Russia “fighting back magnificently” and the “powerful assistance” of the United States to come, he looked ahead “with hope and confidence.”
The first major conference of principal players, at 1:45 P.M., followed a quick vegetarian lunch (kedgeree and grilled tomatoes) at the White House. All the ranking conferees were present, plus Harry Hopkins and General “Pa” Watson as resident appointments secretary. General Marshall took notes. Roosevelt began by presenting a draft declaration “that no one power would make peace without an agreement with the associate powers”—the smaller nations already at war or plunged into the war. He reported agreement with Churchill on sending bombers and three American divisions to Britain, withholding American troops from the “Near East” (Egypt), and maintaining a “flying route” across Africa via Brazil. The British vowed (perhaps with fingers hidden and crossed) to “hold” Singapore while the United States built up forces in Australia to assist “operations in the north including . . . the Philippines.” With Churchill, the President assumed that Japan had unleashed all its offensive strength and would not risk attacking Russia.
The Prime Minister conceded shortages in everything, from munitions to manpower, and wanted the Americans to take over Iceland from British forces to free them for deployment elsewhere. He thought that French North Africa was ripe for invasion unless the Germans got there first. The British could have “55,000 men with transports ready for shipment for such a purpose and that they could be in Africa in twenty-three days.” (It was as unrealistic as his expectation that the British could hold Singapore for half a year.) He suggested that if Vichy cooperated, even passively, “the future France would be protected at the peace table.” Roosevelt added “that he considered it very important to morale, to give this country a feeling that they are in the [European] war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across the Atlantic.” (He had no idea how unready the United States was for concerted action anywhere, even had the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor not happened.) Similarly unrealistic, as French malaise was profound, Secretary Stimson “spoke of the importance of timing in relation to movements into [Northern] Ireland and those projected for the Mediterranean, with relation to its effect on the French people. He thought that our movement into Ireland would have a very definite effect on the French mind, which would facilitate arrangements for a movement into Tunisia and Morocco by the British and French.” No one questioned his illogic. America was a new player.
Reviewing other fronts, Churchill warned that although the British presence in Libya and Egypt was precarious, “it would be a tremendous disaster to give up the [Suez] Canal—Turkey would go, Africa would be overrun.” He suggested an expedition against Vichy French Dakar, on the hump of West Africa, to secure the air route from Brazil and as a jumping-off point for further operations. “I assume,” Marshall questioned in his minutes, “this was on a basis of some agreement with the French.” And Churchill again promised, in Marshall’s notes, “Singapore to hold out. It ought to be a matter of six months before the Japanese can close in.” (The
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