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Authors: Freeman Dyson
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missions reached the moon successfully, and one,
Apollo 13
, was an epic failure from which the crew came home safely. After that, the public was not interested in going further. Budgets rapidly decreased and the Apollo program ended. All that von Braun could do to keep manned rocket missions alive was to promote the Space Shuttle, a reusable ferry vehicle that had originally been the bottom part of his Mars Project. The shuttle was supposed to be cheap and safe, flying frequently with a quick turnaround between missions. When after many delays the shuttle finally flew, it turned out to be neither cheap nor safe nor quick. He was lucky not to live long enough to see how miserably the shuttle would fail.
This book raises three important issues: one historical and two moral. The historical question is whether von Braun’s great achievement, providing the means for twelve men to walk on the moon, made sense. Was it a big step toward the realization of his dream of colonizing the universe, or was it a dead end without any useful consequences? In the short run, the Apollo program was certainly a dead end. As a public program dependent on the taxpayers’ money, it collapsed as soon as the taxpayers lost interest in it. When von Braun moved from NASA to Fairchild Industries in 1972, he was wagering that human adventures in space would in the future be better supported by private investors than by governments. He died of cancer five years later. Now, thirty years after his death, we see a vigorousgrowth of privately funded space ventures. If von Braun had lived twenty years longer, he might have pushed us sooner into the era of private launchers. He might even have rescued the Space Shuttle, his orphaned baby, and made it become what he had intended it to be: cheap and safe and quick. In the long run, one way or another, people will again dream of colonizing the universe and will again build spaceships to embark on celestial journeys. When that happens, they will be following in von Braun’s footsteps.
The two moral issues that Neufeld’s book raises are whether von Braun was justified in selling his soul to Himmler and whether the United States was justified in giving sanctuary and honorable employment to von Braun and other members of the Peenemünde team. Some of the other scientists at Peenemünde were guilty of worse offenses than von Braun. The most notorious was Arthur Rudolph, a close friend of von Braun, who had been an enthusiastic Nazi and served as the chief of production at the Mittelwerk factory. Rudolph was far more directly involved than von Braun in the exploitation and abuse of prisoners. After that, Rudolph lived in the United States for thirty-nine years and enjoyed a distinguished career as a rocket engineer. Finally, in 1984, formerly secret documents describing Rudolph’s activities in Germany emerged into the light of day, and he was threatened with a lawsuit challenging his right to American citizenship. Rather than fighting the lawsuit, he renounced his citizenship and returned with his wife to Germany. One of the investigators of the Rudolph case said, “We’re lucky von Braun isn’t alive.” Von Braun had died, full of years and honor, seven years earlier. If von Braun had been alive in 1984, with his public fame and political clout intact, he would have come to the defense of Rudolph and probably won the case.
Neufeld condemns von Braun for his collaboration with the SS, and condemns the US government for covering up the evidence of hiscollaboration. Here I beg to differ with the author. War is an inherently immoral activity. Even the best of wars involves crimes and atrocities, and every citizen who takes part in war is to some extent collaborating with criminals. I should here declare my own interest in this debate. In my work for the RAF Bomber Command, I was collaborating with people who planned the destruction of Dresden in February 1945, a notorious calamity in which many thousands of
Apollo 13
, was an epic failure from which the crew came home safely. After that, the public was not interested in going further. Budgets rapidly decreased and the Apollo program ended. All that von Braun could do to keep manned rocket missions alive was to promote the Space Shuttle, a reusable ferry vehicle that had originally been the bottom part of his Mars Project. The shuttle was supposed to be cheap and safe, flying frequently with a quick turnaround between missions. When after many delays the shuttle finally flew, it turned out to be neither cheap nor safe nor quick. He was lucky not to live long enough to see how miserably the shuttle would fail.
This book raises three important issues: one historical and two moral. The historical question is whether von Braun’s great achievement, providing the means for twelve men to walk on the moon, made sense. Was it a big step toward the realization of his dream of colonizing the universe, or was it a dead end without any useful consequences? In the short run, the Apollo program was certainly a dead end. As a public program dependent on the taxpayers’ money, it collapsed as soon as the taxpayers lost interest in it. When von Braun moved from NASA to Fairchild Industries in 1972, he was wagering that human adventures in space would in the future be better supported by private investors than by governments. He died of cancer five years later. Now, thirty years after his death, we see a vigorousgrowth of privately funded space ventures. If von Braun had lived twenty years longer, he might have pushed us sooner into the era of private launchers. He might even have rescued the Space Shuttle, his orphaned baby, and made it become what he had intended it to be: cheap and safe and quick. In the long run, one way or another, people will again dream of colonizing the universe and will again build spaceships to embark on celestial journeys. When that happens, they will be following in von Braun’s footsteps.
The two moral issues that Neufeld’s book raises are whether von Braun was justified in selling his soul to Himmler and whether the United States was justified in giving sanctuary and honorable employment to von Braun and other members of the Peenemünde team. Some of the other scientists at Peenemünde were guilty of worse offenses than von Braun. The most notorious was Arthur Rudolph, a close friend of von Braun, who had been an enthusiastic Nazi and served as the chief of production at the Mittelwerk factory. Rudolph was far more directly involved than von Braun in the exploitation and abuse of prisoners. After that, Rudolph lived in the United States for thirty-nine years and enjoyed a distinguished career as a rocket engineer. Finally, in 1984, formerly secret documents describing Rudolph’s activities in Germany emerged into the light of day, and he was threatened with a lawsuit challenging his right to American citizenship. Rather than fighting the lawsuit, he renounced his citizenship and returned with his wife to Germany. One of the investigators of the Rudolph case said, “We’re lucky von Braun isn’t alive.” Von Braun had died, full of years and honor, seven years earlier. If von Braun had been alive in 1984, with his public fame and political clout intact, he would have come to the defense of Rudolph and probably won the case.
Neufeld condemns von Braun for his collaboration with the SS, and condemns the US government for covering up the evidence of hiscollaboration. Here I beg to differ with the author. War is an inherently immoral activity. Even the best of wars involves crimes and atrocities, and every citizen who takes part in war is to some extent collaborating with criminals. I should here declare my own interest in this debate. In my work for the RAF Bomber Command, I was collaborating with people who planned the destruction of Dresden in February 1945, a notorious calamity in which many thousands of
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