Read Online Defection Games (Dan Gordon Intelligence Thriller) by Haggai Carmon - Free Book Online
Authors: Haggai Carmon
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looked like it had been mailed from Dubai City. Which is exactly where I was headed.
There was also a third letter, received at the Consulate very recently. I looked my copy. Like the previous two, its envelope had had no return address. The third letter consisted of just one line: "PO Box 7233-11 Dubai.”
I was familiar with that security procedure. The first letter mentions only a general intention; the second includes the actual approach; while the third letter includes just a POB address with nothing else. Only the intended recipient can link the letters, or someone who hijacks all of them, a lower probability.
The second letter had read:
Attention CIA station manager:
Sir, I am an Iranian national scientist working in one of my country's nuclear development centers. Pardon me for not identifying myself as I have already taken significant risks just by writing this letter. I wish to leave Iran and relocate to the U.S I maintain substantial nonpublic information on Iran's nuclear arms development, which I am willing to disclose in return for American citizenship and a suitable job and housing for me and my family.
Thank you.
Refigh
Anonymous letters were often pranks, or, worse, traps—and therefore dangerous. Only rarely were they the real thing. My job was to see which it was: a prank, a trap, or—hopefully—the real thing.
Reviewing the letters, I identified a discrepancy. The initial letter was purportedly from a person who claimed to know the potential defector. However, the writer of the second letter claimed that he was the potential defector. That reminded me of questions posed to a doctor on a radio talk show purportedly for “a friend,” when the subject matter is too personal for the caller to admit that he’s in fact “the friend.”
Dubai. It would be my first time there. On the surface it was known as a banking and respectable regional center. However, below the surface it was also known as an international hotbed of money launderers, smugglers, and arms dealers. During my briefing I was shown evidence that it was teeming with mobsters—Indian, Asian, and Russian thugs; Arab terrorists; and Iranian government agents. Over the past few weeks, Eric, Paul, and Benny had given me even more information about Dubai: it also had, apparently, a whole lot of Iranian traders trying to broker arms deals. Dubai’s underground banking channels were used to transfer money for the 9/11 terrorists. Even A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, used Dubai to distribute his nuclear technology. And, according to Eric, Dubai was such a global rat’s nest that Dubai’s emir, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, had just recently vowed to honor U.N. sanctions against Iran. Apparently he was trying to make sure that Dubai didn’t wind up facing sanctions.
“Why?” I’d asked Eric, while we were in his office; I had just received my mission.
“Dubai is just across the bay from Iran. I think he finally understood the risks his City State was taking if it continued to allow embargoed goods to be shipped through Dubai to Iran. Most of the Dubai banks have announced that they will no longer be taking new business from Iranian banks. And worst of all, at least from the Iranian perspective, Dubai is cooperating with the United States to uncover dummy corporations used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and other governmental or private entities to import embargoed goods. It’s also harder now for an Iranian citizen to get a work visa, and the Dubai government is harassing arriving Iranian travelers by subjecting them to physical searches, even eye scanning. To by-pass embargo restrictions, Iran has started placing orders for some dual-purpose goods, which can be used for civilian as well as for military purposes, to be shipped through Dubai.”
According to Eric, there had recently been a case in which the Iranians attempted a circular transaction, placing an order through China to a European company
There was also a third letter, received at the Consulate very recently. I looked my copy. Like the previous two, its envelope had had no return address. The third letter consisted of just one line: "PO Box 7233-11 Dubai.”
I was familiar with that security procedure. The first letter mentions only a general intention; the second includes the actual approach; while the third letter includes just a POB address with nothing else. Only the intended recipient can link the letters, or someone who hijacks all of them, a lower probability.
The second letter had read:
Attention CIA station manager:
Sir, I am an Iranian national scientist working in one of my country's nuclear development centers. Pardon me for not identifying myself as I have already taken significant risks just by writing this letter. I wish to leave Iran and relocate to the U.S I maintain substantial nonpublic information on Iran's nuclear arms development, which I am willing to disclose in return for American citizenship and a suitable job and housing for me and my family.
Thank you.
Refigh
Anonymous letters were often pranks, or, worse, traps—and therefore dangerous. Only rarely were they the real thing. My job was to see which it was: a prank, a trap, or—hopefully—the real thing.
Reviewing the letters, I identified a discrepancy. The initial letter was purportedly from a person who claimed to know the potential defector. However, the writer of the second letter claimed that he was the potential defector. That reminded me of questions posed to a doctor on a radio talk show purportedly for “a friend,” when the subject matter is too personal for the caller to admit that he’s in fact “the friend.”
Dubai. It would be my first time there. On the surface it was known as a banking and respectable regional center. However, below the surface it was also known as an international hotbed of money launderers, smugglers, and arms dealers. During my briefing I was shown evidence that it was teeming with mobsters—Indian, Asian, and Russian thugs; Arab terrorists; and Iranian government agents. Over the past few weeks, Eric, Paul, and Benny had given me even more information about Dubai: it also had, apparently, a whole lot of Iranian traders trying to broker arms deals. Dubai’s underground banking channels were used to transfer money for the 9/11 terrorists. Even A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, used Dubai to distribute his nuclear technology. And, according to Eric, Dubai was such a global rat’s nest that Dubai’s emir, Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, had just recently vowed to honor U.N. sanctions against Iran. Apparently he was trying to make sure that Dubai didn’t wind up facing sanctions.
“Why?” I’d asked Eric, while we were in his office; I had just received my mission.
“Dubai is just across the bay from Iran. I think he finally understood the risks his City State was taking if it continued to allow embargoed goods to be shipped through Dubai to Iran. Most of the Dubai banks have announced that they will no longer be taking new business from Iranian banks. And worst of all, at least from the Iranian perspective, Dubai is cooperating with the United States to uncover dummy corporations used by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and other governmental or private entities to import embargoed goods. It’s also harder now for an Iranian citizen to get a work visa, and the Dubai government is harassing arriving Iranian travelers by subjecting them to physical searches, even eye scanning. To by-pass embargo restrictions, Iran has started placing orders for some dual-purpose goods, which can be used for civilian as well as for military purposes, to be shipped through Dubai.”
According to Eric, there had recently been a case in which the Iranians attempted a circular transaction, placing an order through China to a European company
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