Read Online Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad by Tony Geraghty - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Tony Geraghty
Tags: History, Military, Political Science, special forces, Political Freedom & Security, Intelligence
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officer who took part in Eagle Claw, suggests that MC-130 Combat Talon pathfinder aircraft should have led the helicopters safely to the target, as they did in the Son Tay raid. They were on the scene and might even have passed within sight of the ill-fated Sea Stallions.
There was another problem. Navigation equipment that would have helped blind-flying was removed to reduce weight. “Thus,” writes Carney, “they were literally flying blind and could not advise one another of the actual weather conditions, which were much more benign than the pilots believed…. The [Marine] pilots should have broken radio silence for a second or two to query the Combat Talons, regain their bearings, and find better weather.” According to Beckwith, high command suggested following these technical failures that he should proceed with five helicopters. The sinister implication of that was that Delta would be obliged to dump as many as twenty of its own at Desert One. As Beckwith put it: “In a tight mission, no one is expendable before you begin! [his emphasis]. Which twenty would I leave?” 64
Other factors were at work to undermine the mission. Feuding between the CIA, then headed by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and the National Security Agency prompted fears among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a loss of security. NSA was headed by a Vice Admiral, Bobby Ray Inman, and had been excluded from the prolonged planning for Desert One. In spite of that, NSA got wind of what was going on as a result of insecure communications by some of the planners. Inman, in charge of NSA, later suggested that Air Force General David C. Jones, JCS chairman, “was so stunned by the potential of blowing the security at the beginning that he imposed awesome communications security constraints and it probably directly impacted on the readiness of the forces. The fact that the helicopters were put on carriers, sent for five weeks, never flown until they left the carrier, all of this out of concern that they would be detected in the process…” along with total radio silence, lack of pre-mission helicopter training, and the choppers’ condition after they sat unused on the carrier deck for so long all contributed to the disaster. 65
To abort the operation rather than write off twenty men was a bitter decision for Beckwith, but it was, at least, one that did not reinforce a calamity in the making, a calamity that might have resulted in the deaths of many of the hostages as well as their would-be rescuers. Beckwith’s choice required moral courage as well as military cool. Yet fate had one last evil card to play. As Admiral James Holloway put it, in laconic, deadpan language: “While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight, the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C-130s. Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were injured. Since the C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shortly afterwards, ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode. Several helicopters were struck by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition, and at least one and possibly more were rendered non-flyable. At this point, with time and fuel running out for the C-130s, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s and to depart the area.”
The Iranians, remarkably, were able to recover several of the grounded Navy helicopters intact. Holloway reported:
“ Destruct devices on mission rescue helicopters: Helicopter No. 6 developed mechanical problems en route to Desert One and landed in the desert short of destination. Ground personnel tasked with responsibility for helicopter destruction were not available. An unforeseen accident and ensuing
There was another problem. Navigation equipment that would have helped blind-flying was removed to reduce weight. “Thus,” writes Carney, “they were literally flying blind and could not advise one another of the actual weather conditions, which were much more benign than the pilots believed…. The [Marine] pilots should have broken radio silence for a second or two to query the Combat Talons, regain their bearings, and find better weather.” According to Beckwith, high command suggested following these technical failures that he should proceed with five helicopters. The sinister implication of that was that Delta would be obliged to dump as many as twenty of its own at Desert One. As Beckwith put it: “In a tight mission, no one is expendable before you begin! [his emphasis]. Which twenty would I leave?” 64
Other factors were at work to undermine the mission. Feuding between the CIA, then headed by Admiral Stansfield Turner, and the National Security Agency prompted fears among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a loss of security. NSA was headed by a Vice Admiral, Bobby Ray Inman, and had been excluded from the prolonged planning for Desert One. In spite of that, NSA got wind of what was going on as a result of insecure communications by some of the planners. Inman, in charge of NSA, later suggested that Air Force General David C. Jones, JCS chairman, “was so stunned by the potential of blowing the security at the beginning that he imposed awesome communications security constraints and it probably directly impacted on the readiness of the forces. The fact that the helicopters were put on carriers, sent for five weeks, never flown until they left the carrier, all of this out of concern that they would be detected in the process…” along with total radio silence, lack of pre-mission helicopter training, and the choppers’ condition after they sat unused on the carrier deck for so long all contributed to the disaster. 65
To abort the operation rather than write off twenty men was a bitter decision for Beckwith, but it was, at least, one that did not reinforce a calamity in the making, a calamity that might have resulted in the deaths of many of the hostages as well as their would-be rescuers. Beckwith’s choice required moral courage as well as military cool. Yet fate had one last evil card to play. As Admiral James Holloway put it, in laconic, deadpan language: “While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight, the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C-130s. Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were injured. Since the C-130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shortly afterwards, ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode. Several helicopters were struck by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition, and at least one and possibly more were rendered non-flyable. At this point, with time and fuel running out for the C-130s, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C-130s and to depart the area.”
The Iranians, remarkably, were able to recover several of the grounded Navy helicopters intact. Holloway reported:
“ Destruct devices on mission rescue helicopters: Helicopter No. 6 developed mechanical problems en route to Desert One and landed in the desert short of destination. Ground personnel tasked with responsibility for helicopter destruction were not available. An unforeseen accident and ensuing
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