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Authors: Ian Rutledge
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February and March and now placed before the Committee. 4 In the first, Lord Hardinge had asked,
How far the safety of the oilfields in the upper valley of the Karun river could be permanently secured if the Vilayet of Baghdad were to remain under foreign and possibly hostile control? 5
adding,
It is assumed that the administration of the Vilayet, when it comes definitely under British rule, will be carried out by the government of India.
However, in a further telegram in March, the viceroy somewhat modified his remarks about the future administration of Baghdad, stating,
Our interests are at Abadan and in Karun Valley by (
sic
) the oil works… it is essential that for this and other reasons we should remain in permanent occupation of Basra Vilayet and that on political, economic and religious grounds, the Baghdad Vilayet should also be ceded by Turkey and a native administration under our protection and control established there. 6
But Llewellyn Smith thought control of Basra and Baghdad alone was insufficient. If Britain was going to become involved in negotiations with the French on the future of ‘Turkey-in-Asia’, as was probably inevitable, it would be necessary to ask for something more. Britain, he argued, must also have Mosul. Only by taking the line of defence up to this mountainous northern area would it be possible to construct a strategically sound defensive position in the event of future hostilities with either the remnants of Ottoman power or one of Britain’s current allies. And he concluded by saying, ‘May I also remind you gentlemen, that it must not be forgotten that there is a valuable oil region in the Vilayet of Mosul.’ 7
Sykes agreed. ‘If the Baghdad Vilayet is to be incorporated it will be necessary as well to take the Vilayet of Mosul.’ Major General C.E. Callwell of the War Office also threw his weight behind the demand for Mosul: in his opinion the ‘Hit–Tikrit line would be unsuitable as a defensive position.’ However, he added a further consideration. If Britain was going to control all three of the Iraqi vilayets this newly acquired addition to the empire would have to have an outlet to the Mediterranean, either at Haifa in Palestine or further north at Alexandretta.
Admiral Sir H.B. Jackson added that, whereas he had no objection to including Mosul in the list of desirable acquisitions, he felt obliged to say that from the Admiralty point of view the essential thing was to control the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad. ‘Both these Vilayet
s
are of first importance owing to the oil supplies which the Admiralty draws through those regions.’ 8
By the time the third meeting of the committee was convened on Thursday 15 April it had become clear that the observations which a number of members had already made in relation to the question of oil resources called for a more detailed exposition of the subjectthan any of the permanent appointees – even Sykes – could offer. Sir Maurice De Bunsen therefore opened the meeting by reminding the committee, ‘It is known that there are extremely rich oil deposits in Mesopotamia and in view of our commitment as regards the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it is important to know what steps we should take to safeguard those interests.’ 9
De Bunsen therefore informed the committee that he had invited Rear Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, reputed to be the country’s leading oil expert, to address the meeting. Slade had led the Admiralty’s investigating commission which spent three months in Persia between October 1913 and January 1914 studying the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and which had declared the company’s concession to be potentially of great value and capable of supplying the Royal Navy’s requirements for a long time. Behind his bluff, grey-bearded nautical exterior he possessed a shrewd analytical mind with a personal fascination for the facts and figures of fuel logistics and the emerging geopolitics of oil. It
How far the safety of the oilfields in the upper valley of the Karun river could be permanently secured if the Vilayet of Baghdad were to remain under foreign and possibly hostile control? 5
adding,
It is assumed that the administration of the Vilayet, when it comes definitely under British rule, will be carried out by the government of India.
However, in a further telegram in March, the viceroy somewhat modified his remarks about the future administration of Baghdad, stating,
Our interests are at Abadan and in Karun Valley by (
sic
) the oil works… it is essential that for this and other reasons we should remain in permanent occupation of Basra Vilayet and that on political, economic and religious grounds, the Baghdad Vilayet should also be ceded by Turkey and a native administration under our protection and control established there. 6
But Llewellyn Smith thought control of Basra and Baghdad alone was insufficient. If Britain was going to become involved in negotiations with the French on the future of ‘Turkey-in-Asia’, as was probably inevitable, it would be necessary to ask for something more. Britain, he argued, must also have Mosul. Only by taking the line of defence up to this mountainous northern area would it be possible to construct a strategically sound defensive position in the event of future hostilities with either the remnants of Ottoman power or one of Britain’s current allies. And he concluded by saying, ‘May I also remind you gentlemen, that it must not be forgotten that there is a valuable oil region in the Vilayet of Mosul.’ 7
Sykes agreed. ‘If the Baghdad Vilayet is to be incorporated it will be necessary as well to take the Vilayet of Mosul.’ Major General C.E. Callwell of the War Office also threw his weight behind the demand for Mosul: in his opinion the ‘Hit–Tikrit line would be unsuitable as a defensive position.’ However, he added a further consideration. If Britain was going to control all three of the Iraqi vilayets this newly acquired addition to the empire would have to have an outlet to the Mediterranean, either at Haifa in Palestine or further north at Alexandretta.
Admiral Sir H.B. Jackson added that, whereas he had no objection to including Mosul in the list of desirable acquisitions, he felt obliged to say that from the Admiralty point of view the essential thing was to control the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad. ‘Both these Vilayet
s
are of first importance owing to the oil supplies which the Admiralty draws through those regions.’ 8
By the time the third meeting of the committee was convened on Thursday 15 April it had become clear that the observations which a number of members had already made in relation to the question of oil resources called for a more detailed exposition of the subjectthan any of the permanent appointees – even Sykes – could offer. Sir Maurice De Bunsen therefore opened the meeting by reminding the committee, ‘It is known that there are extremely rich oil deposits in Mesopotamia and in view of our commitment as regards the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, it is important to know what steps we should take to safeguard those interests.’ 9
De Bunsen therefore informed the committee that he had invited Rear Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, reputed to be the country’s leading oil expert, to address the meeting. Slade had led the Admiralty’s investigating commission which spent three months in Persia between October 1913 and January 1914 studying the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and which had declared the company’s concession to be potentially of great value and capable of supplying the Royal Navy’s requirements for a long time. Behind his bluff, grey-bearded nautical exterior he possessed a shrewd analytical mind with a personal fascination for the facts and figures of fuel logistics and the emerging geopolitics of oil. It
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