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Authors: Lawrence Kaplan
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more straightlaced traditional America of
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a generation ago, also hold significant political implications. We have today, if I'm right, a citizenry that is far more liberal in terms of its social valuesfavoring abortion, much more tolerant about sexual behavior, about divorce, about racial relations and civil rightsand yet also notably more conservative when it comes to fiscal and governmental matters, especially government from Washington. (in Duke 1986:39)
Even those who are Reaganite on the handling of the economy, defense, and foreign policy wish to maintain the freedom to choose their own lifestyles.
The second reading of "reaction," which sees the NCR as a reactionary political movement supported by a section of the population that feels itself threatened, is more plausible. However, the notion of reaction has to be used carefully if it is not to mislead. We should not see the NCR as an almost neurotic response to social, political, and cultural changes which threaten small-town Americans and their traditional values. Those analysts who have tried to deploy status defense models of the NCR have usually had to admit that they do not work (Simpson 1983, 1985; Buell 1983). Unless status is defined so broadly as to be meaningless, supporters of the NCR do not share a common status. Apart from a tendency to be located in the South or Southwest, the main thing that supporters of organizations such as the Moral Majority have in common is their religion. The NCR is a movement of cultural, rather than status, defense. To use the American phrase, it is concerned with the politics of lifestyles rather than status.
The word "reaction" also has the unfortunate suggestion of bad faith about it; it implies that while liberals have authentic values, which they hold dear for good reasons, their opponents take up positions in reaction. The core of conservative Protestant values has remained remarkably stable for a long time. The social, political, and moral conservatism of evangelicals and fundamentalists is not new. They have not become conservatives in response to the increasing permissiveness of liberal America. They have stood still while everyone around them moved. If liberals see the conservative movement as a reaction, this is akin to the illusion of children in a train that is leaving the station supposing that they are standing still while the stationary train next to them is moving backwards.
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What is novel or reactive about the actions and attitudes of people like Falwell, Robertson, Dixon, and their followers is their willingness to campaign publicly and politically against things they find offensive. Although fundamentalists have always found something to complain aboutafter all, this world is the world of fallen and sinful mantheir environment has grown increasingly hostile. The unregenerate part of the world has become ever more obviously unregenerate. One need not follow fundamentalists in their uncritical attitude to the past, their blanket condemnation of the present, nor in their explanation of the ways in which the world has changed to accept that divorce is now common, as is drug addiction, that homosexuality is accepted in many circles as an alternative lifestyle, that "housewife" is a devalued status, that the separation of church and state (once interpreted as denominational neutrality) is now taken to imply secularity, and so on. The changes that have been promoted and welcomed by atheists, feminists, racial minorities, and liberals are changes that have fundamentally altered the moral, social, and political culture of America and moved it away from the standards and practices that fundamentalists regard as biblical.
Furthermore, and probably more important, the changes in American culture have been accompanied by a social force that amplifies the offense to conservative Protestants: increased centralization. Although America remains far less centralized than Britain, the general trend has
Page 42
a generation ago, also hold significant political implications. We have today, if I'm right, a citizenry that is far more liberal in terms of its social valuesfavoring abortion, much more tolerant about sexual behavior, about divorce, about racial relations and civil rightsand yet also notably more conservative when it comes to fiscal and governmental matters, especially government from Washington. (in Duke 1986:39)
Even those who are Reaganite on the handling of the economy, defense, and foreign policy wish to maintain the freedom to choose their own lifestyles.
The second reading of "reaction," which sees the NCR as a reactionary political movement supported by a section of the population that feels itself threatened, is more plausible. However, the notion of reaction has to be used carefully if it is not to mislead. We should not see the NCR as an almost neurotic response to social, political, and cultural changes which threaten small-town Americans and their traditional values. Those analysts who have tried to deploy status defense models of the NCR have usually had to admit that they do not work (Simpson 1983, 1985; Buell 1983). Unless status is defined so broadly as to be meaningless, supporters of the NCR do not share a common status. Apart from a tendency to be located in the South or Southwest, the main thing that supporters of organizations such as the Moral Majority have in common is their religion. The NCR is a movement of cultural, rather than status, defense. To use the American phrase, it is concerned with the politics of lifestyles rather than status.
The word "reaction" also has the unfortunate suggestion of bad faith about it; it implies that while liberals have authentic values, which they hold dear for good reasons, their opponents take up positions in reaction. The core of conservative Protestant values has remained remarkably stable for a long time. The social, political, and moral conservatism of evangelicals and fundamentalists is not new. They have not become conservatives in response to the increasing permissiveness of liberal America. They have stood still while everyone around them moved. If liberals see the conservative movement as a reaction, this is akin to the illusion of children in a train that is leaving the station supposing that they are standing still while the stationary train next to them is moving backwards.
Page 43
What is novel or reactive about the actions and attitudes of people like Falwell, Robertson, Dixon, and their followers is their willingness to campaign publicly and politically against things they find offensive. Although fundamentalists have always found something to complain aboutafter all, this world is the world of fallen and sinful mantheir environment has grown increasingly hostile. The unregenerate part of the world has become ever more obviously unregenerate. One need not follow fundamentalists in their uncritical attitude to the past, their blanket condemnation of the present, nor in their explanation of the ways in which the world has changed to accept that divorce is now common, as is drug addiction, that homosexuality is accepted in many circles as an alternative lifestyle, that "housewife" is a devalued status, that the separation of church and state (once interpreted as denominational neutrality) is now taken to imply secularity, and so on. The changes that have been promoted and welcomed by atheists, feminists, racial minorities, and liberals are changes that have fundamentally altered the moral, social, and political culture of America and moved it away from the standards and practices that fundamentalists regard as biblical.
Furthermore, and probably more important, the changes in American culture have been accompanied by a social force that amplifies the offense to conservative Protestants: increased centralization. Although America remains far less centralized than Britain, the general trend has
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