city and level it to the ground by means of artillery bombardment using every calibre of shell, and continual bombing from the air.
Following the cityâs encirclement, requests for surrender negotiations shall be denied, since the problem of relocating and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for our very existence, we can have no interest in maintaining even a part of this very large urban population. 25
Â
The formal orders â no acceptance of surrender; the city to be worn down by bombing and artillery fire; civilians to be fired upon if they approached the German lines â were issued by Jodl on 7 October. They did not, however, quite close down the debate. âTodayâ, Army Group North commander von Leeb confided to his diary, âOKWâs [Armed Forces High Commandâs] decision on Leningrad arrived, according to which a capitulation may not be accepted. [We] sent a letter to OKH [Army High Command] asking whether in this case Russian troops can be taken into captivity. If not, the Russians will keep up a desperate fight, which will demand sacrifices on our side, probably heavy ones.â 26
Officers also continued to worry about the practicability of asking their men to fire on fleeing civilians. Returning from a tour of the front line on 24 October, von Leebâs head of staff passed on a divisional commanderâs opinion that his men would carry out such an order once, but that in case of repeated breakouts âhe doubted whether they would hold their nerve so as to shoot again and again on women, children and defenceless old menâ. Though it was âfully understood that the millions of people encircled in Leningrad could not be fed by us without this having a negative impact on our own countryâ, such orders might cause âthe German soldier to lose his inner balance, so that even after the war he will not be able to hold back from acts of violenceâ. The sight of thousands of refugees streaming south through Gatchina and Pleskau, he noted, had already demoralised German troops repairing roads in the area, since âwhere they are going and how they feed themselves cannot be established. One has the impression that sooner or later they will die of hunger.â Commander-in-chief Brauchitschâs response was to suggest that soldiers be spared the psychological strain of killing women and children close to by doing so from further away, with minefields and long-distance artillery. Once the Red Army units around Leningrad had surrendered, German units could even temporarily be transferred to quarters. âEven then a large part of the civilian population will perish, but at least not right in front of our eyes.â 27
Â
In the event, the problems remained hypothetical. Leningradâs leadership never tried to negotiate surrender, nor did ordinary Leningraders ever attempt mass breakout. Germany did not follow her own, muddled, policy either. No gaps were ever left open in the German lines so as to allow disease-bearing starvation survivors to flee into unoccupied Russia; on the contrary, barges and lorries carrying evacuees across Lake Ladoga were repeatedly attacked. For the next three winters, the Wehrmacht prosecuted a classical siege, preventing, so far as possible, all movement of people and goods in and out of the city, and using air and ground bombardment to destroy food stocks, utilities, factories, hospitals, schools and housing. (âIt is particularly importantâ, a Führer Directive issued just before the first air raids explained, âto destroy the water supply.â 28 ) Mass starvation, it should be stressed, was not an unforeseen, or regrettable but necessary, by-product of this strategy, but its central plank, routinely referred to with approval in planning documents, and followed, once it set in, with eager interest by military intelligence.
It was a crime, as Germans have only
Following the cityâs encirclement, requests for surrender negotiations shall be denied, since the problem of relocating and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for our very existence, we can have no interest in maintaining even a part of this very large urban population. 25
Â
The formal orders â no acceptance of surrender; the city to be worn down by bombing and artillery fire; civilians to be fired upon if they approached the German lines â were issued by Jodl on 7 October. They did not, however, quite close down the debate. âTodayâ, Army Group North commander von Leeb confided to his diary, âOKWâs [Armed Forces High Commandâs] decision on Leningrad arrived, according to which a capitulation may not be accepted. [We] sent a letter to OKH [Army High Command] asking whether in this case Russian troops can be taken into captivity. If not, the Russians will keep up a desperate fight, which will demand sacrifices on our side, probably heavy ones.â 26
Officers also continued to worry about the practicability of asking their men to fire on fleeing civilians. Returning from a tour of the front line on 24 October, von Leebâs head of staff passed on a divisional commanderâs opinion that his men would carry out such an order once, but that in case of repeated breakouts âhe doubted whether they would hold their nerve so as to shoot again and again on women, children and defenceless old menâ. Though it was âfully understood that the millions of people encircled in Leningrad could not be fed by us without this having a negative impact on our own countryâ, such orders might cause âthe German soldier to lose his inner balance, so that even after the war he will not be able to hold back from acts of violenceâ. The sight of thousands of refugees streaming south through Gatchina and Pleskau, he noted, had already demoralised German troops repairing roads in the area, since âwhere they are going and how they feed themselves cannot be established. One has the impression that sooner or later they will die of hunger.â Commander-in-chief Brauchitschâs response was to suggest that soldiers be spared the psychological strain of killing women and children close to by doing so from further away, with minefields and long-distance artillery. Once the Red Army units around Leningrad had surrendered, German units could even temporarily be transferred to quarters. âEven then a large part of the civilian population will perish, but at least not right in front of our eyes.â 27
Â
In the event, the problems remained hypothetical. Leningradâs leadership never tried to negotiate surrender, nor did ordinary Leningraders ever attempt mass breakout. Germany did not follow her own, muddled, policy either. No gaps were ever left open in the German lines so as to allow disease-bearing starvation survivors to flee into unoccupied Russia; on the contrary, barges and lorries carrying evacuees across Lake Ladoga were repeatedly attacked. For the next three winters, the Wehrmacht prosecuted a classical siege, preventing, so far as possible, all movement of people and goods in and out of the city, and using air and ground bombardment to destroy food stocks, utilities, factories, hospitals, schools and housing. (âIt is particularly importantâ, a Führer Directive issued just before the first air raids explained, âto destroy the water supply.â 28 ) Mass starvation, it should be stressed, was not an unforeseen, or regrettable but necessary, by-product of this strategy, but its central plank, routinely referred to with approval in planning documents, and followed, once it set in, with eager interest by military intelligence.
It was a crime, as Germans have only
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