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Authors: John Arquilla
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direction from his main enemy. Instead of following Cornwallis, and before informing Washington, Greene took his army southward once more, aiming to set the backcountry ablaze and reclaim the Carolinas and Georgia. This move allowed Cornwallis to invade Virginia, where he prevailed against American forces that Washington had sent from New York under the Marquis de Lafayette. Tarleton, now working in tandem with other British raiding forces, caused considerable suffering among the populace. Nevertheless Greene stuck to his belief that the partisan war in the south was the best hope of achieving a strategic victory. Among the irregular formations fighting there, Greene’s move resonated powerfully, energizing them to new levels of guerrilla activity.
Soon it seemed that no British or Tory patrol in the Carolinas could be undertaken without being ambushed. And no outpost was secure. In a series of hit-and-run raids, the rebels came close to compelling British withdrawal to Charleston and Savannah. When additional British troops were being distributed to shore up security in the hinterland, Greene’s main force arrived on the scene, posing a whole new threat. So the British had to concentrate their forces once again, this time under the command of Lord Rawdon. Early on, in the spring of 1781, Rawdon bested Greene in a firefight at Hobkirk’s Hill. Later Rawdon arrived on scene just in time to thwart Greene’s effort to take the major outpost at Ninety-Six, so named for its distance in miles into the hinterland. The opposing forces met once more at Eutaw Springs on September 8, with the British again carrying the day in savage fighting—a characteristic of Greene’s pitched battles—but suffering mightily.
While Greene engaged the main British forces, his irregulars went wild. As the historian Theodore Thayer notes, “while he was keeping Rawdon occupied, Greene’s subordinates captured ALL the small forts in South Carolina except those in the vicinity of Charleston.” 7 In this sort of fighting the partisan Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, showed a special aptitude and a clear understanding of the larger purpose of the campaign. The historian Derek Leebaert rates Marion quite high in this regard, observing that “what elevated him above just being a guerrilla leader was his ability to accept authority and work hand in glove with Nathanael Greene.” 8 Russell Weigley, who pioneered the concept of there being an “American way of war,” went further in singling out Marion, noting that, when compared to other partisan leaders, he was “possessed of a superior sense of strategy and a superior willingness to cooperate with other leaders.” 9
Beyond Marion, Greene also enjoyed the benefit of a great cavalry leader, Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, 10 father of Robert E. Lee, who would go on to write a brilliant account of the winning mix of conventional and irregular operations in his classic MEMOIRS OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES . With just a few hundred riders under his command, Lee was often able to raise complete havoc with the vulnerable British communications and supply lines. Ironically, his famous son, who would come to command Confederate forces replete with skillful raiders during the Civil War, would choose to fight conventionally, viewing irregular warfare as “an unmixed evil.” 11
His supporting cast aside, it was to Greene’s particular credit that he understood the fundamental dynamic of the campaign: he did not have to win conventional battles in order to prevail. Stand-up fights wore down the British and created opportunities for irregular actions that added to the enemy’s physical and psychological fatigue. All Greene needed to do was keep his conventional force “in being,” able to compel a fight or pose a new challenge when circumstances required. In his famous, fatalistic description of the conventional part of the campaign, Greene summed up matters: “We
Soon it seemed that no British or Tory patrol in the Carolinas could be undertaken without being ambushed. And no outpost was secure. In a series of hit-and-run raids, the rebels came close to compelling British withdrawal to Charleston and Savannah. When additional British troops were being distributed to shore up security in the hinterland, Greene’s main force arrived on the scene, posing a whole new threat. So the British had to concentrate their forces once again, this time under the command of Lord Rawdon. Early on, in the spring of 1781, Rawdon bested Greene in a firefight at Hobkirk’s Hill. Later Rawdon arrived on scene just in time to thwart Greene’s effort to take the major outpost at Ninety-Six, so named for its distance in miles into the hinterland. The opposing forces met once more at Eutaw Springs on September 8, with the British again carrying the day in savage fighting—a characteristic of Greene’s pitched battles—but suffering mightily.
While Greene engaged the main British forces, his irregulars went wild. As the historian Theodore Thayer notes, “while he was keeping Rawdon occupied, Greene’s subordinates captured ALL the small forts in South Carolina except those in the vicinity of Charleston.” 7 In this sort of fighting the partisan Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, showed a special aptitude and a clear understanding of the larger purpose of the campaign. The historian Derek Leebaert rates Marion quite high in this regard, observing that “what elevated him above just being a guerrilla leader was his ability to accept authority and work hand in glove with Nathanael Greene.” 8 Russell Weigley, who pioneered the concept of there being an “American way of war,” went further in singling out Marion, noting that, when compared to other partisan leaders, he was “possessed of a superior sense of strategy and a superior willingness to cooperate with other leaders.” 9
Beyond Marion, Greene also enjoyed the benefit of a great cavalry leader, Henry “Light-Horse Harry” Lee, 10 father of Robert E. Lee, who would go on to write a brilliant account of the winning mix of conventional and irregular operations in his classic MEMOIRS OF THE WAR IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT OF THE UNITED STATES . With just a few hundred riders under his command, Lee was often able to raise complete havoc with the vulnerable British communications and supply lines. Ironically, his famous son, who would come to command Confederate forces replete with skillful raiders during the Civil War, would choose to fight conventionally, viewing irregular warfare as “an unmixed evil.” 11
His supporting cast aside, it was to Greene’s particular credit that he understood the fundamental dynamic of the campaign: he did not have to win conventional battles in order to prevail. Stand-up fights wore down the British and created opportunities for irregular actions that added to the enemy’s physical and psychological fatigue. All Greene needed to do was keep his conventional force “in being,” able to compel a fight or pose a new challenge when circumstances required. In his famous, fatalistic description of the conventional part of the campaign, Greene summed up matters: “We
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