codes embedded in the network banner displayed on the broadcasts of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based news network. Montgomery sold the CIA on the fantasy that al Qaeda was using the broadcasts to digitally transmit its plans for future terrorist attacks. And only he had the technology to decode those messages, thus saving America from another devastating attack. The CIAâmore credulous than Hollywood or Las Vegasâfell for Montgomeryâs claims. In short, he convinced CIA officials that he could detect terrorist threats by watching television.
By late 2003, CIA officials began to flock to eTreppidâs offices in Reno to see Montgomeryâs amazing software. Michael Flynn, Montgomeryâs former lawyer, said that Montgomery had dealings with or knew the identities of at least sixteen different CIA officials. These people now joined the senior military officers who had frequented the company since the previous spring, when it first began to work on the Predator program.
Montgomery persuaded the spy agency that his special computer technology could detect hidden bar codes broadcast on Al Jazeera, which had been embedded into the video feed by al Qaeda. Allegedly, al Qaeda was using that secret method to send messages to its terrorist operatives around the world about plans for new attacks. Montgomery convinced the CIA that his technology had uncovered a series of hidden letters and numbers that appeared to be coded messages about specific airline flights that the terrorists were targeting.
Montgomery insists that he did not come up with the idea of analyzing Al Jazeera videotapesâhe says that the CIA came to him in late 2003 and asked him to do it. CIA officials brought Montgomery two different versions of al Qaeda videotapes, he claims. They gave him original al Qaeda videotapes obtained independently by the CIA, and then also gave him recordings of the same videotapes recorded as they had been broadcast on Al Jazeera. The CIA wanted him to compare the two, he claims.
But even if it wasnât Montgomeryâs idea, he ran with it as fast as he could. He told the CIA that he had found that the versions of the tapes broadcast on Al Jazeera had hidden letters and numbers embedded in them. He says that he found that each bin Laden video broadcast on al Jazeera had patterns and objects embedded in the networkâs own banner displayed with the video recordings.
Montgomery let the CIA draw its own conclusions based on the information he gave them. After he reported to the CIA that he had detected a series of hidden letters and numbers, he left it up to the CIA to conclude that those numbers and letters referred to specific airline flights. He insists that he did not offer the CIA his own conclusions about what the data meant.
By the middle of December 2003, Montgomery reported to the CIA that he had discovered certain combinations of letters and numbers. For example, coded messages that included the letters âAFâ followed by a series of numbers, or the letters âAAâ and âUAâ and two or three digits, kept repeating. In other instances, he told the agency that he had found a series of numbers that looked like coordinates for the longitude and latitude of specific locations.
The CIA made the inevitable connections. âThey would jump at conclusions,â says Montgomery. âThere would be things like C4, C4, and they would say thatâs explosives. They jumped to conclusions.â He added that he ânever suggested it was airplanes or a threat.â
Montgomeryâs data triggered panic at the CIA and the White Houseâand urgent demands that Montgomery produce more. On Christmas Eve, CIA officials showed up at Montgomeryâs house in Reno and told him that he had to go back to his office to keep digging through incoming videotapes and Al Jazeera broadcasts throughout the holidays, Montgomery recalled.
Montgomery was telling the CIA exactly what it wanted
By late 2003, CIA officials began to flock to eTreppidâs offices in Reno to see Montgomeryâs amazing software. Michael Flynn, Montgomeryâs former lawyer, said that Montgomery had dealings with or knew the identities of at least sixteen different CIA officials. These people now joined the senior military officers who had frequented the company since the previous spring, when it first began to work on the Predator program.
Montgomery persuaded the spy agency that his special computer technology could detect hidden bar codes broadcast on Al Jazeera, which had been embedded into the video feed by al Qaeda. Allegedly, al Qaeda was using that secret method to send messages to its terrorist operatives around the world about plans for new attacks. Montgomery convinced the CIA that his technology had uncovered a series of hidden letters and numbers that appeared to be coded messages about specific airline flights that the terrorists were targeting.
Montgomery insists that he did not come up with the idea of analyzing Al Jazeera videotapesâhe says that the CIA came to him in late 2003 and asked him to do it. CIA officials brought Montgomery two different versions of al Qaeda videotapes, he claims. They gave him original al Qaeda videotapes obtained independently by the CIA, and then also gave him recordings of the same videotapes recorded as they had been broadcast on Al Jazeera. The CIA wanted him to compare the two, he claims.
But even if it wasnât Montgomeryâs idea, he ran with it as fast as he could. He told the CIA that he had found that the versions of the tapes broadcast on Al Jazeera had hidden letters and numbers embedded in them. He says that he found that each bin Laden video broadcast on al Jazeera had patterns and objects embedded in the networkâs own banner displayed with the video recordings.
Montgomery let the CIA draw its own conclusions based on the information he gave them. After he reported to the CIA that he had detected a series of hidden letters and numbers, he left it up to the CIA to conclude that those numbers and letters referred to specific airline flights. He insists that he did not offer the CIA his own conclusions about what the data meant.
By the middle of December 2003, Montgomery reported to the CIA that he had discovered certain combinations of letters and numbers. For example, coded messages that included the letters âAFâ followed by a series of numbers, or the letters âAAâ and âUAâ and two or three digits, kept repeating. In other instances, he told the agency that he had found a series of numbers that looked like coordinates for the longitude and latitude of specific locations.
The CIA made the inevitable connections. âThey would jump at conclusions,â says Montgomery. âThere would be things like C4, C4, and they would say thatâs explosives. They jumped to conclusions.â He added that he ânever suggested it was airplanes or a threat.â
Montgomeryâs data triggered panic at the CIA and the White Houseâand urgent demands that Montgomery produce more. On Christmas Eve, CIA officials showed up at Montgomeryâs house in Reno and told him that he had to go back to his office to keep digging through incoming videotapes and Al Jazeera broadcasts throughout the holidays, Montgomery recalled.
Montgomery was telling the CIA exactly what it wanted
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