to hear. At the time, the Bush administration was obsessed with Al Jazeera, not only because of the networkâs unrelenting criticism of the invasion of Iraq, but also because it had become Osama bin Ladenâs favorite outlet for broadcasting his videotaped messages to the world. Each time bin Laden released a new video, the American media immediately turned to the CIA for a quick response and analysis of whether the recording was genuine and where and when it had been taped. Each new broadcast on Al Jazeera forced the CIA to scramble to stay one step ahead of Western reporters baying for answers. At first, when bin Laden released videotapes filmed outdoors in what appeared to be the mountainous terrain of northwestern Pakistan, the CIA even tried to conduct a geological analysis of the rocky outcroppings that served as the backdrop for the video, to try to figure out where bin Laden was. His broadcast statements prompted the CIA to look for new methods of analyzing the news network, and also led some American officials to suspect that there was a covert relationship between Al Jazeera and al Qaeda.
Former senior CIA officials say that officials from the CIAâs Science and Technology Directorate, including the directorateâs chief, Donald Kerr, believed Montgomeryâs claims about al Qaeda codes. They also convinced CIA director George Tenet to take the technology and intelligence flowing from Montgomeryâs software seriously. As a result, in December 2003, Tenet rushed directly to President Bush when information provided by Montgomery and his software purported to show that a series of flights from France, Britain, and Mexico to the United States around Christmas were being targeted by al Qaeda. The data strongly suggested that the terrorist group was planning to crash the planes at specific coordinates.
Based on Montgomeryâs information, President Bush ordered the grounding of a series of international flights scheduled to fly into the United States. This step caused disruptions for thousands of travelers on both sides of the Atlantic, while further stoking public fears of another spectacular al Qaeda attack just two years after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.
Â
Years later, several former CIA officials who eventually pieced together what had happened in those frenzied days became highly critical of how Montgomeryâs information was handled by Tenet and other senior CIA managers. The critics came to believe that top officials in the CIAâs Science and Technology Directorate became fierce advocates for Montgomeryâs information because they were eager to play a more prominent role in the Bush administrationâs war on terror. The scientists were tired of being shunted aside, and Montgomery gave them what they wanted: technology that could prove their worth. âThey wanted in,â said one former senior CIA official, âthey wanted to be part of the game.â
But former CIA officials blame Tenet even more; the CIA director enabled the overeager scientists. He allowed them to circumvent the CIAâs normal reporting and vetting channels, and rushed the raw material fed to the agency by Montgomery directly to the president. Bush himself had no way of vetting the material he was being handed by the CIA. âTenet made George Bush the case officer on this,â said one former senior CIA official. âThe president was deciding how this was being handled.â
One former senior CIA official said that for two or three months in late 2003 and early 2004, the intelligence from Montgomery was treated like it was the most valuable counterterrorism material at the CIA. Special briefings were given almost daily on the intelligence, but only a handful of CIA officials were told where the intelligence was coming from. âThey treated this like the most important, most sensitive compartmented material they had on terrorism,â said one former CIA
Former senior CIA officials say that officials from the CIAâs Science and Technology Directorate, including the directorateâs chief, Donald Kerr, believed Montgomeryâs claims about al Qaeda codes. They also convinced CIA director George Tenet to take the technology and intelligence flowing from Montgomeryâs software seriously. As a result, in December 2003, Tenet rushed directly to President Bush when information provided by Montgomery and his software purported to show that a series of flights from France, Britain, and Mexico to the United States around Christmas were being targeted by al Qaeda. The data strongly suggested that the terrorist group was planning to crash the planes at specific coordinates.
Based on Montgomeryâs information, President Bush ordered the grounding of a series of international flights scheduled to fly into the United States. This step caused disruptions for thousands of travelers on both sides of the Atlantic, while further stoking public fears of another spectacular al Qaeda attack just two years after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington.
Â
Years later, several former CIA officials who eventually pieced together what had happened in those frenzied days became highly critical of how Montgomeryâs information was handled by Tenet and other senior CIA managers. The critics came to believe that top officials in the CIAâs Science and Technology Directorate became fierce advocates for Montgomeryâs information because they were eager to play a more prominent role in the Bush administrationâs war on terror. The scientists were tired of being shunted aside, and Montgomery gave them what they wanted: technology that could prove their worth. âThey wanted in,â said one former senior CIA official, âthey wanted to be part of the game.â
But former CIA officials blame Tenet even more; the CIA director enabled the overeager scientists. He allowed them to circumvent the CIAâs normal reporting and vetting channels, and rushed the raw material fed to the agency by Montgomery directly to the president. Bush himself had no way of vetting the material he was being handed by the CIA. âTenet made George Bush the case officer on this,â said one former senior CIA official. âThe president was deciding how this was being handled.â
One former senior CIA official said that for two or three months in late 2003 and early 2004, the intelligence from Montgomery was treated like it was the most valuable counterterrorism material at the CIA. Special briefings were given almost daily on the intelligence, but only a handful of CIA officials were told where the intelligence was coming from. âThey treated this like the most important, most sensitive compartmented material they had on terrorism,â said one former CIA
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