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Authors: Hans-Hermann Hoppe
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also Mises, Human Action, pp. 863-64.
16 On the lengthy historical process of the acquisition of government power, and the primacy of monarchical rule, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), esp. chap. 10; idem, On Power: The Natural History of its Growth (New York: Viking, 1949); idem, "The Principate" in idem, The Nature of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 1987); Riistow, Freedom and Domination, esp. pp. 101-05.
17 On the ubiquity of natural authority see de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, chap. 2.
All that was needed [for the formation of associations] was that some one man should feel within him a natural ascendancy and should then inspire others with trust in himself. . . . when we can see every day associations forming all around us, why should we imagine them forming in the distant past in some different way? What makes leaders, now as always, is natural ascendancy-—authority as such. We see them arising under our very eyes whenever there is a rescue to organize or a fire to put out. (pp. 31-32)
These two forms of government—private or public ownership of government (monarchy or democracy)—have systematically different effects on social time preference and the attendant process of civilization, and with the transition from personal (monarchical) to democratic (public) rule in particular, contrary to conventional wisdom, the decivilizing forces inherent in any form of government are systematically strengthened. 18
The defining characteristic of private government ownership and the reason for a personal ruler's relatively lower degree of time preference (as compared to criminals and democratic governments) is that the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation are individually owned. The expropriated resources are added to the ruler's private estate and treated as if they were a part of it, and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation is attached as a title to this estate and leads to an instant increase in its present value ("capitalization" of monopoly profit). Most importantly, as the private owner of the government estate, the ruler is entitled to pass his possessions on to his personal heir. He may sell, rent, or give away part or all of his privileged estate (and privately pocket the receipts from the sale or rental), and he may personally appoint or dismiss every administrator and employee of his estate. 19
And on the transition from authority to power, de Jouvenel goeson to say: Power, however, is something very different from authority. The distinguishing mark of the latter is that it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it: if the rulers have authority over only a part of their subjects, they may receive from that part a strength sufficient to subject the others to their power Authority ends where voluntary assent ends. There is in every state a margin of obedience which is won only by the use of force or the threat of force: it is this margin which breaches liberty and demonstrates the failure of authority. Among free peoples it is a very small margin, because there authority is very great, (pp. 32-33)
18 See on the following also the literature on the "tragedy of the commons," e.g., Managing The Commons, Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977). See also Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993).
The institution of private government ownership systematically shapes the incentive structure confronting the ruler and distinctly influences his conduct of government affairs. Assuming no more than self-interest, the ruler tries to maximize his total wealth, i.e., the present value of his estate and his current income. He would not want to increase current income at the expense of a more than proportional drop in the present value of his assets. Furthermore, because acts of
16 On the lengthy historical process of the acquisition of government power, and the primacy of monarchical rule, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), esp. chap. 10; idem, On Power: The Natural History of its Growth (New York: Viking, 1949); idem, "The Principate" in idem, The Nature of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 1987); Riistow, Freedom and Domination, esp. pp. 101-05.
17 On the ubiquity of natural authority see de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, chap. 2.
All that was needed [for the formation of associations] was that some one man should feel within him a natural ascendancy and should then inspire others with trust in himself. . . . when we can see every day associations forming all around us, why should we imagine them forming in the distant past in some different way? What makes leaders, now as always, is natural ascendancy-—authority as such. We see them arising under our very eyes whenever there is a rescue to organize or a fire to put out. (pp. 31-32)
These two forms of government—private or public ownership of government (monarchy or democracy)—have systematically different effects on social time preference and the attendant process of civilization, and with the transition from personal (monarchical) to democratic (public) rule in particular, contrary to conventional wisdom, the decivilizing forces inherent in any form of government are systematically strengthened. 18
The defining characteristic of private government ownership and the reason for a personal ruler's relatively lower degree of time preference (as compared to criminals and democratic governments) is that the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation are individually owned. The expropriated resources are added to the ruler's private estate and treated as if they were a part of it, and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation is attached as a title to this estate and leads to an instant increase in its present value ("capitalization" of monopoly profit). Most importantly, as the private owner of the government estate, the ruler is entitled to pass his possessions on to his personal heir. He may sell, rent, or give away part or all of his privileged estate (and privately pocket the receipts from the sale or rental), and he may personally appoint or dismiss every administrator and employee of his estate. 19
And on the transition from authority to power, de Jouvenel goeson to say: Power, however, is something very different from authority. The distinguishing mark of the latter is that it is exercised only over those who voluntarily accept it: if the rulers have authority over only a part of their subjects, they may receive from that part a strength sufficient to subject the others to their power Authority ends where voluntary assent ends. There is in every state a margin of obedience which is won only by the use of force or the threat of force: it is this margin which breaches liberty and demonstrates the failure of authority. Among free peoples it is a very small margin, because there authority is very great, (pp. 32-33)
18 See on the following also the literature on the "tragedy of the commons," e.g., Managing The Commons, Garrett Hardin and John Baden, eds. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977). See also Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993).
The institution of private government ownership systematically shapes the incentive structure confronting the ruler and distinctly influences his conduct of government affairs. Assuming no more than self-interest, the ruler tries to maximize his total wealth, i.e., the present value of his estate and his current income. He would not want to increase current income at the expense of a more than proportional drop in the present value of his assets. Furthermore, because acts of
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