Read Online Black Ops: The Rise of Special Forces in the C.I.A., the S.A.S., and Mossad by Tony Geraghty - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Tony Geraghty
Tags: History, Military, Political Science, special forces, Political Freedom & Security, Intelligence
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aircraft. The crew was picked [up] by another helicopter, which then continued the mission individually.
“Approximately one hour thereafter, the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust cloud of unknown size and density. The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust but, within an hour, entered a second, larger and denser area. While attempting to navigate through this second area with severely degraded visibility, a second helicopter (No. 5) experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments. Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe flight extremely questionable, the helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue. He aborted the mission, reversed course, and recovered on Nimitz . Eventually six of the original eight helicopters arrived at the refueling site in intervals between approximately 50 minutes and 85 minutes later than planned.
“While en route, a third helicopter (No. 2) experienced a partial hydraulic failure, but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site believing repairs could be accomplished there. Upon landing, however, the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter could not be repaired. A hydraulic pump had failed due to a fluid leak, and no replacement pump was available. Even if a pump had been immediately available, there was insufficient time to change it, repair the cause of the leak, service the system, and complete the next leg prior to daylight. The helicopter was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired.
“Earlier, it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to continue the mission. Since at this point there were only five operational, the on-scene commander advised COMJTF [Commander, Joint Task Force] by radio of the situation, and he in turn communicated to Washington the status of the force and his intention to abort the operation and return to launch base. The President concurred in the decision that the mission could not continue, and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters, the C-130s, and the rescue force.” 63
The first helicopters to arrive would have had no trouble in spotting Desert One. This was not because a CIA-contract pilot, at great risk, had landed there in a Twin Otter aircraft a month before to plant infrared landing lights to be activated as the task force approached. By the time the helos arrived, the scene was illuminated by a blazing road tanker, a sign that on the ground as well as in the air, the operation was already compromised. The element of chance—bad luck—struck almost as soon as Delta landed. Beckwith spotted a Mercedes bus approaching the landing zone, ordered his men to halt it and, leading by example, fired at its tyres. Some 45 passengers, most of them women and children, clambered out, bewildered. One who spoke English asked the black Ranger guarding her where the armed men came from. “We’re African commandos,” he joked.
The next civilian vehicle to blunder into what was, by now, a war zone was the fuel tanker. One of Beckwith’s team fired an anti-tank missile at it. The tanker exploded and burned for hours, illuminating the runway, the waiting aircraft, and the herded bus passengers. The tanker was accompanied by a smaller vehicle which paused long enough for the tanker driver to escape into the darkness on foot. Eagle Claw had now been compromised on the ground three ways within, perhaps, 30 minutes.
Speculation continues, thirty years later, that sand filters to protect the helicopter engines had been removed to reduce weight and increase range. The hazard of dust in the desert is no novelty. If this was a factor in the calamity that followed, Beckwith did not address it in his account. Nor did the unclassified version of the Holloway report. But Colonel John T. Carney, Jr., an Air Force Special Operations
“Approximately one hour thereafter, the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust cloud of unknown size and density. The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust but, within an hour, entered a second, larger and denser area. While attempting to navigate through this second area with severely degraded visibility, a second helicopter (No. 5) experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments. Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe flight extremely questionable, the helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue. He aborted the mission, reversed course, and recovered on Nimitz . Eventually six of the original eight helicopters arrived at the refueling site in intervals between approximately 50 minutes and 85 minutes later than planned.
“While en route, a third helicopter (No. 2) experienced a partial hydraulic failure, but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site believing repairs could be accomplished there. Upon landing, however, the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter could not be repaired. A hydraulic pump had failed due to a fluid leak, and no replacement pump was available. Even if a pump had been immediately available, there was insufficient time to change it, repair the cause of the leak, service the system, and complete the next leg prior to daylight. The helicopter was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired.
“Earlier, it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to continue the mission. Since at this point there were only five operational, the on-scene commander advised COMJTF [Commander, Joint Task Force] by radio of the situation, and he in turn communicated to Washington the status of the force and his intention to abort the operation and return to launch base. The President concurred in the decision that the mission could not continue, and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters, the C-130s, and the rescue force.” 63
The first helicopters to arrive would have had no trouble in spotting Desert One. This was not because a CIA-contract pilot, at great risk, had landed there in a Twin Otter aircraft a month before to plant infrared landing lights to be activated as the task force approached. By the time the helos arrived, the scene was illuminated by a blazing road tanker, a sign that on the ground as well as in the air, the operation was already compromised. The element of chance—bad luck—struck almost as soon as Delta landed. Beckwith spotted a Mercedes bus approaching the landing zone, ordered his men to halt it and, leading by example, fired at its tyres. Some 45 passengers, most of them women and children, clambered out, bewildered. One who spoke English asked the black Ranger guarding her where the armed men came from. “We’re African commandos,” he joked.
The next civilian vehicle to blunder into what was, by now, a war zone was the fuel tanker. One of Beckwith’s team fired an anti-tank missile at it. The tanker exploded and burned for hours, illuminating the runway, the waiting aircraft, and the herded bus passengers. The tanker was accompanied by a smaller vehicle which paused long enough for the tanker driver to escape into the darkness on foot. Eagle Claw had now been compromised on the ground three ways within, perhaps, 30 minutes.
Speculation continues, thirty years later, that sand filters to protect the helicopter engines had been removed to reduce weight and increase range. The hazard of dust in the desert is no novelty. If this was a factor in the calamity that followed, Beckwith did not address it in his account. Nor did the unclassified version of the Holloway report. But Colonel John T. Carney, Jr., an Air Force Special Operations
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