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Authors: Ian Rutledge
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his mid-thirties, and sitting to the left of the chairman was a very short bald man whom Sir Maurice introduced as ‘Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence’. As yet Sykes knew him only by reputation.
SYKES’S 1915 PROPOSED SCHEME FOR THE ‘DECENTRALISATION’ OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE’S EASTERN POSSESSIONS
Calling the meeting to order, Sir Maurice reminded the assembled officials of their remit. The cabinet had already agreed to the tsar’s demand for Istanbul and the Turkish Straits together with the islands of Imbros and Tenedos in the northern Aegean, and in return the tsar’s government had assured Britain that it would respect the ‘special interests’ of Britain and France in Asiatic Turkey. Sir Maurice made it clear from the start that the ‘special interests’ they were being asked to define were ‘the primary economic and commercial interests of Great Britain and the policy it would be desirable for H.M. Government to adopt to secure those ends’. 2 Doubtless Britain also had a ‘civilising mission’ east of the Dardanelles and eventually the ‘white man’s burden’ would have to be taken up; but for the moment it was ‘economic and commercial interests’ which were the overriding focus of the committee’s deliberations. Accordingly, the first civil servant called upon by Sir Maurice to address the committee was Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, permanent secretary of the Board of Trade.
Sir Llewellyn stated that HM Government had three principal economic and commercial objectives in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire: firstly, obtaining a free and open market for British manufactures; secondly, the acquisition of secure sources of food supplies and raw materials; and thirdly, to create a field for the employment of British capital and an outlet for the surplus population of Britain’s Indian Empire. The first of these desiderata implied ensuring that neither the Turks nor Britain’s allies should, in occupation of portions of the Ottoman Empire which they might retain or acquire, be allowed to impose any tariff barriers which would obstruct British trade. The second objective should be based on the recognition that Iraq was of particular interest to Britain as it could be an important source of foodstuffs when major irrigation works were carried out and of oil resources when they were developed. Both the oil and irrigation possibilities fell mainly within the Baghdad vilayet, Llewellyn Smith stated, and so ‘they must clearly be included within a British controlled area’. 3 However, although he believed that British interests in Upper Iraq were not as great as in Baghdad and Basra, Llewellyn Smith added that ‘an important oil region lies in the Mosul Vilayet … and it thereforeseems desirable that Mosul too should fall within the British sphere of influence.’
The following day the committee reconvened and under the direction of its chairman moved on to discuss the strategic implications of the economic interests which had formed the principal topic of the previous day’s deliberations. De Bunsen opened the session by stating that, in his view, if Basra was going to be incorporated into the British possessions – and the government of India now seemed determined that this should be so – then it would also be necessary to control the Baghdad vilayet. Baghdad must not fall into the hands of any other power or its possession by a potential enemy would threaten Britain’s position at Basra and the head of the Gulf. To this, the representative of the India Office, Sir T.W. Holderness, agreed, adding that British control up to a line north of Baghdad, from Hit on the Euphrates to Tikrit on the Tigris, should be sufficient and would almost certainly satisfy the government of India.
In fact, the views of the government of India itself were already set out in two telegrams from the viceroy to the secretary of state for India, received in
SYKES’S 1915 PROPOSED SCHEME FOR THE ‘DECENTRALISATION’ OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE’S EASTERN POSSESSIONS
Calling the meeting to order, Sir Maurice reminded the assembled officials of their remit. The cabinet had already agreed to the tsar’s demand for Istanbul and the Turkish Straits together with the islands of Imbros and Tenedos in the northern Aegean, and in return the tsar’s government had assured Britain that it would respect the ‘special interests’ of Britain and France in Asiatic Turkey. Sir Maurice made it clear from the start that the ‘special interests’ they were being asked to define were ‘the primary economic and commercial interests of Great Britain and the policy it would be desirable for H.M. Government to adopt to secure those ends’. 2 Doubtless Britain also had a ‘civilising mission’ east of the Dardanelles and eventually the ‘white man’s burden’ would have to be taken up; but for the moment it was ‘economic and commercial interests’ which were the overriding focus of the committee’s deliberations. Accordingly, the first civil servant called upon by Sir Maurice to address the committee was Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, permanent secretary of the Board of Trade.
Sir Llewellyn stated that HM Government had three principal economic and commercial objectives in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire: firstly, obtaining a free and open market for British manufactures; secondly, the acquisition of secure sources of food supplies and raw materials; and thirdly, to create a field for the employment of British capital and an outlet for the surplus population of Britain’s Indian Empire. The first of these desiderata implied ensuring that neither the Turks nor Britain’s allies should, in occupation of portions of the Ottoman Empire which they might retain or acquire, be allowed to impose any tariff barriers which would obstruct British trade. The second objective should be based on the recognition that Iraq was of particular interest to Britain as it could be an important source of foodstuffs when major irrigation works were carried out and of oil resources when they were developed. Both the oil and irrigation possibilities fell mainly within the Baghdad vilayet, Llewellyn Smith stated, and so ‘they must clearly be included within a British controlled area’. 3 However, although he believed that British interests in Upper Iraq were not as great as in Baghdad and Basra, Llewellyn Smith added that ‘an important oil region lies in the Mosul Vilayet … and it thereforeseems desirable that Mosul too should fall within the British sphere of influence.’
The following day the committee reconvened and under the direction of its chairman moved on to discuss the strategic implications of the economic interests which had formed the principal topic of the previous day’s deliberations. De Bunsen opened the session by stating that, in his view, if Basra was going to be incorporated into the British possessions – and the government of India now seemed determined that this should be so – then it would also be necessary to control the Baghdad vilayet. Baghdad must not fall into the hands of any other power or its possession by a potential enemy would threaten Britain’s position at Basra and the head of the Gulf. To this, the representative of the India Office, Sir T.W. Holderness, agreed, adding that British control up to a line north of Baghdad, from Hit on the Euphrates to Tikrit on the Tigris, should be sufficient and would almost certainly satisfy the government of India.
In fact, the views of the government of India itself were already set out in two telegrams from the viceroy to the secretary of state for India, received in
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