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Authors: John Bryden
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intelligence, largely obtained from the Abwehr-appointed military attachés posted to the German embassies abroad. The Zentrale — Abwehr Z — was the administration, finance, and records department, the latter an archive containing the names and personal files of thousands of spies, informers, enemy agents, and persons of interest. The equivalent in Britain was the Central Registry administered by MI5 but serving the same function for both the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Zentrale was headed by Hans Oster, a dedicated foe of the Nazi regime.
Abw I was subdivided into Eins Heer (IH: Army Espionage), Eins Marine (IM: Naval Espionage) and Eins Luft (IL: Air Espionage).
Abw III also had a number of subdivisions, the most important being IIIF (Counter-espionage agents bureau). Its main task was to compromise and destroy enemy clandestine organizations by infiltrating them with its own spies and informers. The ultimate prize was to get an IIIF agent into the enemy’s intelligence service.17
The main departments were usually mirrored in the Abwehr’s sub-offices, called Abwehrstellen or “Asts” for short. Thus there was an Ast Hamburg, an Ast Wilhelmshaven, an Ast Weisbaden, and so on, each usually with IH, IM, and IL desks as well as an IIIF section. The pattern was repeated as Nazi Germany conquered its neighbours, with the establishment of Ast Brussels, Ast Dijon, Ast Bordeaux, and so forth. Abwehr offices in neutral countries were called Kriegsorganisationen, or KOs for short, the two most important being KO Portugal in Lisbon and KO Spain in Madrid. These Abwehr stations worked under the cover of the German embassies.
Each Ast or KO was encouraged to recruit and run its own secret agents, coordination being effected by keeping Berlin informed. Thus, Ast Hamburg and Ast Cologne both could have spies in Britain, France, or wherever. This had the advantage of insulating agent networks one from the other, so that if one was penetrated or blown, the others would not be. Also, since individuals with the right temperament and skills for espionage were hard to come by, the chances of finding persons suitable for specific tasks, in terms of language ability, background, and motivation were immensely increased if every Abwehr office and its sub-offices — called Nebenstellen, or “Nests” — were on the lookout. The really successful spies, the many that the British and the Americans did not catch, were obtained in this way.
Ast Hamburg and its satellite, Nest Bremen, were the two principal overseas intelligence-gathering centres, for both were great ports with a large number of companies engaged in shipping and overseas commercial enterprises. Businessmen travelling abroad were persuaded to informally share their observations with Abwehr representatives on their return, while seamen were recruited to act more directly by taking pictures, collecting postcards, and gathering information and documents on the harbours and railways at their ports of call. They were also useful as couriers for Abwehr spies resident in the target countries.18
Nest Bremen ended the war with some four hundred secret agents in its card index. It was the only Abwehr office whose files were recovered at the end of the war, so, counting the others, the number of spies and informers on file at Zentrale in Berlin must have run well into the thousands.19
The Nazi security and intelligence services were also fairly simply structured. Before the war they comprised: (1) the security service (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) under Heydrich; and, separately under Himmler, (2) the security police (or Sipo); (3) the criminal investigation police (Krimminelpolizei, or Kripo); and (4) the Secret State Police (Geheimestaatspolizei, notoriously better known by its abbreviation, the Gestapo). The first was set up originally to gather intelligence on the Nazi party’s political rivals and expanded as time went on to surveillance of just
Abw I was subdivided into Eins Heer (IH: Army Espionage), Eins Marine (IM: Naval Espionage) and Eins Luft (IL: Air Espionage).
Abw III also had a number of subdivisions, the most important being IIIF (Counter-espionage agents bureau). Its main task was to compromise and destroy enemy clandestine organizations by infiltrating them with its own spies and informers. The ultimate prize was to get an IIIF agent into the enemy’s intelligence service.17
The main departments were usually mirrored in the Abwehr’s sub-offices, called Abwehrstellen or “Asts” for short. Thus there was an Ast Hamburg, an Ast Wilhelmshaven, an Ast Weisbaden, and so on, each usually with IH, IM, and IL desks as well as an IIIF section. The pattern was repeated as Nazi Germany conquered its neighbours, with the establishment of Ast Brussels, Ast Dijon, Ast Bordeaux, and so forth. Abwehr offices in neutral countries were called Kriegsorganisationen, or KOs for short, the two most important being KO Portugal in Lisbon and KO Spain in Madrid. These Abwehr stations worked under the cover of the German embassies.
Each Ast or KO was encouraged to recruit and run its own secret agents, coordination being effected by keeping Berlin informed. Thus, Ast Hamburg and Ast Cologne both could have spies in Britain, France, or wherever. This had the advantage of insulating agent networks one from the other, so that if one was penetrated or blown, the others would not be. Also, since individuals with the right temperament and skills for espionage were hard to come by, the chances of finding persons suitable for specific tasks, in terms of language ability, background, and motivation were immensely increased if every Abwehr office and its sub-offices — called Nebenstellen, or “Nests” — were on the lookout. The really successful spies, the many that the British and the Americans did not catch, were obtained in this way.
Ast Hamburg and its satellite, Nest Bremen, were the two principal overseas intelligence-gathering centres, for both were great ports with a large number of companies engaged in shipping and overseas commercial enterprises. Businessmen travelling abroad were persuaded to informally share their observations with Abwehr representatives on their return, while seamen were recruited to act more directly by taking pictures, collecting postcards, and gathering information and documents on the harbours and railways at their ports of call. They were also useful as couriers for Abwehr spies resident in the target countries.18
Nest Bremen ended the war with some four hundred secret agents in its card index. It was the only Abwehr office whose files were recovered at the end of the war, so, counting the others, the number of spies and informers on file at Zentrale in Berlin must have run well into the thousands.19
The Nazi security and intelligence services were also fairly simply structured. Before the war they comprised: (1) the security service (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) under Heydrich; and, separately under Himmler, (2) the security police (or Sipo); (3) the criminal investigation police (Krimminelpolizei, or Kripo); and (4) the Secret State Police (Geheimestaatspolizei, notoriously better known by its abbreviation, the Gestapo). The first was set up originally to gather intelligence on the Nazi party’s political rivals and expanded as time went on to surveillance of just
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