Read Online Call Sign Extortion 17 by Don Brown - Free Book Online Page B

2011, nine days after the fatal crash, officers testifying under oath offered the Colt Report’s only glimpse into the key questions surrounding the seven unidentified Afghans in Exhibit 1, at page 118. Remember, as a roadmap has keys, so does the Colt Report.
    IO-­DEP was the deputy investigating officer, the principal officer assisting General Colt in the investigation of the shoot-­down. General Colt was the investigating officer. The deputy investigating officer was the guy doing a lot of the “heavy lifting,” so to speak, by asking a large number of questions on the record.
    JSOTF J3 was the joint/combined operations officer for the Joint Services Theater of Operations. This title was often shortened to “J3,” or the “operations officer.”
    JSOTF CDR was the commander for the Joint Services Theater of Operations. This officer was ranked above the JSOTF J3. Put another way, this officer was the J3 or the operations officer’s boss. This officer is also not specifically named in the report.
    Note how the operations officer (J3) brings up the topic of the unidentified Afghans, and note how quickly his boss, the JSOTF commander, cuts him off and changes the subject:
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    IO-­DEP: Was there a manifest for that aircraft back at the—
    JSOTF J3 (Operations Officer): Yes, sir. And I’m sure you know by now the manifest was accurate with the exception of the [Afghan] personnel that were on. So the [Afghan] personnel, they were the incorrect—all seven names were incorrect. And I cannot talk to the back story of why, but—
    JSOTF CDR: But the bottom line is: We knew the total number that were on the aircraft. We knew the total number that we were trying to account for on the ground.
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    In the interest of full disclosure, the word “Afghan” had been redacted from the initial written report as shown above when originally released by the Navy to the families, perhaps to reduce the types of questions about be asked in this book and by others wanting answers. The word has been reinserted for our purposes here, to make the testimony easier to follow. But junior- and senior-­level US Navy and Army officials as well as others have repeatedly admitted to Extortion 17 family members that seven unidentified Afghans boarded the aircraft.
    Now in analyzing the portion of the testimony on the unidentified Afghans, note how the J3, the operations officer, basically said that the manifest was accurate except for the seven Afghans. The names were incorrect because seven other Afghans had been assigned for the mission, but were mysteriously switched out at the last second.
    Note too, how the JSOTF commander abruptly cut off the operations officer midsentence when the operations officer started talking about possible reasons for the switch-­out.
    Again, the operations officer said, “So the [Afghan] personnel, they were the incorrect—all seven names were incorrect. And I cannot talk to the back story of why, but—”
    The commander then cuts him off midstream, interjecting his own “but” midsentence, and goes on to give his “bottom line” analysis.
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    JSOTF CDR: But the bottom line is: We knew the total number that were on the aircraft. We knew the total number that we were trying to account for on the ground.
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    The commander clearly wanted no part of an extended conversation on the record about the Afghans, and immediately changed the subject.
    But the cat was now out of the bag, and the needle was now in the haystack. It would take a while before that needle—the fleeting reference to the Afghan infiltrators—was found, but later, with the help of a senior sergeant major in the US Army who cared about the truth and who apparently didn’t care much about political correctness, it would be found.
    Consider just how important the issue of passenger manifest accuracy is to the military. The requirement for accuracy is