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Authors: Peter Tsouras
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made with the convoy, the battle groups would destroy its cruiser escort. Thereafter, the merchant ships would be at their mercy either to be sunk or escorted back to Norwegian ports as German prizes. Tankers were high on the list of ships to be captured.
Dönitz emphasized that contact with a surface force of equal or superior size was to be completely avoided. The fleet would rely on the Luftwaffe to give warning of the approach of any such force. U-boats would deploy to attack any such force. 6
Göring was the first to speak, almost eagerly. ‘I shall guarantee you that Luftflotte 5 will conduct reconnaissance to 500 kilometres [approx. 300 miles].’ Hitler nodded his approval. Dönitz glanced between them and caught the subtle body language. So the Führer did have his little talk with Goring. Heydrich had told him how much the Reichsmarschall had been embarrassed by the revelation that the British had been reading the Luftwaffe’s mail. Well, it was to the Kriegsmarine’s advantage that he now wanted to overcompensate. 7
Now Hitler spoke:
Yes, yes, Dönitz. I agree that contact with large British naval forces is to be absolutely avoided. But do not forget the aircraft carriers. They are a great threat to your ships. I tell you that the aircraft carriers must be located before the attack and they must be rendered harmless by our aircraft beforehand. 8
Dönitz was prepared for this:
Mein Führer, rest assured we have given much thought to keeping the British focused elsewhere. Before the operation we shall let the British learn that Battlegroup 3 is preparing to foray into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait. 9
The Admiralty, London, 18 June 1942
The message from the British naval attaché in Stockholm, Henry Denham, hit the Admiralty like a bombshell. He warned that the Germans were preparing a major fleet action to destroy PQ-17. All seven major German ships, two light cruisers, three destroyers, several E-boat squadrons, six U-boat flotillas and a strongly reinforced Luftwaffe contingent would take part. It was clearly an all-out effort.
What made the report so convincing was that Denham classified it A3, one of the highest grades, which meant the source was absolutely reliable and the information most probably true. That source was an officer in the Royal Swedish Navy who had given the same reliable information when Bismarck sortied in 1941. What Denham did not know was that the Swedes had tapped the landlines that the Germans ran to Norway. 10
This information forced a reappraisal of the defence of the convoy. Admiral Pound believed the risk to the convoy too great to proceed. Churchill at a conference with his senior naval commanders demanded that the convoy proceed despite the risk. ‘Risk’, he said, ‘is in the blood of the Royal Navy. What better way to finish off the Germans than with a decisive battle. Their fleet in being keeps far too many ships in home waters, ships that could better be used elsewhere, especially in the Mediterranean and Pacific.’
Churchill was not aware of the tension between Pound and Tovey. They had been discussing the tactics to be used in defending the convoy. Tovey put the proverbial skunk up on the table.
‘If the Tirpitz catches up with it under favourable conditions, the convoy is sure to be destroyed. I want permission to turn the convoy around if Tirpitz makes a show of it so that the Home Fleet can protect it.’ He had in mind also that the Home Fleet, except in emergency, was forbidden to get within range of the Luftwaffe. Nor was it able to escort the convoy all the way to Russia.
‘No, absolutely not,’ Pound said. ‘I intend, instead, to scatter the convoy should the Tirpitz be on the prowl.’
Tovey was aghast. ‘But that would be sheer, bloody murder.’ But the First Sea Lord was adamant.
At the conference Pound was clearly not happy at the Prime Minister’s insistence on a decisive battle. But Churchill looked at Tovey, whose command of
Dönitz emphasized that contact with a surface force of equal or superior size was to be completely avoided. The fleet would rely on the Luftwaffe to give warning of the approach of any such force. U-boats would deploy to attack any such force. 6
Göring was the first to speak, almost eagerly. ‘I shall guarantee you that Luftflotte 5 will conduct reconnaissance to 500 kilometres [approx. 300 miles].’ Hitler nodded his approval. Dönitz glanced between them and caught the subtle body language. So the Führer did have his little talk with Goring. Heydrich had told him how much the Reichsmarschall had been embarrassed by the revelation that the British had been reading the Luftwaffe’s mail. Well, it was to the Kriegsmarine’s advantage that he now wanted to overcompensate. 7
Now Hitler spoke:
Yes, yes, Dönitz. I agree that contact with large British naval forces is to be absolutely avoided. But do not forget the aircraft carriers. They are a great threat to your ships. I tell you that the aircraft carriers must be located before the attack and they must be rendered harmless by our aircraft beforehand. 8
Dönitz was prepared for this:
Mein Führer, rest assured we have given much thought to keeping the British focused elsewhere. Before the operation we shall let the British learn that Battlegroup 3 is preparing to foray into the Atlantic through the Denmark Strait. 9
The Admiralty, London, 18 June 1942
The message from the British naval attaché in Stockholm, Henry Denham, hit the Admiralty like a bombshell. He warned that the Germans were preparing a major fleet action to destroy PQ-17. All seven major German ships, two light cruisers, three destroyers, several E-boat squadrons, six U-boat flotillas and a strongly reinforced Luftwaffe contingent would take part. It was clearly an all-out effort.
What made the report so convincing was that Denham classified it A3, one of the highest grades, which meant the source was absolutely reliable and the information most probably true. That source was an officer in the Royal Swedish Navy who had given the same reliable information when Bismarck sortied in 1941. What Denham did not know was that the Swedes had tapped the landlines that the Germans ran to Norway. 10
This information forced a reappraisal of the defence of the convoy. Admiral Pound believed the risk to the convoy too great to proceed. Churchill at a conference with his senior naval commanders demanded that the convoy proceed despite the risk. ‘Risk’, he said, ‘is in the blood of the Royal Navy. What better way to finish off the Germans than with a decisive battle. Their fleet in being keeps far too many ships in home waters, ships that could better be used elsewhere, especially in the Mediterranean and Pacific.’
Churchill was not aware of the tension between Pound and Tovey. They had been discussing the tactics to be used in defending the convoy. Tovey put the proverbial skunk up on the table.
‘If the Tirpitz catches up with it under favourable conditions, the convoy is sure to be destroyed. I want permission to turn the convoy around if Tirpitz makes a show of it so that the Home Fleet can protect it.’ He had in mind also that the Home Fleet, except in emergency, was forbidden to get within range of the Luftwaffe. Nor was it able to escort the convoy all the way to Russia.
‘No, absolutely not,’ Pound said. ‘I intend, instead, to scatter the convoy should the Tirpitz be on the prowl.’
Tovey was aghast. ‘But that would be sheer, bloody murder.’ But the First Sea Lord was adamant.
At the conference Pound was clearly not happy at the Prime Minister’s insistence on a decisive battle. But Churchill looked at Tovey, whose command of
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