Read Online Chasing Perfection: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the High-Stakes Game of Creating an NBA Champion by Andy Glockner - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Andy Glockner
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playing shorthanded and losing a tough game to LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, and the Heat, the Spurs were fined $250,000 by then-commissioner David Stern for violating league rules by resting players in a manner that was “contrary to thebest interests of the NBA.”
In a statement released by the league, Stern explained that “the result here is dictated by the totality of the facts in this case. The Spurs decided to make four of their top players unavailable for an early-season game that was the team’s only regular-season visit to Miami. The team also did this without informing the Heat, the media, or the league office in a timely way. Under these circumstances, I have concluded that the Spurs did a disservice to the league and our fans.”
Interestingly, it was James himself who triggered an initial discussion of the rights of a team to strategically rest its players when Cleveland sat him for four straight games late in the 2009–10 season to help him recover ahead of what was expected to be a lengthy playoff run. At a subsequent owners’ meeting in New York, Stern discussed the issue with his constituents and noted that there was “no conclusion reached, other than a number of teams thought it should be at the sole discretion of the team, the coach, the general manager, and I think it’s fair to say I agree with that, unless that discretion is abused.”
Since the Miami incident, the Spurs and Popovich have become more prudent in the way they strategically utilize their roster, but they continue to do so, and with good reason. At a base level, Popovich, general manager RC Buford, and their lieutenants do amasterful job of identifying players that will fit into the Spurs’ culture and basketball systems, and then Popovich is able to achieve the equally difficult task of maintaining their readiness throughout the season. That successful nexus is how the Spurs annually seem to have quality depth options at bargain prices. The Spurs typically still play well when they’re shorthanded, and research into the strategy—and the whole structure of the Spurs’ roster—illuminates just how they manage to pull that off.
In a November 2014 column at The Cauldron, Ian Levy looked at the way the Spurs handled their minutes during the 2013–14 season (one in which the Spurs ended up winning the NBA title after no one on the roster averaged more than thirty minutes a game during the regular season), and noted that, while the top four players on the Spurs played fewer minutes on average than their counterparts on other NBA teams, the rest of the roster (players five through twelve) playedmore minutes than average. Levy detailed this in the graphic shown below:
This in itself isn’t a surprise for a team that has older stars, quality depth that allows them to go deeper into their bench, and finds itself in a fair number of blowout wins, which means they can pull their best players earlier in the contest. What was much more compelling, though, was that the Spurs were getting significantly more impact from their deeper rotation players than the average NBA team. Levy charted a stat called “box plus-minus” (which measures a player’s approximate impact when he’s on the floor), against the players’ total minutes distributions, and painted a really interesting picture:
Levy’s second chart shows that the Spurs basically got the same composite level of production from their top three players as other NBA teams do. San Antonio’s top minutes guy (Duncan) was better overall than the NBA average while the second- and third-most heavy minutes guys (surprisingly, shooting guard Marco Belinelli and point guard Tony Parker) were slightly worse.
Look at the rest of that chart, though. Where the NBA at large sees a continued drop-off in on-court impact, with no average player from number four in minutes through the end of the bench evenhaving a positive box plus-minus rating, every single Spur from four through twelve was
In a statement released by the league, Stern explained that “the result here is dictated by the totality of the facts in this case. The Spurs decided to make four of their top players unavailable for an early-season game that was the team’s only regular-season visit to Miami. The team also did this without informing the Heat, the media, or the league office in a timely way. Under these circumstances, I have concluded that the Spurs did a disservice to the league and our fans.”
Interestingly, it was James himself who triggered an initial discussion of the rights of a team to strategically rest its players when Cleveland sat him for four straight games late in the 2009–10 season to help him recover ahead of what was expected to be a lengthy playoff run. At a subsequent owners’ meeting in New York, Stern discussed the issue with his constituents and noted that there was “no conclusion reached, other than a number of teams thought it should be at the sole discretion of the team, the coach, the general manager, and I think it’s fair to say I agree with that, unless that discretion is abused.”
Since the Miami incident, the Spurs and Popovich have become more prudent in the way they strategically utilize their roster, but they continue to do so, and with good reason. At a base level, Popovich, general manager RC Buford, and their lieutenants do amasterful job of identifying players that will fit into the Spurs’ culture and basketball systems, and then Popovich is able to achieve the equally difficult task of maintaining their readiness throughout the season. That successful nexus is how the Spurs annually seem to have quality depth options at bargain prices. The Spurs typically still play well when they’re shorthanded, and research into the strategy—and the whole structure of the Spurs’ roster—illuminates just how they manage to pull that off.
In a November 2014 column at The Cauldron, Ian Levy looked at the way the Spurs handled their minutes during the 2013–14 season (one in which the Spurs ended up winning the NBA title after no one on the roster averaged more than thirty minutes a game during the regular season), and noted that, while the top four players on the Spurs played fewer minutes on average than their counterparts on other NBA teams, the rest of the roster (players five through twelve) playedmore minutes than average. Levy detailed this in the graphic shown below:
This in itself isn’t a surprise for a team that has older stars, quality depth that allows them to go deeper into their bench, and finds itself in a fair number of blowout wins, which means they can pull their best players earlier in the contest. What was much more compelling, though, was that the Spurs were getting significantly more impact from their deeper rotation players than the average NBA team. Levy charted a stat called “box plus-minus” (which measures a player’s approximate impact when he’s on the floor), against the players’ total minutes distributions, and painted a really interesting picture:
Levy’s second chart shows that the Spurs basically got the same composite level of production from their top three players as other NBA teams do. San Antonio’s top minutes guy (Duncan) was better overall than the NBA average while the second- and third-most heavy minutes guys (surprisingly, shooting guard Marco Belinelli and point guard Tony Parker) were slightly worse.
Look at the rest of that chart, though. Where the NBA at large sees a continued drop-off in on-court impact, with no average player from number four in minutes through the end of the bench evenhaving a positive box plus-minus rating, every single Spur from four through twelve was
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