have reached enemy before 18/11. This very satisfactory and completely justifies care and trouble taken. LAMBERT still in touch but doubt further utility.
In November 1941 the network in Cairo appeared on the verge of collapse because of lack of promised funds and George Khouriâs (authentic) internment. Nicossof protested that he was merely the radio operator, unable to recruit and pay for agents, and himself heavily in debt. SIME had anticipated that after CRUSADER his value to the enemy would diminish, but despite having been patently wrong, his standing appeared initially to be unaffected. This created a further opportunity to be exploited, but exacerbated the problem of Nicossofâs finding. Without sufficient cash, it was hardly credible that the improvident spy would continue to put his life at risk for an ungrateful employer. This issue had been considered several times, but SIME had assumed that Nicossof would be abandoned after the full scale of the CRUSADER debacle emerged, and the general view was that this sacrifice was probably worthwhile. Now the priority was to support Nicossof by transferring any blame to Nicossofâs unreliable informants (whom he had been unable to pay) and assist the enemy by providing a suitable channel for passing the money he demanded. One reassurance was a message sent on 18 December promising that more than enough money had been in a neutral country âfor a long timeâ although there was no explanation for what had happened to it.
One obstacle was some evidence which emerged in TRIANGLE traffic in November 1941 and again January 1942 that Nicossof had come under suspicion and the Abwehr had begun to lose confidence in an agent codenamed ROBERTO , an individual who strongly resembled CHEESE . The first sign of trouble was a text which included the ominous comment that âthe intrusion of the enemy Intelligence Service into the ROBERTO network is becoming clearer and clearer.â
As well as the TRIANGLE material, there was other evidence of German suspicions. SIME noted âafter the New Year message of good wishes, there was a marked changeâ.
The enemy frequently failed to reply to, or even acknowledge our signals, and contact was seldom established more than once a week. His messages showed far less interest in military matters, and few questions were asked on military subjects. Traffic continued sporadically on the subject of the money which was said to be on its way, but enemy messages were such as to lead us to suspect that traps were being set. It was for instance proposed that the enemy should send the money to Istanbul and we should send someone to fetch it. This looked very like an attempt to kidnap a British agent on the Venlo pattern, or at least learn more of our organisation. We toyed with the suggestion over some messages, pleading lack of money for the journey and suggesting that we might find a âneutral merchantâ to act as an intermediary. A scheme was tentatively laid on for action at Istanbul, but the enemy appeared to lose interest, and it was not thought wise to persevere.
Perhaps because of this shadow cast over the channel, between 1 January and 25 June 1942, only three items of any significance were conveyed to the enemy. They were reports that an American aircraft factory was being planned to be constructed just outside Cairo; that American military personnel had been seen in Cairoâs streets, together with a description of three different shoulder-flashes; and the correct location of the GHQ Middle East building in Cairo. Requests for specific military information, such as the location of the 23rd Infantry Division and various Polish, Free French and colonial troops, and details of shipping in the Suez Canal, were simply ignored.
As an expedient on the issue of the factory, âenemy enquiries about site, capacity, etc. were first evaded then answered with the excuse that the agent who supplied the original
In November 1941 the network in Cairo appeared on the verge of collapse because of lack of promised funds and George Khouriâs (authentic) internment. Nicossof protested that he was merely the radio operator, unable to recruit and pay for agents, and himself heavily in debt. SIME had anticipated that after CRUSADER his value to the enemy would diminish, but despite having been patently wrong, his standing appeared initially to be unaffected. This created a further opportunity to be exploited, but exacerbated the problem of Nicossofâs finding. Without sufficient cash, it was hardly credible that the improvident spy would continue to put his life at risk for an ungrateful employer. This issue had been considered several times, but SIME had assumed that Nicossof would be abandoned after the full scale of the CRUSADER debacle emerged, and the general view was that this sacrifice was probably worthwhile. Now the priority was to support Nicossof by transferring any blame to Nicossofâs unreliable informants (whom he had been unable to pay) and assist the enemy by providing a suitable channel for passing the money he demanded. One reassurance was a message sent on 18 December promising that more than enough money had been in a neutral country âfor a long timeâ although there was no explanation for what had happened to it.
One obstacle was some evidence which emerged in TRIANGLE traffic in November 1941 and again January 1942 that Nicossof had come under suspicion and the Abwehr had begun to lose confidence in an agent codenamed ROBERTO , an individual who strongly resembled CHEESE . The first sign of trouble was a text which included the ominous comment that âthe intrusion of the enemy Intelligence Service into the ROBERTO network is becoming clearer and clearer.â
As well as the TRIANGLE material, there was other evidence of German suspicions. SIME noted âafter the New Year message of good wishes, there was a marked changeâ.
The enemy frequently failed to reply to, or even acknowledge our signals, and contact was seldom established more than once a week. His messages showed far less interest in military matters, and few questions were asked on military subjects. Traffic continued sporadically on the subject of the money which was said to be on its way, but enemy messages were such as to lead us to suspect that traps were being set. It was for instance proposed that the enemy should send the money to Istanbul and we should send someone to fetch it. This looked very like an attempt to kidnap a British agent on the Venlo pattern, or at least learn more of our organisation. We toyed with the suggestion over some messages, pleading lack of money for the journey and suggesting that we might find a âneutral merchantâ to act as an intermediary. A scheme was tentatively laid on for action at Istanbul, but the enemy appeared to lose interest, and it was not thought wise to persevere.
Perhaps because of this shadow cast over the channel, between 1 January and 25 June 1942, only three items of any significance were conveyed to the enemy. They were reports that an American aircraft factory was being planned to be constructed just outside Cairo; that American military personnel had been seen in Cairoâs streets, together with a description of three different shoulder-flashes; and the correct location of the GHQ Middle East building in Cairo. Requests for specific military information, such as the location of the 23rd Infantry Division and various Polish, Free French and colonial troops, and details of shipping in the Suez Canal, were simply ignored.
As an expedient on the issue of the factory, âenemy enquiries about site, capacity, etc. were first evaded then answered with the excuse that the agent who supplied the original
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